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Trademark law's functionality doctrine is a mess, and the responsibility
for this mess rests squarely with the United States Supreme Court. In
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
intervened to resolve a minor split on a secondary functionality issue,2 and
proceeded to recast the entire law of functionality. In so doing, the Court
summarily rejected the general functionality standard used by every circuit
court of appeals prior to the TrafFix decision. The TrafFix Court simply
declared the existing law "incorrect," 3 and replaced it with an unwieldy,
unjustified, and unworkable set of rules.
The mess created by the TrafFix Court is troublesome. The
functionality doctrine is perhaps the most important limitation on
1. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
2. See id. at 28.
3. Id. at 33.
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trademark protection for product configurations and packaging. A
functional product feature cannot be protected as a trademark.' This
statement of black letter law illustrates both the importance and the crux
ofthe difficulty posed by the functionality doctrine. It is important because
how we define functionality will directly affect the range of symbols that
may be protected as trademarks. It is difficult because persons with
different views on the propriety of trademark protection for attributes such
as product configuration or product color are likely to push for different
functionality standards. In the TrafFix decision, the Court rejected a
competition-based definition of functionality,6 but failed to provide a clear
alternative definition.
Within one year of the TrafFix decision, the lower federal courts
divided on the crucial question of what general functionality standard
should be used.7 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded

4. Some may disagree with this proposition, arguing instead that distinctiveness is a more
significant limitation on trademark protection. I view distinctiveness not as a limitation, but rather
as a definitional requirement. To be a trademark, a symbol must be distinctive. Nondistinctive
symbols are simply not trademarks, so it seems wrong to discuss distinctiveness as a limitation on
the scope of protection afforded to trademarks. Having made this clarification, I also believe that
distinctiveness should be a significant filtering requirement oftrademark law. See infra notes 50512 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., TrajFix, 532 U.S. at 29 ("[T]rade dress protection may not be claimed for
product features that are functional."); RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF UNFAIRCOMPETITION § 16 (1995)
(explaining that the configuration of a product or its packaging may be protected if it is distinctive
and not functional); 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:63 (4th ed. 2002).
6. See Tra]Fix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
7. See infraPart II.B. The TrafFixdecision also led to a good deal of commentary. See, e.g.,
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Directing TrafFix: A Comment on the Construction and Application of
Utility Patent Claims in Trade Dress Litigation, 54 FLA. L. REv. 229 (2002); Discussion, 2001
PanelDiscussion on CurrentIssues in TrademarkLaw-I'll See Your Two Pesos and Raise You...
Two Pesos, Wal-Mart... andTrafFix: Where Is US. Supreme CourtJurisprudenceHeading,and
How Will It Affect TrademarkPractitioners?,11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 509
(2001); William T. Fryer, III, TrademarkProductAppearanceFeatures,UnitedStates andForeign
ProtectionEvolution: A Need for Clarificationand Harmonization,34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 947
(2001); Joanne Hepburn, Caution: Roadblocks Ahead: Patent Revealing Traffic Sign Stand's
FunctionalityPrevents Trade Dress Protection,7 B.U. J.SCi. & TECH. L. 413 (2001); William P.
Kratzke, The Supreme Court and Trade Dress-A Short Comment, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 73 (2001); Doris Estelle Long, First, "Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawyers!":
Musings on the Decline and Fallof the IntellectualPropertyEmpire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851
(2001); Jeanne-Marie Marshall, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: A Step in the
Right Direction,91 TRADEMARK REP. 632 (2001); Jonathan E. Moskin, The Shape of Things to
Come-Emerging Theories of Design Protection, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 681 (2002); Robert P.
Renke, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: The Shrinking Scope of Product
Configuration Trade Dress, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 624 (2001); Kerry S. Taylor, Intellectual
Property: TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205 (2002);
Harold R. Weinberg, TrademarkLaw, FunctionalDesignFeatures,and the Trouble with TrafFix,
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that TrafFix did not change the general functionality standard.' This
reading is particularly significant because the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is bound by the decisions of the Federal Circuit
on such issues.9 The PTO, therefore, is still using a competition-based
functionality standard when evaluating applications to register
trademarks.'0 Other courts, however, have read TrajFix as radically
changing the law." These courts now equate functionality with utility, a
standard very
different from the competition-based standard in use prior
2
TrafFix.'
to
To appreciate the significance of this split, consider the shape of a
plastic spray bottle like the one used with Fantastik® cleaner or Spray 'N
Wash® laundry stain treatment. This bottle design was the subject of a
9 J. InTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2001); Timothy M. Barber, Comment, High Court Takes Right Turn in
TratFix, But Stops Short ofthe Finish Line: An Economic Critique of Trade Dress Protectionfor
Product Configuration, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 259 (2003); Michael Scott Fuller,
Casenote, An IP Conundrum: Can Patent Policy and Trade Dress Law Be Reconciled?, 6
COMPuTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 303 (2002); Keeley Canning Luhnow, Note, TrafFix Devices, Inc.
v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: The Problem with Trade DressProtectionfor Expired UtilityPatents,
I BUFF. INELL. PROP. L.J. 224 (2002); Alison Marcotte, Note, ConcurrentProtectionof Products
by Patent and Trade Dress: Use of the Functionality Doctrine in Marketing Displays, Inc. v.
TrafFix Devices, Inc., 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 327 (2001); Tracey McCormick, Note, Will TrafFix
"Fix" the SplinteredFunctionalityDoctrine?: TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
40 Hous. L. REv. 541 (2003); Nancy Sya, Comment, PresumedFunctional Until Rebutted: The
IncreasedDifficultyof ObtainingTrade DressProtectionwith an Expired UtilityPatent,43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 971 (2003).
8. Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("We do not
understand the Supreme Court's decision in Tra./Fixto have altered the Morton-Norwichanalysis.")
(referring to In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2000).
10. See, e.g., Newborn Bros. v. Dripless, Inc., No. 113,471 2002 TIAB LEXIS 537, at *21
(Trademark Trial App. B. Aug. 16,2002) ("As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
stated in [Valu Eng'g], the [TrajFTix] decision did not alter the Morton-Norwich analysis.").
11. One court changed a prior functionality ruling expressly because ofthe TralFixdecision.
In Antioch Co. v. .W. Trimming Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2002), the court
explained, "in light of the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix Devices, the Sixth Circuit's
competitive need test is no longer applicable." The court had "previously concluded that evidence
of alternative possible designs was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the
question of whether a competitive necessity supported the Defendant's use ofPlaintiff's trade dress
and, thus, whether that trade dress was functional." Id. at 640 n.4. After TrafFix, the court
reconsidered its prior ruling and concluded that the plaintiff's trade dress was functional. Id. at 641.
In reaching this conclusion, the court did "not consider whether alternative designs exist," id. at
640, a striking change from the functionality analysis conducted by the same court prior to the
TrafFix decision.
12. See, e.g., Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 03-2704, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
26430, at *13 (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003) ("TrajFix rejected an equation of functionality with
necessity; it is enough that the design be useful."); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter
GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) ("TrafFix supersedes the definition of functionality
previously adopted by this court.").
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trademark application filed in 1977.' In 1982, the Court of Claims and
Patent Appeals (CCPA) held that the bottle design was non-functional, and
therefore could be registered as a trademark if the applicant could show
the bottle design was distinctive."' The design was unquestionably useful,
but there was evidence that other bottle designs worked as well as the one
used by the applicant.' 5 Because the CCPA held that functionality must be
defined in terms of competitive need, the design was found to be nonfunctional. 6
If, however, functionality is equated with utility (i.e., the approach
taken by some courts after TrafFix),the applicant's bottle design would be
functional, and therefore, ineligible for trademark protection. Because of
the current division in the courts, it is likely that some product features
will be registered as trademarks, based on the competitive need standard
used by the PTO, but will be deemed functional, and thus unprotected, by
some courts. In fact, at least three federally registered trademarks have
been found functional in post-TrajFix decisions, including one decision
involving a well-known design logo used on athletic shoes.' In all three
13. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. filed U.S. Trademark Application No. 123,548 on April
12, 1977. Morton-NorwichProds.,671 F.2d at 1334. Morton-Norwich manufactured and sold a line
of household chemical products, like cleaners, spray starch, and insecticides. Id. Morton-Norwich
sold the following successful products: Fantastik® cleaner, Glass Plus®cleaner, Spray 'N Wash®
laundry pre-treatment and Grease ReliefS cleaner. Id Morton-Norwich no longer exists, but the
listed products do. The Morton-Norwich businesses were divided and subsequently acquired by
different entities. The product lines were sold to different companies. Fantastik® cleaner is
currently sold by S.C. Johnson, and Spray 'N Wash® laundry pre-treatment is sold by Reckitt
Benckiser, PLC.
14. Id. at 1342-43.
15. Id at 1342 ("[E]vidence, consisting of competitor's molded plastic bottles for similar
products, demonstrates that the same functions can be performed by a variety of other shapes with
no sacrifice of any functional advantage.").
16. The court reasoned:
[W]e do not see that allowing appellant to exclude others (upon proof of
distinctiveness) from using this trade dress will hinder competition or impinge
upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of the goods named in
the application, even to the extent of marketing them in functionally identical
spray containers.
Id.

17. In ASICS Corp. v. TargetCorp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030-31 (D. Minn. 2003), the
court held the stripe design used with ASICS athletic shoes to be functional and, thus, unprotectable
as a trademark. The court's functionality holding was based largely on a utility patent owned by
ASICS for a "skeleton-shaped carapace" design for an athletic shoe. Id. at 1026 (internal quotation
omitted). Because the ASICS Stripe Design trademark seemed to meet the requirements of part of
the claims from this patent, and because the design "actually does something," the court held that
ASICS' design trademark was functional. Id. at 1027-28, 1030-31. The court acknowledged
"ASICS [sic] exclusive use of its Stripe Design mark for over thirty-five years has not stopped
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cases, the registered trademarks probably would have been upheld if the
courts had used a competitive need functionality standard."
In this Article, I examine the development (i.e., the rise) and collapse
(i.e., the fall) of the functionality doctrine. I describe an important
common-law struggle, an effort that produced a coherent, workable
limitation on trademark protection for nontraditional product identifiers.
The doctrine produced by this struggle denied trademark protection to
product features necessary for free and vigorous competition. Such
features were deemed functional under this competitive need standard. 9
While the "functional" label may have been a bit misleading,2 ° the
competitive need standard was well-established in the federal courts when
TrafFix was decided. 2
competitors from effectively competing," but concluded the competitive need functionality standard
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Tral7ix. Id.at 1030-31 (internal quotation omitted). The
court's decision is troubling given the distinctiveness and value of the ASICS Stripe Design
trademark. I discuss the case, and the court's treatment of the patent issue, in more detail below.
See discussion infraPart II.B.2. The other two post-TrajFixdecisions involving federally registered
trademarks involved the round design ofHoneywell thermostats, Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int'l,
Inc., No. 03-2704, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26430 (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003), and the yellow color of
certain underground drainage tubing, Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d
720, 723-25 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
18. In all three cases, there was evidence of alternative designs that seemed to work as well
as the claimants' designs. ASICS Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 ("it is true that ASICS [sic]
exclusive use of its Stripe Design mark for over 35 years has not stopped competitors from
effectively competing" in the athletic shoe market (internal quotation omitted)); Eco Mfg. LLC v.
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-01 70-DFH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11384, at *57 (S.D. Ind. June
20, 2003) ("Honeywell also argues that there are many other shapes available for Eco to use in
making its mercury-free thermostat," but, based on Tra/Fix, the court held "that the availability of
other design possibilities.., does not defeat the functionality defense.") aff'd, Eco.Mfg. LLC, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 26430; Baughman Tile Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (acknowledging, but rejecting
as irrelevant, the plaintiff's evidence that other tubing colors would work as well as the yellow
color at issue in the case).
19. The competitive need standard did not require a showing of absolute necessity. There are,
after all, varying degrees of need. While the courts were not perfectly consistent in their use of the
competitive need standard, the focus was on the degree protection of a particular design would
impair or hinder competition. A feature was "needed" by competitors "if exclusive use of the
feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobsen Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). The inquiry focused on the ability of competitors to
compete effectively with the party claiming trademark rights in a particular product configuration
or feature. Id. This inquiry almost always involved an evaluation of alternative product designs. See
discussion infra Part I.C.2.
20. The term may be misleading in the sense that more than performance of a function was
required to render a feature "functional." The word "functional" was a term of art in trademark law.
See Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1337 (noting difference in lay and legal meaning of the
word "functional" and adopting the labels "de facto functional"--a feature that serves some
function-and "dejurefunctional"-a feature deemed legally functional and therefore outside the
scope of trademark protection).
21. See, e.g., William G. Barber, Recent Developments in TrademarkLaw: DisrobingTrade
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The functionality story I tell differs from the stories told by most
commentators. Where others have found division and confusion in the
courts, I find consistencies and trends toward a coherent doctrine. Where
others have focused primarily on modem cases, I present a careful review
of unfair competition cases from the early twentieth century and discover
important lessons from the early cases. The functionality story I tell makes
clear that this was not a doctrine in need of repair.22 It was, to the contrary,
a remarkable common-law success. By the end of the twentieth century,
the functionality doctrine was working better than it ever had."

Dress, Confounding Dilution, andCondemning Cybersquatting,10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 245,
251 (2002) ("Before the TrafFix decision, most courts and commentators believed the crux of the
functionality issue was the effect on competition: if granting exclusive rights in a particular design
or feature would significantly hinder competition, it was deemed functional and trade dress
protection would be denied."); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological
Approach to TrademarkLaw, 84 IOWA L. REv. 611,696 (1999) ("while there remains a variety of
textual formulations, competitive effect has become the overriding watchword in the majority of
jurisdictions"); Discussion, supra note 7, at 532 (comments of Inna Fayenson).
22. My point is that courts were not having undue difficulty applying the doctrine. One could
always argue the functionality doctrine needed repair if one wanted a different rule. As explained
below, a vigorous debate raged during the latter years of the twentieth century over the propriety
of trademark protection for product features. See infranotes 298,315 and accompanying text. Some
argued for less protection, and one way to achieve this result was to adopt a functionality standard
that precludes protection for more designs. I disagree with this view, but my point, as noted above,
is based more on courts' ability to fairly apply the doctrine in litigated disputes. The examination
of the doctrine's development provided below supports my conclusion. See discussion infra Part
I.C.
23. It is important to understand that functionality is a policy-based limitation on the
trademark protection provided to otherwise valid source identifiers. Put a bit differently, the
functionality doctrine only matters when it is applied to distinctive symbols-those symbols that
are actually serving as source identifiers. Though many product features are both nondistinctive and
functional, the functional nature of features is of no real consequence, at least in terms of trademark
law, because nondistinctive features are not trademarks in the first place. Many courts and
commentators have placed too much emphasis on the functionality doctrine as a filtering rule, when
the distinctiveness requirement is, or should be, the more limiting rule. See infra notes 505-12 and
accompanying text. When a rigorous distinctiveness requirement is applied, relatively few product
configurations will be protected as trademarks. It is, therefore, of little consequence that such
configurations might have been deemed non-functional under the competitive need standard in use
at the end of the twentieth century.
Some courts and commentators have expressed concern over the broad range of nontraditional
product identifiers protected under trademark law and the nature of the protection provided during
the last ten years or so. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.:
Exposing the Malign Application of the FederalDilution Statute to Product Configurations,5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 427-29 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death
of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1700-01 (1999); sources cited infra note 115. This concern
likely drove some of the calls for a more limiting functionality standard, but these calls miss the
point. Such a standard imposes too many social costs and provides too few social benefits to justify
its use. Those concerned with overbroad trademark protection should focus on the distinctiveness
requirement, the infringement standard, and perhaps the lack of a more refined set of remedial rules
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Unfortunately, the functionality story does not have a happy ending.
The doctrine collapsed in TrafFix. The Supreme Court turned its back on
the doctrine's rich history, recast its own prior functionality decisions, and
adopted new rules that no one seems to understand. The current division
in the lower federal courts over the proper general functionality standard
is not the only problem caused by the TrajFix decision. The TrafFix Court
held that product features with aesthetic value require different treatment
than features with utilitarian value.24 The competitive need standard
described above still applies to aesthetic features, but a different standard
applies to utilitarian features.25 Though courts are divided on exactly what
the utilitarian standard is, it is clear that more designs will be deemed
functional, and thus denied trademark protection, under this standard than
under the competitive need standard. The distinction between aesthetics
and utility, therefore, is now extremely important. In close cases-and
there probably will be many-vigorous disputes are likely to arise on the
question of whether the aesthetic functionality standard or the utilitarian
functionality standard should be used. The resolution of this issue will
effectively resolve the functionality question in many cases. Prior to
TrafFix, most courts used the competitive need standard regardless of the
aesthetic or utilitarian nature of the product features at issue.26 This
troublesome distinction is likely to lead to a great deal of confusion and
inconsistency in the lower federal courts.
I identify three possible solutions to the problems caused by TrajFix.
All three require a complete rejection of the TrafFix analysis. The first,
and perhaps most obvious, solution is to return to the competitive need
functionality standard. This solution would essentially take the law back
to its pre-TrafFix state, though it would be helpful to do a bit more. The
circuit courts were divided on the question of how to deal with trade dress
claims that include elements of a previously patented invention. A number
of commentators have argued for a broad right to copy unpatented articles
and especially previously patented articles.27 The concern raised by these
commentators is that overbroad trademark protection for such articles
might undermine the balance struck by the patent system. These
for trademark cases. These rules and standards go more directly to the propriety of the protection
extended to particular symbols. The functionality doctrine, on the other hand, results in a denial of
protection to distinctive trademarks, a result that requires strong justification. I discuss these issues
in more detail below. See discussion infra Part III.A. This overview is provided to alleviate readers'
concerns that I am advocating a rule that would further open the flood gates to questionable
trademark claims. My proposals, when considered within the context of the other relevant
trademark rules, should not produce this result.
24. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23, 33 (2001).
25. Id.
26. See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
27. See sources cited infra notes 42, 280.
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arguments were rejected by almost all courts, but one, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, adopted a special rule for trade dress cases involving
previously patented articles.2" This isolated decision should be expressly
rejected, along with TrafFix,and the competitive need standard applied as
the sole limitation on the scope of trademark protection for unpatented,
distinctive, product features. Finally, this first solution also should make
clear that no distinction is needed between aesthetic and utilitarian
features.
The second solution requires the elimination of functionality as an
element29 of trade dress claims and adopts, in its place, a limited
functionality defense. This proposal may be more controversial than the
first, partly because the treatment of functionality as an element of a claim
for trade dress infringement is so well-established in the modem practice.30
Old habits sometimes die hard. But in this case, there are good reasons to
reject the established practice.
The modem functionality rule is a front-end, filtering rule. Trade dress
claims are evaluated by examining the claimant's overall product design.
If that design is deemed functional, the trade dress claim fails. If the
design is non-functional, the claim proceeds with no further analysis of the
functionality issue. This approach is flawed. The functionality inquiry
should look at the defendant's product, or more specifically, at the parts
of the defendant's product copied from the plaintiffs product. No party
should be enjoined from the use of functional product features. On the
other hand, where the plaintiff can prove its design is distinctive and the
defendant's design is likely to confuse consumers, a court should not walk
away from the controversy, even if the plaintiff s overall design is deemed
functional. To do so--and this is precisely what modem courts have done

28. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracrafi Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995).
29. It may be more accurate to say that non-functionality is an element, because the claimant
must prove that its design is non-functional. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000).
30. There was a debate over whether the plaintiff or the defendant should carry the burden
of proof on the functionality issue, but that issue was largely resolved by Congress through
amendment of the Lanham Act in 1999. The Act now states that "in a civil action for trade dress
infringement.., for [a] trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts
trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not
functional." Id.; see also Glenn Mitchell & Rose Auslander, Trade Dress Protection: Will a
Statutorily UnifiedStandardResultin a FunctionallySuperiorSolution?, 88 TRADEMARKREP. 472,
499 (1998) (noting variation among the circuits on the burden allocation issue); Christopher J.
Kellner, Comment, Rethinking the Procedural Treatment of Functionality: Confronting the
Inseparability of Useful, Aesthetically Pleasing, and Source-Identifying Features of Product
Designs, 46 EMORY L.J. 913, 950 (1997) ("The circuit courts of appeals are currently split
concerning proper allocation of the burden of proof for functionality."); Danielle Rubano, Note,
Trade Dress: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving or DisprovingFunctionalityin a Section
43(a) Infringement Claim?, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 345, 353-61 (1995)
(reviewing the decisions of several courts on the burden allocation issue).
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upon finding a plaintiffs design functional-is to ignore the consumer
interest in preventing confusion. Where confusion is likely, some steps
should be taken to reduce or eliminate the confusion risk. The burden of
such steps should be allocated in an equitable manner between the plaintiff
and the defendant.
My second proposal, eliminating functionality as an element of a trade
dress claim, may seem radical, but it is not. Nor is it new. This proposal
is based on the functionality analysis conducted by courts during the early
development of the doctrine.' In the earliest functionality cases, courts
focused on the elements a defendant copied and refused to enjoin copying
where such elements were found to be functional. The courts, however,
still imposed on such defendants a duty to take reasonable steps to
distinguish their products from those of the plaintiffs. This lesson from the
early cases was somehow lost when the courts began to treat functionality
as an affirmative element rather than a limited defense. I believe much
would be gained by returning to the old rule.
My third proposal is a combination of the first two. It may be the most
attractive solution, though I believe the second proposal is a sufficient
solution. By combining the first two proposals, a front-end functionality
rule would remain in place to filter out bogus claims and applications to
register wholly-functional designs as trademarks.32 The limited
functionality defense would continue to play an important role in resolving
litigated trade dress disputes and would provide the flexibility needed to
best balance the competing interests at stake. Because this solution offers
the benefits of the second proposal, while keeping important parts of the
modem functionality approach, it may be more acceptable to the range of
parties interested in reforming the functionality doctrine.33
My analysis and arguments are presented in three parts. First, I
examine the rise of the functionality doctrine. This examination, presented
in Part I below, is the longest of the three parts. It covers the development

31. See infra note 85.
32. Under the second proposal, there would be no substantive justification for the rejection
of trademark applications based on wholly-functional product designs. The granting of federal
trademark registrations to these designs could pose problems in practice, though I believe the threat
is more theoretical than real. See infra notes 591-93 and accompanying text.
33. The two most influential intellectual property law organizations in the United States have
issued statements formally objecting to the TrafFixdecision. Both the American Bar Association's
Intellectual Property Law (ABA IPL) Section and the American Intellectual Property Law
Association have issued proposals calling for the rejection of the functionality rules adopted by the
TraFax Court. See AM. INTEI.ECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N RESOLUTIONS 3, 4 (2001); AM. BAR
ASS'N INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW SECTION RESOLUTION 201-04 (2002). Both organizations have
called for a return to a competition-based functionality standard. The American Intellectual
Property Law Association additionally proposed limiting functionality to utilitarian features, but
the ABA IPL Section was silent on that issue.
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of the doctrine over a period of almost 100 years and includes a discussion
of aesthetic functionality and the debate over special rules limiting
trademark protection for features of previously patented inventions. In Part
I, I describe the fall of the doctrine. TrafFix is the cause of the fall and the
primary focus of this part of my analysis. I also examine the consequences
of TrafFix in the lower courts, finding both division and confusion.
Finally, in Part III, I present arguments supporting my three proposed
solutions to the TrafFix problems.
I. THE RISE

The federal courts have struggled with the functionality doctrine for
over 100 years. The struggle, however, was not in vain, as the courts
reached agreement on the most important functionality issues by the end
of the twentieth century. By the time TrafFix was decided in 200 1, every
federal court of appeals defined functionality in terms of competitive
need.34 This uniformity was a remarkable achievement, a true common law
success story. It is, unfortunately, a story seldom told. Most modem
commentators have focused primarily on modem functionality cases.35
These commentators identified differences in the functionality analysis in
the modem cases, and often concluded that the courts were hopelessly
divided.36 This conclusion was somewhat justified, but to properly assess

34. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 696; Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic
FunctionalityDoctrineand the Law of Trade-DressProtection,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1142
(1998) ("The 'competition' theory of functionality is currently the prevailing theory in the courts
and is embraced by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITIoN." (footnote omitted)).
35. See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress ProtectionforProductConfigurationsand the
Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 479-83 (1998) (reviewing the
functionality doctrine and relying primarily on decisions from the 1980s and 1990s); Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Management and Protectionof Brand Equity in ProductConfigurations, 1998 U. ILL.
L. REv. 59, 96-108 (providing a lengthy review of the functionality doctrine and citing almost
exclusively to modem decisions); Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 688 & n.292 (referring to "[miost
early applications of the functionality rule" and citing cases dating from 1961 to 1982); Jay Dratler,
Jr., TrademarkProtectionforIndustrialDesigns, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 887,938-42 (explaining that
the functionality doctrine was "originally and primarily intended to protect the integrity of utility
patent law," but citing modem decisions as support for this proposition). But see Weinberg, supra
note 7, at 10-14 (reviewing a number of important early functionality decisions).
Commentators examining the aesthetic functionality doctrine typically begin their analysis with
the Ninth Circuit's 1952 decision in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (1952), but
generally fail to look at earlier decisions. See, e.g., Erin M. Harriman, Aesthetic Functionality:The
DisarrayAmong Modern Courts,86 TRADEMARK REP. 276,280-82 (1996); Wong, supranote 34,
at 1118 & nn.5-6 (referring to "the early cases concerning functionality," and citing decisions from
1955).
36. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 686 ("Each circuit has developed its own
formulation of the [functionality] concept, and several circuits have employed different versions
(sometimes using more than one at the same time)."); Willajeanne F. McLean, Opening Another
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the functionality doctrine, it is important to understand the whole story.
How did the doctrine first develop? What were the early rules? How and
why did those rules change over time?
I attempt to provide answers to these questions in the following
sections. The story I tell differs from most functionality discussions in
three respects. First, I trace the doctrine to its true origins, the palming off
cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. I examine those
cases to determine what policies moved the courts to place limits on the
protection of product designs, and what rules resulted from those policies.
In Part A below, I look for helpful lessons in the early decisions.
Second, my analysis differs from other functionality commentary in
that I focus on the development of the general functionality rules, rather
than on secondary functionality issues. Much has been written, for
example, on the concept of aesthetic functionality." And though this
concept is important, it was not a significant factor in the courts'
development of a general functionality standard. The same is true of the
patent bargain and right-to-copy concerns. Though important, these
concerns did not shape the general functionality standard adopted by most
courts. I focus on the general standard first (Parts A-C below), and then
address these two important, but secondary, functionality issues (Part D).
The third important difference in my analysis is my attempt to find
common themes and consistencies in the functionality cases. Most
commentators have concluded that the functionality doctrine is, and

Can of Worms: ProtectingProduct Configurationas Trade Dress, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 125
(1997) ("[T]here are almost as many definitions of the term [functional] as there are circuit
courts."); Judith Beth Prowda, The Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of ProductDesign, 61
ALB. L. REV. 1309, 1354 (1998) ("It is manifest that courts that have addressed the issue of whether
non-functional features can serve as trade dress have reached very different conclusions as to the
relevant legal standard for such a determination."); David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and
Patent-TheDilemma ofConfusion, 30 RUTGERs L.J. 289, 331 (1999) (stating that the functionality
doctrine "is so uncertain in its application that one cannot reasonably predict in most cases how it
will affect the result").
37. See, e.g., Bradford J. Duft, "Aesthetic" Functionality,73 TRADEMARK REP. 151 (1983);
Harriman, supranote 35; Mark I. Peroff& Nancy J. Deckinger, "Conditional"Functionality: The
New Standardfor Evaluating "Aesthetic" FunctionalityEstablished by the Second Circuit in
Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 1 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117 (1991); Diana Elzey Pinover, Aesthetic Functionality: The Need for a
Foreclosure of Competition, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 571 (1993); Jerre B. Swann, The Design of
Restaurant Interiors-A New Approach to Aesthetic Functionality, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 408
(1986); Robert Unikel, Better by Design: The Availability of Trade Dress Protectionfor Product

Design and the Demise of "Aesthetic Functionality," 85 TRADEMARK REP. 312 (1995); Kellner,
supra note 30; Deborah J. Krieger, Note, The BroadSweepofAesthetic Functionality:A Threatto
Trademark Protection ofAesthetic ProductFeatures,51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1982); Wong,

supra note 34.
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always has been, a confused mess.3" I disagree. I believe the doctrine was
coherent and workable during much of the last century. There were
differences in how the courts dealt with some issues, and there were
differences in the specific tests or standards used by some courts. These
differences were relatively minor when they existed, and, more
importantly, the differences were largely gone by the time TrafFix was
decided. At the end of the twentieth century, the functionality doctrine was
more coherent and workable, save one important exception, than it ever
had been.
The exception to this uniformity was a single decision by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals: Vornado Air CirculationSystems v. Duracraft
Corp.39 In this decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its use of a general
competitive need functionality standard,40 but held an additional rule was
needed where the claimed design includes elements of a previously
patented invention.4 The question of how trademark law should deal with
such claims is important, but does not arise in most functionality disputes.
Nevertheless, the Vornado case led to a flood of commentary and calls for
special trademark law rules prohibiting the protection of either previously
patented designs or all unpatented designs.42 The intense debates spawned

38. See sources cited supra note 36.
39. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
40. Id. at 1507 ("Functionality ... has been defined both by our circuit, and more recently
by the Supreme Court, in terms of competitive need.").
41. Id. at 1508 ("We conclude that the inability freely to copy significant features of patented
products after the patents expire impinges seriously upon the patent system's core goals .... ").
42. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 35; Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?:
Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25 (1999); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the
Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595 (1996); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protectionfor Product Configurations:Is There a Conflict with Patent
Policy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427 (1996); Joseph Fischer, Harmonization of Federal Patent and
Trademark Laws After the Vornado, Zip Dee, and Thomas & Betts Decisions: An Economic
Analysis, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 29 (1998); Bradley K. Groff, Bare-FistedCompetition or Palming Off?.
Protectionof ProductDesign as Trade Dress Under the Lanham Act, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 65 (1995);
IndustrialDesigns, AIPLA BuLLETIN, Jan. 24, 1997, at 146 (reporting on presentation of James W.
Dabney, Product Configurations in the Public Domain); Manotti L. Jenkins, A Request to the High
Court: Don't Let the PatentLaws Be Distractedby a Flashy Trade Dress, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 323 (1997); McLean, supra note 36; Kevin E. Mohr, At the Interface of
Patentand TrademarkLaw: Should a Product ConfigurationDisclosedin a Utility PatentEver
Qualify for Trade Dress Protection?, 19 HASTINGs COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339 (1997); David W.
Opderbeck, Form and Function:Protecting Trade Dress Rights in Product Configurations,20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1996); Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional
Right Not toBe Excluded-Orthe Supreme Court Chose the Right BreakfastCereal in Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265,293-94(2000); Prowda, supra note
36; Jerre B. Swann, The ConfigurationQuagmire:Is ProtectionAnticompetitive or Beneficialto
Consumers, and the Need to Synthesize Extremes, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 253 (1997); Welkowitz,
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by Vornadotended to overshadow the remarkable uniformity in the courts'
treatment of all other functionality issues. I conclude that Vornado was an
aberration unlikely to be followed by other circuit courts. Vornado clearly
was not a decision warranting a complete revision to the law of
functionality, a point even recognized by the Tenth Circuit panel that
decided the case.
A. Early Development of the FunctionalityDoctrine and the
Rise of the Competitive Need Rationale
The functionality doctrine provides a good example of how legal rules
developed in the common-law courts. In the late nineteenth century, only
inherently distinctive words and designs-so-called "technical
trademarks"-were protected as trademarks.43 Efforts to claim trademark

supra note 36; Ruby Ann David, Comment, FederalPreemptionof a FederalStatute: The Case
of Vornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corporation, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 253
(1996); Andrea Falk, Comment, Harmonizationof the PatentAct and FederalTrade Dress Law:
A CritiqueofVornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corp., 21 J. CORP. L. 827 (1996); Todd
R. Geremia, Comment, Protectingthe Right to Copy: Trade Dress Claimsfor Configurationsin
Expired Utility Patents,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 779 (1998); Gwendolyn Gill, Comment, Through the
Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade Dress to ProtectExpired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1269
(1999); R. Lawton Jordan III, Note, Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.-Towarda Coherent
View of Trade Dress Protectionfor Product Configurations, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 323 (1999);
Kerrie A. Laba, Note, Have Trade Dress Infringement Claims Gone too Far Under the Lanham
Act?, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1649 (1996); Michael S. Perez, Note, Reconciling the PatentAct andthe
Lanham Act: Should Product Configurations Be Entitled to Trade Dress ProtectionAfter the
Expirationofa Utility or Design Patent?,4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 383 (1996); Michael E. Peters,
Note, When Patentand TrademarkLaw Hit the Fan: PotentialEffects ofVomado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. on Legal Protectionfor IndustrialDesign, 15 TEMP. ENV L. L. &
TECH. J. 123 (1996); Recent Case, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1457 (1996); Glen A. Weitzer, Note, No
TradeDressProtectionforAnything Disclosedin a Patent:A Defense of the Supreme Court'sPer
Se Restriction, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 181 (2000).
43. One commentator provided the following explanation of the early practice:
The courts distinguished "trade names" from "technical trademarks" on the basis
of etymological differences. Technical trademarks were required to be fanciful,
invented, arbitrary, distinctive, or nondescriptive. In contrast, trade names were
nontechnical trademarks-words descriptive of qualities or attributes, generic
words, geographical terms, and personal names. Technical trademarks were
protected in an action for trademark infringement by which imitation of the
trademark could be absolutely enjoined. Trade names were protected in an action
for passing off or unfair competition.
Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and UnfairCompetition:A CriticalHistory of Legal Thought, 69
TRADEMARK REP. 305,316 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also Milton Handler & Charles Pickett,
Trademarks and Trade Names-An Analysis andSynthesis, 30 COLuM. L. REv. 168 (1930).
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rights in other types of product identifiers (e.g., color, packaging, or
product designs) were summarily rejected."
This treatment by the courts, however, did not change commercial
reality. Product designs or packages that differed in their appearance from
others sometimes became distinctive product identifiers. If, for example,
consumers came to associate the appearance of a particular product with
a single source, whether the consumers knew the identity of the source or
not, then the product's appearance effectively served as a trademark.45
Consumers could, and likely would, use the appearance of the product as
a means to identify the product and to distinguish it from competing
products. If a competitor copied the product's appearance and failed to
provide other means to distinguish its product, consumers would be
confused.
Though the early courts refused to give full trademark status to
nontraditional product identifiers, they did recognize the need to provide
some protection to these identifiers:
There can be no question of the soundness of the plaintiffs'
proposition that, irrespective of the technical question of
trade-mark the defendants have no right to dress their goods
up in such manner as to deceive an intendingpurchaser,and
induce him to believe he is buying those of the plaintiffs.
Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage
of the public in the quality and price of their goods, in the
beauty and tastefulness of their inclosing [sic] packages, in
the extent of their advertising, and in the employment of
agents, but they have no right, by imitative devices, to
beguile the public into buying their wares under the
impression they are buying those of their rivals.46

44. See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166,
171 (1906) (suggesting in dictum that color cannot be a trademark); Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492
(C.C.D. Mass. 1886) ("[Tlhe trade-mark must be something other than, and separate from, the
merchandise."); Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951, 952 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 4,608) ("[A]
trade-mark is always something indicative of origin or ownership, by adoption and repute, and is
something different from the article itself which the mark designates ....
Any other doctrine is
impossible to be maintained; for, otherwise, all the colors, all the unessential forms, could be
monopolized as trade-marks."); Moorman v. Hoge, 17 F. Cas. 715, 718-19 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No.
9,783) ("[T]he size or shape of the barrel, box, or package can scarcely be considered a mark.").
45. It was established early on that consumers may associate a symbol with a single source
while not knowing the identity of that source. "The plaintiff has at least shown that the public has
become accustomed to regard its familiar wheat biscuit as emanating, if not from it by name, at
least from a single, though anonymous, maker, and the second is as good for these purposes as the
first." Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918) (L. Hand, J.,
sitting by designation).
46. Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893) (emphasis added).
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The common-law palming off claim developed to address this
situation. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff had to prove (1) that its
product, packaging, or some feature of either had become distinctive; (2)
that the defendant copied the distinctive features of the plaintiff's product
or packaging; and, (3) that consumers were likely to be confused by the
appearance of the defendant's product.47 Plaintiffs had to prove the copied
features were distinctive, but the focus'of the early palming off claim was
on the defendant's conduct.48

47. One court provided the following explanation of the requirements for an unfair
competition claim based on copying of a product design:
It is well settled in the law of unfair competition that a manufacturer has good
right to make any unpatented article embodying therein necessary functional parts
so that the whole will function; but, if he incorporates what is distinctive,
ornamental, fanciful, or merely peculiar to another's product,he may trespass....
Therefore, the sole question in this controversy is as to whether or not some ofthe
features of defendant's shaver are nonfunctional and whether such nonfunctional
elements have been embodied in defendant's shaver head for the purpose and with
the effect of misleading the public.
Lektro-Shave Corp. v. Gen. Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Conn. 1937); see also John H.
Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 F. 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1913) (finding no unfair competition
because the defendant did not copy the distinctive trademarks or dress of the plaintiff's product
"and there is no evidence that defendants attempted to palm off their goods as those of
complainants"); Yale &Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 F. 37,38 (2d Cir. 1907) ("[W]hen all ofthe
prominent [features] have been appropriated, and so assembled together with slight variations in
some of them that altogether they produce the same general effect, and the ordinary purchaser
would not be apt to discover the difference, enough appears to establish unfair competition.");
McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 607,608 (E.D.N.Y. 1930) (finding confusion likely
where the defendant copied the distinctive elements of the plaintiff's design); Cook & Bernheimer
Co. v. Ross, 73 F. 203, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1896) (finding unfair competition where the defendant
copied the distinctive square whisky bottle design used by the plaintiff and where "the ultimate
consumer, deceived by the shape, will mistake the [defendant's] bottle for one of complainant's").
48. A few judges during this period attempted to explain the rationale behind the unfair
competition claim. Judge Oliver Booth Dickinson of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was a
leader in this effort. The following example is taken from one of his decisions:
One man sets up a wireless apparatus to serve as a receiving station. This he does
by manufacturing or securing a certain kind or make of goods for which he
expects, or at least hopes, to be able to create a demand. He then sets up other
wireless apparatus constituting as many sending stations as possible for the use of
his customers, and provides them with a code of calling signals. This he does by
advertising and educating intending purchasers among the buying public in every
way possible to prefer and ask for his product. After he has done all this and the
messages begin to fly thick and fast, another sets up a receiving station attuned to
receive the messages intended for the first man and intercepts the messages. This
the law condemns as unfair competition and prohibits it.
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With the recognition of palming off claims based on product designs
came a realization that overly broad protection of product features could
harm, rather than help, consumers. Two specific concerns arose. First,
courts worried that palming off claims, if not limited in some way, might
stifle competition.49 In some cases, even distinctive product features might
be needed by competitors. If such features were protected through use of
the palming off claim, unfair competition could be used to stifle or hinder
vigorous competition. This result seemed to turn unfair competition law
on its head. Courts, therefore, began to deny palming off claims if the
defendant could prove it needed the copied features in order to compete.50
A second, and quite different, concern arose from patent law. During
this period, courts were reluctant to extend unfair competition protection
to useful articles because such articles, the courts held, were protectable,
if at all, by patents. 5' Though this attitude changed, and courts began to

Gandy Belting Co. v. Victor-Balata & Textile Belting Co., 215 F. 795, 799-800 (E.D. Pa. 1914);
see also Miller v. Swartz, 36 F.2d 83, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1929); Premier Malt Prods. v. Kasser, 23 F.2d
98,98-99 (E.D. Pa. 1927); Everlasting Valve Co. v. Schiller, 21 F.2d 641, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 1927);
Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611-12 (E.D. Pa. 1924); Johnson v. Lit Bros., 278 F. 279, 280
(E.D. Pa. 1921); Helfi Co. v. Silvex Co., 274 F. 653,654-55 (E.D. Pa. 1921); Steele v. D. L. Ward
Co., 257 F. 747,749-50 (E.D. Pa. 1919); Cushman & Denison Mfg. Co. v. Grammes, 225 F. 883,
885 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
49. Note, UnfairCompetition andthe DoctrineofFunctionality,64 COLuM. L. REv. 544,552
(1964) (noting that injunctions prohibiting the copying of product configurations "made
competition much more difficult than those preventing the copying of trademarks, labels, or
packages").
50. Id. at 554 ("With the adoption of the doctrine of functionality, judicial analysis shifted
from the abstract question of whether defendant had slavishly copied to whether he had imitated
more extensively than necessary to compete."); see also Pope Automatic Merch. Co. v. McCrumHowell Co., 191 F. 979,981 (7th Cir. 1911) (denying relief where the design copied was "the most
efficient and most economically manufactured form into which the mechanical combination can
probably be embodied"); Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir.
1906) (finding no unfair competition where the features copied by the defendant "serve not only
a useful purpose but an essential function").
51. An early decision by the Illinois Supreme Court illustrates this attitude:
Appellees have no patent upon any portion of their plows; any one, therefore,
has a perfect right to make plows in their exact similitude, even to "the curve of
the mould board" and "the tip of the handles"-in the minutest, as well as in the
most important points-all have a right to manufacture them, no matter where the
maker may reside, and [each] has the right to put the name of the place where
manufactured, as well as his own name, on such part of the plows as he pleases,
taking care, however, so to use the brand as not to deceive the public, so as not to
create a belief that the plow is the manufacture of another.
Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 461 (1870); see generally Note, supra note 49,
at 549-50 (explaining the reluctance of courts to extend unfair competition protection).
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extend unfair competition protection to useful product features, the
concern over conflict with the patent system remained. Courts did not
want to grant perpetual patent-like protection under the guise of unfair
competition law. This patent concern did not depend, in any direct way,
on the commercial importance of the features at issue.
These two concerns are distinct and do not necessarily lead to a single
rule. Courts during the early period, however, were not always careful to
distinguish the two concerns. And perhaps more importantly, early courts
seemed most concerned with the patent bargain issue when the feature in
question was also important to free competition. The following excerpt
from a leading early case is illustrative:
In the absence of protection by patent, no person can
monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion of others elements
of mechanical construction which are essential to the
successful practical operation of a manufacture, or which
primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the purpose to
which it is devoted. Unfair competition is not established by
proof of similarity in form, dimensions, or general
appearance alone. Where such similarity consists in
constructions common to or characteristic of the articles in
question, and especially where it appears to result from an
effort to comply with the physical requirements essential to
commercial success, and not to be designed to misrepresent
the origin of such articles, the doctrine of unfair competition
cannot be successfully invoked to abridge the freedom of
trade competition.52
Note the court's reference to the patent bargain-no monopolistic
protection is possible without a patent-and its reliance on competitive
need to fix the proper limit on protection--only features "essential to the
successful practical operation" of the product or that "primarily serve to
promote its efficiency" are denied all protection.53 This type of analysis
was common during the early development of the functionality doctrine.54
During the early period, courts considered different ways to define
functionality. First, functionality could be equated with utility. This
approach would have eliminated any potential for conflict with the utility
52. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Le Mur Co. v. W.G. Shelton Co., 32 F.2d 79, 81 (8th Cir. 1929) ("A
manufacturer, therefore, must be admitted to have good right to make and vend any unpatented
article embodying therein the necessary functional parts so that the whole will function."); LektroShave Corp. v. Gen. Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Conn. 1937) ("[A] manufacturer has
good right to make any unpatented article embodying therein necessary functional parts so that the
whole will function.").
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patent system," but it also would have had the effect of sanctioning bad

faith palming off of distinctive, though useful, product features. 56 A few
courts adopted this definition, but these decisions were a small minority
ofthe early functionality cases. For example, in one case involving electric
meter cabinets, the court explained "that where the article involved is
merely a mechanical device designed to perform a strictly mechanical
function, and is without ornamental or non-functional features, unfair
competition cannot be predicated upon the sale of similar articles. 57 In a
case involving the design of a tire tread pattern, a court held "the chattel
itself is not and cannot be the trade-mark" because "it forms a useful and
functional part of the whole. 58
A second, and less extreme, approach for dealing with the possible
conflict between patent protection and unfair competition protection would
be to reject unfair competition claims where the feature or features at issue
were disclosed or claimed in a patent. This approach is based on the patent
concern described above. "It is self evident," the Supreme Court explained
in an early case, "that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created
by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by

55. By focusing on utility, this approach ignores the possible conflict between design patent
protection and trademark or unfair competition protection. I return to this point below. See
discussion infra Part III.A.4.
56. I develop this point more below, but it is worth noting here that equating functionality
with utility makes it lawful to copy any distinctive product feature that is also useful. If the
distinctive feature is merely useful-that is, if it has no more utility than alternative features-the
distinctiveness may be of greater value to the copyist than the utility. When this happens, the law
has effectively sanctioned bad faith palming off ofdistinctive product features. See discussion infra
Part III.A.5.
57. M.J. Lewis Prods. v. Lewis, 57 F.2d 886, 888-89 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
58. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 18 F.2d 639, 641 (D. Md. 1927). The
Goodyear litigation involved an effort to register the tread pattern of a Goodyear tire as a trademark
under the 1905 Trademark Act. Id. at 639. When the Patent Trademark Office rejected the
application, Goodyear appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
affirmed the PTO's decision. In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 4 F.2d 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1925) ("The diamond-shaped projections, which appellant claims as a trade-mark, are clearly
descriptive of the goods on which they are used, since they form a very essential part of the goods
itself.").
Though its application had been twice rejected, Goodyear did not give up the fight. Instead,
Goodyear filed a bill in equity in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
asking the court to authorize the Commissioner of Patents to register the tread design as a
trademark. Goodyear, 18 F.2d at 639. The district court denied the bill (i.e., it refused to order the
Commission to register the tread pattern as a trademark) primarily because it found the tread pattern
"a functional part of the tire." Id. at 641. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to reject the trademark application, but focused more on distinctiveness than functionality. See
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834 (4th Cir. 1928).
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the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent
is granted." 59
Several early functionality cases involved product designs disclosed or
claimed in existing or expired patents.' Some of these decisions include

59. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). A good deal-perhaps
too much-has been written about the Singer Court's discussion of the patent bargain. See, e.g.,
Davis, supra note 7, at 247-48; Jenkins, supra note 42, at 346; Taylor, supra note 7, at 215;
Anthony E. Dowell, Note, Trade Dress Protectionof ProductDesigns: Stifling the Progressof
Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 137, 152 (1994);
Geremia, supra note 42, at 793; Gill, supra note 42, at 1283; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 183.
The patent bargain discussion in Singer was dicta because there was no dispute over the
defendant's right to make a sewing machine that operated in accordance with the various expired
utility patents owned by the plaintiff. See Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 184-85. The question
presented in Singer involved the defendant's use of the name "Singer" on its sewing machines.
Id. at 184. The Supreme Court considered the "Singer" name generic for a sewing machine of
the type made by the parties, despite the long, and apparently exclusive, use of the name by the
plaintiff. Id. at 185-86. Because the defendant had a right to make Singer-type machines, it had
the right to use the "Singer" name to identify its machines:
To say otherwise would be to hold that although the public had acquired the
device covered by the patent, yet the owner of the patent or the manufacturer
of the patented thing had retained the designated name which was essentially
necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that which had become
theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly.
Id. at 185. At the end of the day, the Singer Court retreated a bit from its conclusion that the
"Singer" name was generic. The Court held the "Singer" name was associated with the plaintiff
and that the defendant must make only limited uses of the name to prevent consumer confusion.
Id. at 187. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would create an "unrestrained right to deceive
and defraud the public by so using the [Singer] name as to delude them into believing that the
machine made by one person was made by another." Id.
The Singer Court's discussion of the generic nature of the "Singer" name is somewhat
analogous to the competitive need functionality analysis that developed in the years following
the Singer decision. A generic term can be as necessary for competition as the basic
configuration of the product itself, as the Singer Court explained. Yet, generic terms are free for
all to use even absent a showing of competitive need because such terms lack the distinctiveness
required for trademark protection. Some, however, have drawn an analogy between generic
terms and functional features. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
1985). Singer, therefore, is an important early trademark decision, but it is not a functionality
case. The Singer Court's discussion of the patent bargain provides only persuasive support for
those who argue that previously patented features must be deemed functional or otherwise
denied trademark protection. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 247; Jenkins, supra note 42, at
346; Marshall, supra note 7, at 639-40; Taylor, supra note 7, at 215; Dowell, supra, at 168;
Geremia, supra note 42, at 793; Gill, supra note 42, at 1283; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 183.
60. See, e.g., Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946);
Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Master-Craft Corp., 67 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1933); A.C. Gilbert Co. v.
Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1930); Le Mur Co. v. W.G. Shelton Co., 32 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1929);
Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, N.Y., 250 F. 450 (2d Cir. 1918); Daniel v. Elec. Hose &
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references to the patent bargain and suggestions that no unfair competition
claim could be based on copying of such designs.6 ' It is, however, easy to
read too much into these cases. A careful examination of the decisions
reveals two important points. First, the patent bargain concept was not
used to define the general functionality standard. In making functionality
determinations, courts looked more to the competitive significance of the
features at issue than to the existence of a patent claiming or disclosing the
same features. Second, few, if any, courts relied on the patent bargain
rationale as ajustification for denying all protection to a particular design.
Though some judges during the early period spoke of the patent bargain
in sweeping terms, the courts more often required defendants to take steps
to distinguish their products from those of plaintiffs, even if the plaintiff's
design was previously patented.62
A good example of this approach is found in Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co.,63 a Second Circuit decision authored by Judge
Learned Hand. The unfair competition claim in this case was based on the
defendant's copying of a shredded wheat biscuit made by the plaintiff.64
The shape and size of the biscuit were the subject of an expired design
patent, a fact the court said was a "conclusive reason against any
injunction based upon the exclusive right to that form, however necessary
the plaintiff may find it for its protection."6 5 Yet contrary to the suggestion
of this strong statement, the court concluded that the plaintiff's biscuit
Rubber Co., 231 F. 827 (3d Cir. 1916); Edward Hilker Mop Co. v. U.S. Mop Co., 191 F. 613 (6th
Cir. 1911); Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 F. 696 (6th Cir. 1902); Swanson Mfg. Co.
v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 54 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Witherow Steel Corp. v. Donner
Steel Co., 31 F.2d 157 (W.D.N.Y. 1929); Abbott Coin Counter Co. v. Standard-Johnson Co., 290
F. 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1923); Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265 (N.D. II1.1917);
Kawneer Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Showcase Co., 240 F. 737 (E.D. Mich. 1917).
61. See, e.g., A.C. Gilbert Co., 45 F.2d at 99-100 (holding the plaintiff's patent "invalid for
lack of invention," and noting that as a result of the invalidity of the plaintiff's patent, "the
defendants would have the right to copy the [plaintiff's] design slavishly so long as they did not
represent that the goods sold were those of the [plaintiff]"); Daniel, 231 F. at 831, 833-34 (noting
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were entitled to use a design taken from an expired patent
previously owned by a third party).
62. See, e.g., Smith, Kline & French Labs., 157 F.2d at 731 (noting the defendants' right to
make a functionally equivalent version of the plaintiffs drug, but "requiring the defendants to
stamp their tablets with the initials C & C or some other distinguishing mark"); Daniel, 231 F. at
834 (noting that the defendant had an obligation to distinguish its goods from those of the plaintiff
even though both parties were exercising their right to use a previously patented design); Abbott
Coin Counter Co., 290 F. at 427 (finding the defendant's coin-counting machine did not infringe
on the plaintiffs patent, that the defendant was entitled to make coin wrappers in the same color
and design as the plaintiffs wrappers, but requiring the defendant to use "a different size, arranged
in a somewhat different way, [to] distinguish between its and the plaintiff's wrappers").
63. 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918) (L. Hand, J., sitting by designation).
64. Id. at 962-63.
65. Id. at 964.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

design was distinctive 66 and, therefore "entitled to some protection. ' , 67
These seemingly contradictory statements illustrate the court's recognition
of the competing interests at stake: the patent bargain placed the biscuit
shape in the public domain, but a failure to provide any protection to the
distinctive shape would lead to consumer confusion. A middle ground was
needed.
When the Second Circuit balanced the patent bargain concern against
the need to protect consumers from confusion, the court found the latter
concern more important. Rather than allowing the defendant to copy the
previously patented design without restriction, the court considered a
number of possible changes the defendant might make to its shredded
wheat biscuit to eliminate the risk of consumer confusion.68 This analysis
was guided by "the principle often applied in this court that minor, or
'nonfunctional,' changes in appearance may be required, so long as the
substantial elements are left in the public domain., 69 The court defined
"nonfunctional" changes as those changes that would not adversely affect
the defendant's ability to compete in the shredded wheat biscuit market.70
Judge Hand's analysis on this point was detailed and practical.
The plaintiff urged the court to order the defendant to adopt a different
color for its biscuit.7 This argument was rejected because "to require the
defendant to adopt a shade different enough for commercial distinction
would be to force them to bake their biscuits so that they would be
repellant to most tastes,"7 2 leaving the defendant with an unmarketable
product. Changing the size would have similar results; such a change
would "greatly embarrass the defendants"73 in the market.'

66. Id. at 962-63. "The plaintiff has at least shown that the public has become accustomed
to regard its familiar wheat biscuit as emanating, if not from it by name, at least from a single,
though anonymous, maker, and the second is as good for these purposes as the first." Id. at 963.
Judge Hand's statement on the distinctiveness of the plaintiffs biscuit design was one of the early
explanations of the anonymous source rule. See, e.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192,
1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the rule in a trade dress dispute over the design of bulk spice
containers); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291,299-300 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying
the rule and noting that Congress expressly adopted the rule through a 1984 amendment of the
Lanham Act).
67. Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 963.
68. Id. at 964-66.
69. Id. at 964.
70. Id. at 964-65.
71. See id. at 964.
72. Id. at 964-65.
73. Id. at 965.
74. The court may have been mistaken on this point, given the subsequent introduction and
success of the "mini-wheats" product. Full-sized shredded wheat biscuits are still sold, but the
smaller mini-sized biscuits are more popular today. Perhaps the market simply was not ready for
miniature shredded wheat biscuits in 1918.
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After considering a number of possible changes to the appearance of
the defendant's biscuit, the court decided the defendant could stamp its
name or trademark on the surface of its shredded wheat biscuits.7" There
was, Judge Hand concluded, "no reason to suppose that such a requirement
is not possible."'7 6 But the record was not entirely clear on the practicality
of this requirement:
[T]he defendant at the end of six months may apply to the
District Court to be relieved of the [injunction], upon
showing that after a bona fide trial of all possible expedients
it cannot comply with that provision, except at an expense
which would make impossible any continued competition in
the business of selling biscuits outside the cartons with any
assurance of reasonable profit."
The Shredded Wheat case is among the most important of the early
functionality cases.78 Even though the product design at issue was

Though the market's subsequent acceptance of a small shredded wheat product is interesting,
it also illustrates the fact-intensive and market-dependent nature of the functionality analysis. It
often will be difficult to determine accurately which features are important to the success of a
particular product. Determining the importance of a given feature may be even more difficult. This
difficulty probably helps explain why courts historically focused so heavily on the availability of
alternative designs. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. If an alternative design was
accepted in the market, that acceptance was an objective indication that the claimed design was not
essential. If several other designs were accepted by the market and available for use, then the
claimed design probably was not particularly important to effective competition. Because there
were no other shredded wheat products on the market, the Second Circuit was forced to engage in
the largely speculative exercise of predicting how the market would respond to various alternatives.
75. Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 966.

76. Id. at 965.
77. Id. at 967.
78; It is not, however, the most famous of the cases involving shredded wheat. In Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), the Supreme Court held that the words "shredded
wheat" and the pillow shape of the shredded wheat biscuit were generic. Id. at 116, 119-20 ("The
plaintiff has no exclusive right to the use of the term 'Shredded Wheat' as a trade name. For that
is the generic term of the article." Additionally, the biscuit shape was "the form in which the article
became known to the public" and "is primarily associated with the article rather than a particular
producer.").
The Court also noted the expired design patent for the physical shape of the biscuit, and, in
dicta, suggested that the patent created a right to copy the design. Id. at 119-20 & n.4. A number
of commentators have cited Kellogg for this point, though many have mischaracterized the Court's
discussion of the patent issue. See Discussion, supra note 7, at 537; Fischer, supra note 42, at 34;
Jenkins, supra note 42, at 348; Pollack, supra note 42, at 295; Dowell, supra note 59, at 153;
Geremia, supra note 42, at 794; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 184. The Tenth Circuit read Kellogg as
a patent bargain decision in Vornado Air CirculationSystems v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498,

1504 (10th Cir. 1995).
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previously patented, the court relied on the competitive need rationale to
resolve the dispute. 79 The patent bargain concern was important, but it was
just one part of the court's functionality analysis, not the basis for a per se
rule."0 The court was looking for a practical solution to the problem at
hand, not for a bright-line rule that would prevent all potential conflict
between unfair competition protection and the patent system.
The Second Circuit's emphasis on the practical impact of potential
changes to the defendant's product was typical of the functionality
analysis used during the early period. In another important Second Circuit
case, the court denied an unfair competition claim because the court could
find "'nothing about the article as made and sold by the defendants that is
not necessary in the making and operation of such an instrument."' 8
Ordering the defendants to make changes to such an article, the court held,
would make it difficult or impossible for the defendants to compete. 2 In
another important early case, the Sixth Circuit held a two-color match tip
functional because contrasting colors "serve not only a useful purpose but

The Kellogg Court also commented on functionality, though this too probably was dicta.
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122. After denying protection because the appearance was not distinctive, the
Court made the following statements about the importance of the shape: "Moreover, the pillowshape must be used for another reason. The evidence is persuasive that this form is functional-that
the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were
substituted for the pillow-shape." Id. Regardless of this comment's nature, though, the Kellogg
Court's comment on functionality is consistent with the competitive need rationale used by most
courts during the early period. The Court did not link functionality with the patent bargain concern.
79. See Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 964-65. It is perhaps important that the case involved
a design patent rather than a utility patent, id. at 964, but that distinction does not appear to have
mattered in the court's analysis. Indeed, the court seemed to say the design was clearly in the public
domain because of the expired design patent. Id. This is precisely the same point other courts and
commentators have made concerning designs covered by expired utility patents. See sources cited
supra note 78.
80. See Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 965-65.
81. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) (quoting the lower court with
approval). The product at issue in Marvel was a syringe configured for use as a vaginal douche. Id.
The court found:
It is essential to the successful practical use and operation of such a syringe that
it should be bulbous in shape, of dimensions such that it may be easily compressed
and emptied by the pressure of one hand, and that it should have a soft rubber
protecting guard sliding upon the tube of the syringe ....
Id.
82. Id. at 162 (noting that the features were copied in "an effort to comply with the physical
requirements essential to commercial success," and that "enforcement of [the plaintiff's] claim
would permit unfair appropriation, and deny the exercise of the right of fair competition").
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an essential function, for the very essence of the tipped match is the tip
itself, which must be marked out by a color of its own." 3
One of the clearest early examples of the competitive need rationale is
found in Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co.,
where the Seventh Circuit reversed an injunction prohibiting the defendant
from making a vacuum cleaner similar in appearance to the vacuum
cleaner made by the plaintiff." As the court explained:
In short, [the plaintiff] uses the most efficient and most
economically manufactured form into which the mechanical
combination can probably be embodied. Not a line, nor a
curve, nor a mark, not a bit of superfluous material, for
embellishment or distinction. Nothing but the name-plate. If
[the defendants] should be required to give a square or
hexagonal or other than cylindrical form to the outer surface
of the casings, considerations of cost of the superfluous
materialand labor mightprevent them from competing with
[the plaintiff] in the manufacture and sale of a mechanism
that was equally open to both. 5

83. Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906).
84. 191 F. 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1911).
85. Id. at 981 (emphasis added). The Pope decision also illustrates another important
characteristic of the functionality doctrine during the early period: a second-comer had a duty to
take reasonable steps to avoid confusion, even if he copied only functional elements from a
plaintiff's product. In Pope, the court found that the parts copied were functional, but did not stop
there. The court also discussed the clear labeling of the defendant's product; a point that would
have little relevance if functionality had been an absolute bar to the plaintiff's claims. Id at 980
("To appellants' cleaner was affixed a name-plate much larger than appellee's, as large as could
well be attached, displaying conspicuously a red cross and the words in large capitals, 'The Pope
Electric Cleaner, Made by the Pope Co., Chicago, U.S.A."'); see also Remington-Rand, Inc. v.
Master-Craft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1933) (finding the copied elements functional and
also finding no passing off because the defendant's products "were sold from appellee's own
branch offices and carried distinctive labels indicating their origin"); Le Mur Co. v. W.G. Shelton
Co., 32 F.2d 79, 81 (8th Cir. 1929) (finding that the copied features were functional, but also
considering whether the defendant took adequate steps to distinguish its goods from those sold by
the plaintiff).
A few courts during this early period suggested that an injunction against copying even
functional features might be required where no other action would prevent consumer confusion. See
James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 12 (6th Cir. 1942) ("[T]he
elements of the two baits are functional to such an extent that nothing short of a showing of clear
likelihood of confusion would justify a court of equity granting appellant relief."); A.C. Gilbert Co.
v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that "the elements of the fruit juice extractor are
so far functional that nothing short of a clear danger of confusion would justify us in requiring a
modification of the model"). It is not entirely clear whether courts would actually have issued
injunctions against copying functional features where the risk of confusion was clear, but these
decisions do illustrate the early courts' concern over consumer confusion.
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Nor would the court agree to a restriction on the color of defendants'
machine. "In both cleaners the [aluminum] metal is unpainted. If [the
defendants] should be compelled to paint their cleaner a distinctive color,
they would increase their manufacturing cost and would also lose one of
the main advantages of a metal that was as open to them as to [the
Though not all courts were this clear in their analysis, the
plaintiff] .
competitive need rationale was clearly the prevailing functionality
standard during the early period. 7
Over time, the courts refined the competitive need rationale and began
to focus on the availability of alternative designs. This analysis became the
cornerstone of the functionality doctrine. 8 If equally effective alternatives
to a particular feature were available to competitors, the feature was
deemed non-functional. Or to put it in terms of the competitive need
rationale, there could be no competitive need for a feature when viable
alternatives existed.
A good example of the alternatives analysis is found in Lektro-Shave
Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., a case involving, not surprisingly, the
design of electric shavers.8 9 Finding that "the round shaver head of
plaintiff has in fact come to mean that some particular person or firm
makes them, whether it be the plaintiff herein or some other person or
concern associated with it,"9 the court considered the functionality issue.

86. Pope Automatic Merch. Co., 191 F. at 981.
87. In addition to the cases discussed in the preceding and following text, see Le Mur Co.,
32 F.2d at 81 (holding features functional because they were needed to make a system that would
compete effectively with the system sold by the plaintiff); John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co.,
202 F. 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1913) (finding functional the design of a bottle shaped like a miniature
telephone because protecting the design would give the plaintiff control over the market for toys
of this type); Globe-Wernicke Co. v. FredMacey Co., 119 F. 696, 704 (6th Cir. 1902) ("Upon the
claim made for the appellant, it would be impossible, without invading complainant's right, to
construct and sell a bookcase having the most desirable characteristics."); Margarete Steiff,Inc. v.
Bing, 215 F. 204, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) ("What makes the fight unfair is always the borrowing by
the newcomer from the first maker of something not necessary to excellence of product, not
required for functional perfection, yet almost invariably cleverly calculated to attract and fix the
attention, or please the eye of the careless."); and Cook & Bernheimer Co. v. Ross, 73 F. 203, 20506 (S.D.N.Y. 1896) (failing to mention the functionality rule, but rejecting the defendant's
argument that the copied features were "convenient and useful," finding instead that the copying
"was calculated to increase the sale of their goods; and that such increase, if increase there be, is
due to the circumstance that the purchasers from defendants have a reasonable expectation that the
ultimate consumer, deceived by the shape, will mistake the bottle for one of complainant's").
88. A. Samuel Oddi, ProductSimulation:From Tort to IntellectualProperty,88 TRADEMARK
REP. 101, 108 (1998) ("The definition adopted by the courts for functionality, while varying
somewhat among circuits, was considerably narrower than that of the First Restatement, and
essentially limited functionality to those features that were needed for competition because of the
unavailability of alternatives."); Note, supra note 49, at 554-55.
89. 19 F. Supp. 843, 843 (D. Conn. 1937).
90. Id. at 845.
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The shape of the cutter housing and the cutter were at issue in the case,
and the court carefully evaluated each ofthese features. The housing shape
was found non-functional, as explained in the following passage:
It is unnecessary for the proper operation of plaintiff's shaver
head that the cutter housing be of cylindrical form. It is true
that a substantial advantage may be had by making that
portion of the housing which is to contact with the user's skin
part of a cylindrical surface or generally curved, but it is
unnecessary to make the casing, as a whole, cylindrical. Such
feature is not necessary to the practical operation of the
device and can be changed without lessening the
effectiveness of the appliance. For instance, the housing may
be generally polygonal with a curved toothed portion without
in the least impairing its proper function and efficiency."
The court then considered the shape of the cutter. Note the court's
careful analysis, and, in particular, the different conclusions concerning
the designs used by the plaintiff and the defendant:
The cylindrical shape of the movable cutter of plaintiff's
device is necessary for the proper operation of its shaver for
the reason that no other shape would permit the said movable
cutter to move to and fro and at the same time have an
oscillating movement. However, as far as defendant's
movable cutter is concerned, the cylindrical shape is
unnecessary because the cutter has only a reciprocating
motion. Obviously, any other shape could be used in
defendant's shaver head and a cutter so shaped would operate
just as efficiently as one of cylindrical shape.92
The court found the cylindrical shape of the cutter used by the plaintiff
a necessary part of the plaintiff s design, but not a necessary part of the
defendant's design. In the plaintiffs shaver, only a cylindrical cutter
would work. The defendant's shaver, though it used a cylindrical cutter,
operated somewhat differently from the plaintiffs shaver. In the
defendant's device, there was no need to use a cylindrical cutter. The
cylindrical shape of the cutter was functional as used by the plaintiff, but
non-functional as used by the defendant. The court, therefore, ordered the
defendant to change the shape of both its cutter housing and its cutter.93

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 846.
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The importance of the alternatives analysis is also illustrated in McGill
ManufacturingCo. v. Leviton ManufacturingCo.94 The plaintiff, McGill,
made a lighting fixture that had become distinctive.95 Because the
defendant sold almost identical fixtures, the court had "no doubt that
confusion exists between plaintiff's and defendant's devices, and that
purchasers are more than likely to be deceived in buying defendant's
devices believing them to be plaintiffs devices." 96 The defendant argued
that key features of the fixtures were essential, including openings in the
insulation and visible strengthening ribs.97 The court agreed, but concluded
that the defendant could modify the location or appearance of the features
while retaining the same utilitarian benefit.98 The features, therefore, were
non-functional, and the defendant was ordered to modify its fixtures to
eliminate the risk of consumer confusion.99
The early period cases discussed above provide a number of important
lessons concerning the proper application of the functionality doctrine.
Perhaps most importantly, the early courts recognized the need to apply
the functionality doctrine in a flexible, pragmatic manner. The courts
avoided bright-line rules, and instead looked for practical solutions that
would maximize vigorous competition, protect the patent bargain, and
minimize the risk of consumer confusion. This effort to balance potentially
divergent interests sometimes resulted in protection for previously
patented designs (e.g., the shredded wheat biscuit design at issue in the
Shredded Wheat case), but the early courts found this result acceptable so
long as the protection did not hinder competition.
During the early period, functionality was a limited defense, not an
affirmative element of a claimant's case. The early doctrine, therefore,
differed in two significant respects from the modem doctrine. First, the
focus in the early cases was on the defendant's product, not the overall
design of the plaintiff's product. In modem cases, however, the question
is whether the plaintiffs product, taken as a whole, is functional. That

94. 43 F.2d 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).
95. Id. at 608 ("Due to the distinctive shape and appearance of plaintiff's fixtures, they have
acquired a secondary meaning so that the purchasers of similar devices of this nature understood
and believed them to be the manufactured articles of plaintiff.").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. As to the openings for the wiring, the court gave the following explanation: "It is true
that the visible protruding insulation serves a functional purpose, because it prevents contact
between the emanating wires and the shell. An examination of the devices shows that such
functional requirement does not necessitate placing these openings in any certain specified place."
Id. A similar conclusion was reached on the question of the strengthening ribs: "If defendant
believed that strengthening ribs were necessary, there were other forms of ribs which could have
been designed. It was not necessary to copy the three ribs which plaintiff used." Id.
99. Id.
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question did not arise in the early cases. Second, the functionality doctrine
did not create an absolute bar to protection during the early period. If a
defendant successfully proved the copied features were functional, the
defendant still had to take reasonable steps to distinguish its product from
the plaintiffs product.1' The interest in preventing consumer confusion
remained important, even when a successful functionality defense was
established. The modem rule is quite different. A finding that a plaintiff s
design is functional ends the dispute, and defendants are not required to
take any steps to distinguish their goods from those of a party whose
design is deemed functional. °1
Finally, it is important to consider the meaning of competition in the
early cases. Courts during the early period sought to prevent patent-like
protection under the guise of a palming off claim. Patents protect specific
inventions, and as a result, provide a level of exclusivity to products
embodying the protected inventions. Though a patent could, at least in
theory, provide broad enough protection to allow a patent owner to
effectively control a particular market, such a result is uncommon.0 2 In
other words, patents typically provide some level of exclusivity at a
product level, but not at a market level. Given this reality, it is not
surprising that early courts focused on product-level competition in their
application of the functionality doctrine. Courts did not require a showing
that a particular feature was critical to control an entire market. Instead,
the early courts asked whether the feature or features at issue were
important to competition at the product level; that is, whether the features
were needed to make a competitively comparable product.'0 3
B. The Turbulent Middle Period:1938-1981
In 1938, the American Law Institute published the unfair competition
provisions of the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement included the
common-law palming off claim under the heading "Unprivileged
Imitation."'" To prove a defendant's copying amounted to an unprivileged

100. See supra note 85.
101. There is a limited exception to this general rule, but it has been used quite infrequently
during the last twenty years. See infra note 584 (explaining that some courts have issued limited
injunctions to prevent confusion even where the features copied were functional).
102. See Cotter, supra note 42, at 62-63.
103. The early courts' focus on product competition also may have been motivated by the
nature of trademarks. In any given market, trademarks are used to differentiate competitive
products, including products that otherwise may be materially identical. By protecting trademarks,
product-level competition is enhanced. This focus likely carried over into the functionality analysis,
where courts also evaluated competition at a product, rather than a market, level.
104. The Restatement provided the following definition of this tort:
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imitation, a plaintiff had to show, among other things, that "the copied or
imitated feature is non-functional, or, if it is functional, [that the
defendant] does not take reasonable steps to inform prospective purchasers
that the goods which he markets are not those of the other."' 5 "A feature
of goods is functional," the Restatement explained, "if it affects their
purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling1or
using them; it is non-functional if it does not have any of such
6
effects."'
07
The Restatement marked "a substantial departure from prior law.'
Many features "affect" the "purpose, action or performance" of products,
but far fewer features have a significant impact on competition. Consider
the plastic spray bottle discussed in the Introduction to this Article."0 The
bottle is a fairly common design, and its shape clearly "affects [the]
purpose, action or performance" of the bottle. The neck portion of the
bottle is sized to easily fit within a person's hand, and the spray
mechanism is designed so that a user may easily reach the spray trigger to
dispense the liquid. These features seem to satisfy the Restatement
definition of a functional feature. But are the particular characteristics of
this spray bottle necessary for vigorous competition in the liquid cleaner
market? Do competitors need to use the same design to make competitive

§ 741. Elements of Unprivileged Imitation.
One who markets goods, the physical appearance of which is a copy or
imitation of the physical appearance of the goods of which another is the initial
distributor, markets them with an unprivileged imitation, under the rule stated in
§ 711, if his goods are of the same class as those of the other and are sold in a
market in which the other's interest is protected, and
(a) he copied or imitated the appearance after obtaining, access to or
procuring the goods, or their labels, wrappers, containers, styles or
designs by improper means or on his promise not to copy or imitate
them, or
(b) the copied or imitated feature has acquired generally in the market a
special significance identifying the other's goods, and
(i) the copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to
regard his goods as those of the other, and
(ii) the copied or imitated feature is non-functional, or, if it is
functional, he does not take reasonable steps to inform
prospective purchasers that the goods which he markets are not
those of the other.

§ 741 (1938). The first two volumes of the Restatement were published
in 1934, the third in 1938. The trademark and unfair competition provisions were contained in
Chapter 35, titled "Confusion of Source," which was part of the third volume.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 742.
107. Note, supra note 49, at 558.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
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products? These questions may be rather close ones, but the spray bottle
may well be non-functional under a competition-based definition of
functionality. This example illustrates the significance of the change
brought by the Restatement in 1938. The Restatement definition also
"implies that the availability of substitutes for the simulated feature is
basically irrelevant."1 °9 This too marked an important change, as early
courts had come to focus heavily on the availability of alternative designs.
There was no explanation of why or how the Restatement reporters
decided to define functionality in this way,"' but the new definition had
a significant impact on the development of the doctrine.
After the publication of the Restatement, courts began to reject the
competitive need rationale and replace it with a much more restrictive
functionality standard. In 1964, one commentator explained, "Many courts
have relied on the Restatement in holding 'functional' to be synonymous
with 'utilitarian' or 'useful,' and have withheld relief whenever the copied
features aided the performance or manufacture of the product.""' A
number of decisions illustrate the shift from the competitive need rationale
to the Restatement standard. For example, in J. C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee
MercantileCo., the Eighth Circuit considered an unfair competition claim
based on the bib pocket design used on the plaintiff's overalls." 2 Relying
on the Restatement, the court found the design functional."' The court

109. Note, supra note 49, at 559.
110. In the Introductory Note to Chapter 35, the Restatement reporter notes that "the scope of
liability in this field is constantly expanding." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 35, introductory note
(1938). The more traditional labels "passing off" and "palming off" were not used in the
Restatement because the protection provided to "trade-marks and trade names, and, under certain
conditions, to the interest in the physical appearance of goods transcends that given under the
narrower conception of 'passing off."' Id. This explains the "unprivileged imitation" label, but says
nothing about how the Institute selected the functionality standard provided in Section 742.
The comment following Section 742 further explains the functionality definition. The comment
makes clear that under the Restatement, a feature can be functional if it provides utilitarian or
aesthetic value to a product. Id § 742 cmt. a. "A candy box in the shape of a heart" is provided as
an example of an aesthetic feature that "may be functional," despite the fact that other shapes would
hold the candy just as effectively. Id. After giving other examples of aesthetic features that might
be functional, the comment concludes "[t]he determination of whether or not such features are
functional depends upon.. . whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of
something which will substantially hinder them in competition." Id. This statement harkens back
to the competitive need rationale so prominent in the pre-Restatement cases, but it is not clear
whether this explanation was limited to aesthetic features or was intended to apply to all cases. In
the end, it made little difference, as most courts focused on the Restatement definition rather than
the comment. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
111. Note, supra note 49, at 560.
112. 120 F.2d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 1941).
113. Id. at 954. The court explained,
the term "functional" is not to be treated as synonymous with the literal
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suggested that the pocket design was important in the market for overalls,
but did not define functionality in terms of competitive need." 14 PreRestatement cases relying on the competitive need rationale were not
cited.' '5

signification of the term "Utilitarian." A design, for example, may not be
utilitarian in a technical sense, but it may nevertheless be functional in the sense
that it will contribute materially to a general sale of the goods.
Id. This discussion was based on the inclusion of aesthetic functionality in the Restatement
explanation of the functionality rule. Id. at 954; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938).
114. The plaintiff made arguments based on the competitive need rationale, but these
arguments did not sway the court. For example, the plaintiff argued "that the utility features of the
pocket could have been adopted without copying the actual design" used by the plaintiff. JC.
Penny Co., 120 F.2d at 954. The court treated this argument as factually suspect and legally
irrelevant. First, the court noted that the alternatives to the plaintiff's design would require use of
more than one pocket, and that "[tihe unity ofthe structure suggests a utilitarian value over separate
pocket elements." Id.But the court also held that evidence of alternatives would not necessarily
render the plaintiff's design non-functional because consumers might have a "legitimate desire...
for the design itself without regard to its source or claimed symbolization." Id.
The Eighth Circuit did not fully reject the competitive need analysis in JC.Penney, but it did
rely on the new Restatement definition of functionality. The result is a somewhat ambiguous
decision with elements of competitive need analysis and elements of the Restatement approach. The
case is important because it marks the beginning of a shift toward the Restatement definition of
functionality. Indeed, it seems likely that the plaintiff's reliance on the competitive need rationale
was based on the widespread acceptance of this rationale prior to the publication of the
Restatement.
115. Id. at 954-55. In the latter part of its functionality discussion, the Eighth Circuit
considered the patent bargain rationale because the plaintiff "had been denied a patent upon the bibpocket design." Id. at 954. The absence of patent protection for the design provided a second reason
for rejecting the plaintiff's unfair competition claim. See id. at 954-55. In this part of its analysis,
the Eighth Circuit relied on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as a decision written by
Oliver Wendell Holmes while he was ajustice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id.
at 955 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) and Flagg Mfg. Co. v.
Holway, 59 N.E. 667 (Mass. 1901)).
It is possible to read JC.Penney as an early patent bargain decision. The court does not
explicitly link the functionality standard to its discussion of the plaintiff's failed effort to obtain a
patent, but it is clear that the absence of patent protection was one of the reasons the court refused
to protect the plaintiff's pocket design. Id. at 954-55. In this sense, the JC.Penney court went
beyond the more moderate patent bargain approach-that is, the notion that previously patented
designs must not be protected under trademark or unfair competition law-and endorsed a more
absolute right-to-copy approach--that is, the notion that any unpatented design, whether previously
patented or never patented, must be free for all to copy. No modem courts have gone this far, but
some commentators have argued for such a rule. See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 36, at 367-68
(arguing for very limited trade dress protection for product configurations); Dowell, supranote 59,
at 190-91 (arguing for a right to copy all unpatented designs with a requirement that copyists
"utilize every reasonable means to label products and avoid confusion"); Note, Trademark
Protectionof Objects and Configurations: A CriticalAnalysis, 59 MINN. L. REV. 541,557-59, 568
(1975) (arguing that trade dress protection for articles conflicts with the patent system and that
"[s]hapes could still be registered [as trademarks], but only in the unusual circumstances where they
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The Sixth Circuit adopted the Restatement functionality standard in a
1942 decision involving the appearance of fishing lures. In James
Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., the court found that
the outward appearance of a fishing lure contributed to the "purpose,
action or performance" of the product."1 6 The lure design, therefore, was
functional." 7 This case is a particularly striking break with the preRestatement case law, given the Sixth Circuit's use of the competitive
need rationale in its early Diamond Match case." 8 In James Heddon's
Sons, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Restatement definition of
functionality;" 9 the case contains no citation to Diamond Match or any
other pre-Restatement functionality decision.
The Restatement definition of functional product features was a clear
break with the prior case law, but the Restatement was not the final word
on this issue. In a series of important decisions, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals revived the competitive need rationale. Judge Giles Rich,
perhaps the leading patent jurist in the United States, led this effort. The
shift began with two cases decided on the same day in early 1961: In re
Deister ConcentratorCo.,2 and In re ShakespeareCo. 2 ' Both cases were
appeals from refusals to register product configurations as trademarks
under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act). 22 In both
cases, the CCPA affirmed the refusals, finding both designs legally
functional. 23 The results, however, were less important in the long run
than the reasoning used in the cases.

perform no marketing or attractiveness function").
116. 128 F.2d6, 13 (6th Cir. 1942).
117. Id. at 12-13. The Sixth Circuit relied exclusively on the Restatement for the general
definition of a functional feature, quoting the entire text of Section 742. Id.at 13. "When [the
Restatement definition is] specifically applied to the manufacture of artificial fishing bait, shape,
size and color may be altogether functional," the court held. Id.
The James Heddon's Sons decision also presented a patent bargain issue. The plaintiff held a
design patent for its lure design until 1935. Id. at 12. The defendant copied the design disclosed in
the expired design patent. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff "cannot, as patentee, claim
a monopoly beyond the life of the patent on the form and shape of its bait described therein." Id.
at 13. This statement was followed by a discussion of the functionality doctrine. Id. The court's
decision apparently was based on both the patent bargain concern and the general rule against
protection of functional features. On the functionality question, the Sixth Circuit followed the
Restatement.
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
119. The court cited only the Restatement and the JC. Penney case as support for its
functionality analysis. James Heddon's Sons, 128 F.2d at 13.
120. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
121. 289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
122. Deister ConcentratorCo., 289 F.2d at 497; Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d at 506.
123. DeisterConcentratorCo., 289 F.2d at 504; Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d at 508.
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Judge Rich wrote for the court in both Deister and Shakespeare.24 In
Deister, the applicant sought to register the "substantially rhomboidal
outline" of a shaking table, "a device for separating solid particles
suspended in a flowing film of water on the basis of differences in their
size, specific gravity, or shape."' 25 Under almost any definition of
functionality this alleged trademark probably would be functional. But
Judge Rich used the Deister case as an opportunity to provide additional
insights into the functionality doctrine. He began by acknowledging that
trademark protection for the design at issue could create a "potential
perpetual monopoly on the outline shape of [applicant's] shaking table
deck." 2 6 That concern, however, was not enough to resolve the case. "The
basic issue here is whether the law permits such a monopoly.""'
After citing the Restatement definition of functionality and the leading
post-Restatement cases, Judge Rich made a subtle, but important, break
with that line of authority. Though the Restatement could be read as
equating functionality with usefulness, Judge Rich rejected that approach.
The shaking table's "'shape is not required to be wholly useless to qualify
for registration,"' he explained. 2 "A feature dictated solely by
'functional' (utilitarian) considerations may not be protected as a
trademark; but mere possession of a function (utility) is not sufficient
reason to deny protection."'29 The outline of the shaking table was
functional, Judge Rich concluded, "because the shape is in essence
utilitarian."' 13
The Deister case did not explicitly return the functionality doctrine to
the competitive need rationale, but it did move away from the Restatement
approach. A design "dictated solely by 'functional' (utilitarian)

124. DeisterConcentratorCo., 289 F.2d at 497; Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d at 506.
125. DeisterConcentratorCo., 289 F.2d at 497-98.
126. Id. at 499.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 500 (quoting the appellant's statement with approval).
129. Id. at 502. This statement was the last of four "truisms" identified by Judge Rich in
Deister.The other three follow:
(1) Trademarks enable one to determine the existence of common source; but not
everything that enables one to determine source is a trademark.
(2) A trademark distinguishes one man's goods from the goods of others; but not
everything that enables goods to be so distinguished will be protected as a
trademark.
(3) Some trademarks are words or configurations which are protected because
they have acquired a "secondary meaning"; but not every word or configuration
that has a de facto "secondary meaning" is protected as a trademark.

130. Id.at 506.
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considerations"13 ' would be functional under almost any definition. The
"mere possession of a function," on the other hand, reflects a much
different standard.'32 What about highly useful designs (i.e., designs with
more than "mere possession of a function") that are not "dictated solely by
'functional' (utilitarian) considerations?"' 33 There seems a fairly wide
range of utility between these two alternatives, but Deister does not
resolve this ambiguity.
The Shakespeare decision sheds a bit more light on the functionality
analysis. That case involved an attempt to register as a trademark the spiral
appearance of the tip-end of a fishing rod.'34 The applicant's rods were
made using a patented method, and the spiral appearance was the result of
using this method.'35 Shakespeare was a difficult case under the
Restatement approach, because the spiral design did not perform any
useful role in the operation of the rod.'36 Nor did the spiral design have
significant aesthetic appeal.'37 Nevertheless, protecting the design as a
trademark could have an adverse effect on competition when the
applicant's patent expired. As Judge Rich noted:
[W]e must treat the process, and the resulting product, as one
which will eventually be in the public domain, even if it is
not now. Were the spiral marking to be treated as a trademark
the holder of the trademark rights would have a potentially
perpetual monopoly which would enable it either to prevent
others from using the process which results in the mark or
38
force them to go to the trouble andexpense of removing it.'
The emphasized language is similar to the analysis used in preRestatement functionality cases.' 39 The CCPA moved closer to the

131. Id. at 502.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. In re Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d 506, 506-07 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
135. Id. at 507.
136. Id. at 507-08.
137. Id. at 507.
138. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
139. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. The quoted language also can be read as
supporting the patent bargain and right-to-copy arguments. This reading, however, fails to take full
account of the concluding statement. The court accepts as a given that upon expiration of the utility
patent, others would be allowed to use the claimed method to make a fishing rod. This part of the
analysis sounds like a patent bargain statement, but this fact alone was not enough to render the
spiral design functional. See Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d at 508. The design was simply a result of
the patented method, but the design was deemed functional because it would require effort and
money to remove the design. Id. at 507-08. The latter considerations are not grounded in the patent
bargain concerns but are more consistent with the competition rationale.
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competitive need rationale in the Shakespeare case, though the court
stopped short of fully embracing this rationale. 4
Judge Rich's rejection of the literal reading of the Restatement and his
endorsement of the competitive need rationale became clear in an
important 1964 decision. The case, In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
involved an application to register as a trademark the shape of a
nontraditional wine bottle. 14' The bottle design was covered by an existing
design patent, a fact that forced the court to consider the relationship
between design patent protection and trademark protection. 42 The
majority saw no conflict because of14the
3 different purposes of the design
patent laws and the trademark laws.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rich cast the functionality question in
terms of competitive need. "Whether competition would in fact be
hindered is really the crux of the matter. I disagree with the solicitor
because I am convinced that others would not be in the least hindered in
competition."1 44 The solicitor argued that the Mogen David bottle design
The point is somewhat subtle, but important. Consider, for example, the effect of changing one
fact. What if the spiral design, a direct result of using the patented method, was quite easy to
remove or otherwise eliminate from consumers' view? For example, what if fishing rods were
always covered with some protective finish, and a manufacturer could simply use an opaque finish
to cover the spiral design? Ifthis design alternative added nothing to the overall cost or complexity
of the manufacturing process, would the Shakespeare court have found the spiral design functional?
Perhaps not, which suggests the decision was not based solely on the patent bargain concern.
140. Judge Rich and the CCPA took another step toward the competitive need rationale in In
re Pollack Steel Co., 314 F.2d 566, 570 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ("To permit appellant to assert trademark
rights in its alleged mark would clearly have the effect of unjustifiably giving appellant a perpetual
monopoly on the simplest and cheapest use of a simple process of applying a functional reflective
coating to a functionally designed metal fence post.").
141. 328 F.2d 925, 926 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
142. Id. at 926-28.
143. The court explained:
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair competition,
which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not
"extend" the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law
and for different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on the
continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark
rights do not extend it.
Id. at 930.
144. Id. at 933 (Rich, J., concurring). Though Judge Rich concluded that competition "would
not be in the least hindered," he did not define functionality in those specific terms. Id. (Rich, J.,
concurring). That is, Judge Rich did not suggest that a feature would be functional if it had a
minimal effect on competition. Instead, he focused on the availability of functionally equivalent
alternative designs and concluded that competitors did not need to use the design adopted by the
applicant:
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was aesthetically pleasing, and therefore functional under the
Restatement. 145 Judge Rich was unpersuaded because the bottle design,
whatever its aesthetic value, was not necessary for competition. "[T]he
design of a wine bottle like the one here is of such an arbitrary nature that
depriving the public of the right to copy it is insignificant, as a policy
matter, in comparison with the vendor's right to protection from possible
confusion in trade.' 46
These important decisions by the CCPA during the early 1960s seem
to have turned the tide. Strict readings of the Restatement became less
common, and courts began to return to the competitive need rationale.
Decisions by the Eighth Circuit and Third Circuit provide a good
illustration of this shift. As noted above, the Eighth Circuit was one of the
first courts to explicitly endorse the Restatement definition of
functionality. 147 The J.C. Penney case (the overall bib pocket case) was
decided in 1941.14' Thirty-five years later, the Eighth Circuit returned to
the functionality issue49 in Truck Equipment Service v. FruehaufCorp.
(hereinafter TESCO).1
TESCO involved the design of "a twin hopper bottomed grain or bulk
commodity semi-trailer."' 50 This product, like the one at issue in the
Deistercase, was clearly useful. It was, after all, a semi-trailer for hauling
grain or other commodities.' 5 ' If the Eighth Circuit used the same
functionality standard it employed in the J C. Penney case-that is, if the
court used the Restatement definition-the design at issue in TESCO
almost certainly would have been found functional. But the TESCO court
found the design non-functional because "prohibition against the copying
of [the design] will not affect Fruehauf's competitive position in the
marketplace."' 52 The court relied upon Deister and other CCPA decisions
Others can meet any real or imagined demand for wine in decanter-type
bottles-assuming there is any such thing-without being in the least hampered
in competition by inability to copy the Mogen David bottle design. They might
even excel in competition by producing a more attractive design under the
stimulus of a prohibition against copying under the principles of unfair
competition law.
concurring). Judge Rich emphasized the negligible impact of protecting the Mogen
Id. (Rich, J.,
David bottle design to show that the design was clearly non-functional. Id. (Rich, J., concurring).
In his view, the functionality question in Mogen Davidwas not close.
145. Id.at 932-33 (Rich, J., concurring).
146. Id.at 933 (Rich, J., concurring).
147. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
148. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941).
149. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
150. Id at 1213.
151. Id.
at 1218. The TESCO court clearly defined functionality in terms of competitive need.
152. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56

'
as support for its adoption of a competitive need functionality standard. 53
54
it
used
decision,
Though the TESCO court cited its earlier J C. Penney
a new standard. The influence of Judge Rich and the CCPA was clear.
The shift in the Third Circuit was less striking than that in the Eighth,
but no less important. In two post-Restatement, but pre-Deister,cases, the
Third Circuit rigidly applied the Restatement definition of functionality.
The first, Vaughan Novelty Manufacturing Co. v. G. G. Greene
ManufacturingCorp., involved an unfair competition claim based on the
design of a can opener.'55 Using almost no analysis, the court deemed the
design functional.' 56 In a footnote, however, the court summarily rejected,
as irrelevant, the plaintiffs argument that other can opener designs would
work equally well.'57
The second case from the Third Circuit involved the highly successful
Sylvania flash bulbs. 5 These bulbs, used with cameras, were made with

Id. ("The question in each case is whether protection against imitation will hinder the competitor
in competition.").
153. Id.
154. The court provided the following quote from the J.C.Penney case:
[T]he law treats a nonfunctional aspect of goods as constituting in effect a mere
form of merchandising or a business method. The law necessarily and naturally
condemns any method of merchandising which unjustifiably tends to deceive or
confuse the public. And so, in competitive goods, the appropriation of a
nonfunctional aspect will generally be regarded as an improper method of
merchandising and prohibited as unfair competition, in order to prevent probable
deception or confusion of the public in the market.
Id at 1217 (quoting J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1941)). This quotation is not helpful. It explains that non-functional designs are protected under
unfair competition law to prevent consumer confusion, but it does not explain how to determine
whether a particular design is functional. When the TESCO court addressed the latter point, it
turned to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decisions reviewed above, and adopted a
competitive need standard. See id.
155. 202 F.2d 172, 173 (3d Cir. 1953).
156. Id. at 176 ("Since the items copied are functional, defendant has as much right to use
them as does plaintiff, even though plaintiff may have been their originator.").
157. Id. at 175 n.10. The court stated:
[P]laintiff does argue that there are many different shapes and sizes which
defendant could use and still produce a workable can opener. This is true, but the
same could be said of the pillow-shaped shredded wheat biscuit, the rounded
overall pockets, and the two-tone match head in the cases cited above.
Id. The court was referring to the following decisions: Kellogg Co. v. NationalBiscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111 (1938); JC.Penney Co., 120 F.2d at 949; and DiamondMatch Co. v. Saginaw Match Co.,
142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906).
158. Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 731 (3d Cir. 1957).
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a defect or use indicator.'59 A good, unused bulb had a blue dot, but if the
bulb was used or defective, the dot changed to pink. " Because the
indicator was useful, the court found it functional under the Restatement
standard.'16 The plaintiff argued "that Dura could have varied the color or
positioning of the dot indicating air leakage." 1 62 The court summarily
rejected this argument because, "[p]laintiffs in unfair competition cases are
always able to conceive of other courses which defendants might have
pursued.', 63 After these two decisions, the Third Circuit seemed one of the
least receptive courts to an unfair competition claim based on a product's
design.
When the Third Circuit returned to the functionality issue, it faced a
difficult application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine. In Keene Corp.
v. ParaflexIndustries, Inc., the Third Circuit rejected a broad reading of
the Restatement's aesthetic functionality position.'" The court held that
findings of functionality should be based on utilitarian value. 65 In
explaining the proper role of the functionality doctrine, the Third Circuit
66 the
relied upon Judge Rich's concurrence in the Mogen David case,'
67 and the Deister case. 68
Circuit,
Eighth
the
by
TESCO decision
The Third Circuit, however, stopped short of adopting a strict
competitive need standard in Keene, viewing this approach as "an
unnecessarily narrow view of functionality. This court has previously
indicated that merely because there are other shapes and designs 'which
defendant could use and still produce a workable' product, the design used
is not thereby non-functional.' ' 169 The important question, the Keene court
explained, is how many equally effective alternatives exist:

159. Id at 731.
160. Id.
161. Id.at 732.
162. Id.at 734.
163. Id.
164. 653 F.2d 822, 833 (3d Cir. 1981).
165. Id. at 825-26.
166. Id. at 825.
167. Id.at 825-26.
168. Id.at 826. The Third Circuit cited its earlier Sylvania decision, but described "the blue
dot on the Sylvania photographic flash-bulbs" as "essential to the utility of the item." Id.at 824
(citing Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 732). The defect identification function may have been "essential,"
but, as noted above, Sylvania argued the color or position of the dot could have been changed
without reducing the utility of the feature. Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 734. The Keene court glossed over
this rather important point in an apparent effort to "reconcile" the earlier Sylvania decision with a
competition-based functionality analysis.
169. Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 827 (quoting Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G.G. Greene Mfg.
Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 175 n.10 (3d Cir. 1953)).
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Because there are only a limited number of configurations
or designs for a luminaire which are architecturally
compatible with the type of structures on which they are
placed, the selection of a luminaire design does not have the
unlimited boundaries as does the selection of a wine bottle or
ashtray design, and the [district] court's finding that
competition will be stifled is again not clearly erroneous. 7
Note the court's conclusion concerning the impact on competition.
Protecting the luminaire design would stifle competition-that is,
competitors needed the design to effectively compete-so it was
functional. This decision marks a shift in the Third Circuit, just as surely
as the TESCO decision reflected a shift in the Eighth Circuit. 7 '
These decisions illustrate the resiliency of the common law and the
strong appeal of the competitive need rationale. When the Restatement
introduced a new functionality standard, courts moved away from the
competitive need rationale. But over time, with assistance from Judge Rich
and the CCPA, courts began to return to this rationale. When the Third
Circuit decided Keene in 1981, it joined the trend toward endorsement of
the competitive need rationale.
C. The Modern Period-Consistencyand Competitive Need
The "modem period"'" marked the high point in the development of
the functionality doctrine. During this period, federal courts unanimously
adopted the competitive need rationale as the proper general functionality
standard and reached agreement on other difficult functionality issues.
1. The Competitive Need Rationale Becomes the Law of the Land
Two important functionality decisions were issued in 1982. The first
came from the CCPA, was authored by Judge Giles Rich, and presented
the most comprehensive examination of the functionality doctrine ever
undertaken by a court. The case, In re Morton-NorwichProducts,involved
an attempt to register as a trademark the shape of a plastic spray bottle
(i.e., the type often used with household cleaners).' 7 3 In a somewhat
surprising decision, the court held the bottle design was not legally
functional because there was no evidence competitors needed to use the
170. Id.
171. It is a bit ironic that these two circuits proved to be the last circuits to complete the move
toward adoption of a functionality standard defined purely in terms of competitive need. See infra
notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
172. I define this period as running from 1982 until 2001. My definition is based on the
issuance of two important functionality decisions in 1982 and the 2001 TrajFix decision.
173. 671 F.2d 1332, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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same design. 74 The basis of the functionality doctrine, Judge Rich
explained, was "not the right to slavishly copy articles which are not
protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which
is more properly termed the right to compete effectively."'75
The second important functionality decision issued in 1982 was Inwood
Laboratoriesv. Ives Laboratories,a Supreme Court decision involving the

174. Id.
at 1342.
175. Id. at 1339. The Morton-Norwich decision was an important precedent on three issues.

First, the decision marked the strongest endorsement of the competitive need rationale during the
post-Restatement period. Subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit and other circuit courts
strongly endorsed this rationale, but it was Morton-Norwich that blazed the trail for others to
follow. It remains one of the most important of all functionality decisions.
The second legacy of Morton-Norwich did not withstand the test of time. In evaluating the
spray bottle design, the CCPA suggested that only utilitarian features can be functional. Id at 1338
("From the earliest cases, 'functionality' has been expressed in terms of 'utility."'). The Federal
Circuit followed this suggestion in later cases, which led to some rather contorted efforts to
characterize features as utilitarian where the court believed the features should not be protected.
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
black color of outboard engines functional because "[c]olor compatibility and ability to decrease
apparent motor size are not in this case mere aesthetic features. Rather these non-trademark
functions supply a competitive advantage."). Most other circuits eventually recognized some form
of aesthetic functionality. See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
The final Morton-Norwich legacy was the nomenclature Judge Rich crafted for the evaluation
of functionality. To distinguish between features that serve some useful function and those that
cannot be protected as trademarks, Judge Rich explained:
[W]e must speak in terms of de facto functionality and dejure functionality, the
former being the use of "functional" in the lay sense, indicating that although the
design of a product, a container, or a feature of either is directed to performance
of a function, it may be legally recognized as an indication of source. De jure
functionality, of course, would be used to indicate the opposite--such a design
may not be protected as a trademark.
Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1337. This approach may make sense to lawyers, but it is not
a user-friendly explanation of the functionality doctrine. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
regional circuit courts did not follow this aspect of the Morton-Norwich analysis. See, e.g., W.T.
Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,341-42 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the difficult task of framing
a jury instruction on functionality). Perhaps in deference to Judge Rich, the examining trademark
attorneys in the PTO and the administrative law judges on the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) continue to use the de facto/de jure labels. See 1 TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1202.03(a) (2000); see also Nordson Corp., No..75/578,830, 2003 ITrAB LEXIS
128, at *9 (Trademark Trial App. B. Mar. 13, 2003); All Rite Prods., No.75/260,089, 2001 TFAB
LEXIS 703, at *3 (Trademark Trial App. B. Sept. 26, 2001); Ennco Display Sys., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1279, 1282 nn. 10-11 (Trademark Trial App. B. 2000). The Federal Circuit also continues to use
these labels in appeals from the TrAB. See, e.g., Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d
1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002); L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1999); In re Bose, 772 F.2d 866, 872-73 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482,
1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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appearance of generic substitutes for a branded prescription drug.1 6
Though the Supreme Court issued no holding on the functionality issue in
Inwood,' the Court explained that "a product feature is functional if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article." ' The first prong of this explanation is generally
consistent with the competitive need rationale-any feature "essential to
the use or purpose" of a product' is surely a feature of
competitors need t79 -but the second prong is not. Indeed, the second part

176. 456 U.S. 844, 846 (1982).
177. The trademark claim in Inwood was based on a contributory liability theory. According
to the plaintiff, pharmacists were passing offthe defendants' generic substitutes when prescriptions
were written for the plaintiff's branded drug. Id.at 852-53. Rather than sue the pharmacists, the
plaintiff sued the defendants on the theory that by copying the appearance of the plaintiff's branded
product, the defendants were contributorily liable for the pharmacists' infringing acts. Id.at 850-51.
The defendants challenged the plaintiff's theory on a number of grounds, including functionality.
Id. at 853. According to the defendants, the physical appearance of the plaintiffs product was
functional, and thus no infringement could be found based merely on the copying of the
appearance. Id. at 857 n.20. The district court agreed, but the court of appeals did not directly
address the functionality issue. Id. For that reason, the issue was not squarely presented in the
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court noted, however, that on remand, the lower courts probably
would have to consider the functionality issue. Id.
178. Id. at 850 n.10.
179. The first prong of the Inwood test is open to two interpretations. First, a feature could be
"essential" if it is absolutely needed to compete as a product in a particular market. I read Inwood
this way, and thus conclude the first part of the Inwood definition is generally consistent with the
competitive need standard. Inwood,however, sets the bar too high, because many features are quite
important to competition, yet not absolutely essential. The competitive need standard never
required a showing of absolute necessity. The proper question is whether protection would unduly
hinder competition. See supranotes 72-87 and accompanying text. The late Ralph Brown also read
Inwood in this way. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection,An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
1362 (1987) ("[Mly unease with this definition centers on the word 'essential.' Of course an
essential feature is functional. But any implication that only essential features are functional is
misleading.").
But Inwood also could be read to support a focus on the importance of a feature to the particular
product embodying the feature. In other words, the first prong of the Inwood definition might
render a feature functional if the feature is essential to the operation of the plaintiffs product--that
is, if the product would not work without the feature. The same feature, however, might be of little
importance to competition in the broader market. In fact, the plaintiff's entire product might be of
little competitive importance, but certain features of the product might be functional under this
reading of the Inwood definition.
It is not clear whether courts recognized these two conflicting interpretations of the first part
of the Inwood test, but it seemed the trend was more consistent with the first reading. The
competitive need standard was more restrictive than an "essential" standard (i.e. more designs
would be denied protection under a competitive need standard), but did focus on the competitive
importance of the feature or features at issue. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may have
accepted the second reading of Inwood in TrajfFix when it endorsed Inwood but rejected the
competitive need standard. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
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of the Inwood definition seems to harken back to the old Restatement
standard. 'o
The functionality definition provided in Inwood threatened the trend
toward universal adoption of a competition-based functionality standard.
To appreciate the potential of the Inwood definition, one must first
recognize the importance of the Court's use of the disjunctive "or" in the
definition. Features are functional under the Inwood standard, and
therefore receive no trademark protection, if they satisfy either of the two
parts of the test. The second prong of the Inwood definition seems much
easier to satisfy-indeed, if applied literally this part of the standard would
render virtually all features functional-and therefore, could have
dominated the functionality analysis. Or put somewhat differently, why
would a defendant argue the feature at issue is "essential" when the same
result (i.e., a finding that the feature is functional) could be obtained
merely by showing the feature "affects the cost or quality" of the product?
The second prong of the Inwood test seems to create a functionality
standard quite different from the competitive need standard endorsed by
the CCPA in Morton-Norwich.
As the modem period began, courts faced a difficult choice: follow the
Morton-Norwich analysis and continue the trend toward greater reliance
on the competitive need rationale, or follow the Inwood standard, as
written, and adopt a functionality rule strikingly different from the
approach used by the CCPA in Morton-Norwich. To follow the former
course, courts had to find a way to deal with Inwood.
The Fifth Circuit was the first regional court of appeals to consider the
general functionality standard after Morton-Norwich and Inwood.' In

180. If applied literally, this part of the Inwood standard would render virtually all designs
functional because nearly "every design 'affects' . . . the utility of the article in which it is
embodied. 'Affects' is broad enough to include a design which reduces the utility or the economy
ofmanufacture." Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1340. Judge Rich's criticism of the "affects"
standard was prophetic, as the CCPA decision in Morton-Norwich was issued about three months
before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Inwood. Judge Rich was commenting on the
language from the Restatement of Torts, but because the second part of the Inwood standard so
closely parallels the Restatement language, his criticism seems to apply with equal force to Inwood.
181. The Fifth Circuit, however, was not the first court to address functionality after MortonNorwich and Inwood. The CCPA and the Second Circuit faced somewhat similar aesthetic
functionality issues in In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.P.A. 1982), and Warner
Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1983). Both cases involved the use of
well-known trademarks on toys. DC Comics presented the question of whether the Superman,
Batman, and Joker characters could be registered as trademarks for dolls. DC Comics Inc., 689 F.2d
at 1044-45. The applicant owned registrations for each character for use in comic books and related
materials, but the trademark-examining attorney rejected the application for use on dolls because
such use would be aesthetically functional. Id. at 1045. The CCPA rejected this argument and held
the drawings of the characters were valid trademarks for dolls. Id.
The Warner Bros. case involved an infringement claim brought by the owners of the Dukes of
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8 2 the court began by noting
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox,"
that the
"circuits have provided differing definitions of functionality that have
resulted in nonuniform application of the doctrine."' 3 "The ultimate
inquiry concerning functionality," the court concluded, "is whether
characterizing a feature or configuration as protected 'will hinder
competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in
the sale of goods.""" The Fifth Circuit relied on Morton-Norwich and
decisions from the Third,8 5 Eighth,1 6 and Ninth' 7 Circuits, but did not
cite Inwood. 8 '

Hazard television show against a company making toy cars resembling the "General Lee" car used
by characters on the show. WarnerBros., 724 F.2d at 329. The defendant argued that its use was
aesthetically functional, but the Second Circuit rejected the argument. Id. at 330-32.
182. 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984).
183. Id. at 422.
184. Id. at 429 (quoting Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1342).

185. Id. at 428 (citing Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981)).
186. Id. at 427 (citing Truck Equip. Serv. v. Fruehauf Co., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976)).
187. Id. at 428 (citing Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. J.Young Enter., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981)).
188. This omission may have been intentional. The Fifth Circuit cited an article from the
TrademarkReporter on the Inwood case. Id. at 429. The cited article presented the views of four
leading trademark attorneys and one prominent trademark scholar. An Analysis of the Ives Case:
A TMR Panel, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 118, 118 (1982). The panel members responded to various
questions about the Inwood case, including the Supreme Court's discussion of functionality. Id. at
127-28. It is unlikely the Fifth Circuit judges could have read this article and not recognized the
potential relevance of the Inwood case on the functionality issue. Indeed, the following discussion
from the article focuses on precisely this point:
QUESTION: Do any of the opinions [in Inwood] shed new light on, or clarify
understanding of, what is functional?
[Beverly W.] PATTISHALL: None of the three opinions appears to shed new
light on, or to clarify understanding of, what is "functional."
[Jerre B.1 SWANN: I agree.
[Ronald R.] KRANZOW: I did not find any of the opinions to be especially
illuminating with respect to functionality....
[J. Thomas] MCCARTHY: ... All in all, the Court's treatment of "functionality"
does nothing to clarify the meaning of the concept. Justice White's treatment is
disappointing but not disastrous. Judge Rich's recent explication on
"functionality" [citing Morton-Norwich]will prove much more useful in the long
run.

[Vincent N.1 PALLADINO: Unfortunately, the most significant statement in the
Supreme Court's decision may turn out to be the majority's footnote 10, which
states that "a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." This standard is not
only internally inconsistent, but is such an oversimplification of the law of
functionality that I believe it would be inappropriate to try to analyze it here.
Id. This discussion is significant, as it includes both a prediction that Morton-Norwich will be the
more significant functionality precedent and a recognition of the internal inconsistency of the two
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The Sicilia case involved the design of a small, squeezable bottle for
lemon or lime juice."8 9 "A particular design, such as the Sicilia bottle," the
Fifth Circuit held, "may serve functions demanded by the product's
manufacturer, but it is not thereby rendered legally functional-and thus
unprotectable-unless the design is only one of a limited number of
equally efficient options and free competition would be unduly hindered
by according that design trademark protection." "° Because "a vast number
of forms may accommodate the functions of a citrus juice
bottle-containing the liquid, permitting one to squeeze the bottle to
dispense the liquid, holding an identifying label, and possessing a flat base
that enables the bottle to stand upright"--the design at issue was nonfunctional. 9 ' This conclusion was supported by evidence of three other
competing juice products with significantly different bottles and a number
of different proposed designs considered by the defendant.' 92
The Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to expressly
consider the relevance of both Morton-Norwich and Inwood on the
functionality issue. The case, LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,193 is
important for three reasons. First, the Second Circuit followed MortonNorwich and adopted the competitive need rationale. 94 Second, the court
correctly characterized the Inwood Court's definition of functionality as
dicta.'95 And third, the court attempted to reconcile the Inwood standard
with the competitive need rationale. 96 With this effort, the Second Circuit
began the process of bringing Inwood in line with the clear trend toward
adoption of a competitive need functionality standard.
Two years later, in 1987, the Second Circuit confirmed its commitment
to the competitive need rationale. In a case involving the design of "a
waterproof rainjacket,"' 97 the court emphasized the need to consider "the
parts of the functionality definition provided in Inwood.
189. Sicilia DiR Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 429.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
194. Id. at 77 (finding the design at issue non-functional because "K Mart's ability to compete
is not unduly hindered by the determination that LeSportsac's particular configuration of design
features is non-functional and therefore eligible for protection").
195. Id.at 76 ("The Supreme Court, in dictum, recently defined a functional feature in 'general
terms' as one that 'is essential to the use or purpose of the article or [that] affects the cost or quality
of the article."' (alteration in original) (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844,850 n. 10

(1982))).
196. Id. (noting that the second part of the Inwood test requires a reduction in cost or an
improvement in operation and concluding that the functionality defense, as described in Inwood
and other cases, "is designed to encourage competition and the broadest dissemination of useful
design features" (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983))),
197. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir. 1987).
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purpose of the functionality defense."' 98 This approach required a focus
"on whether bestowing trade dress protection upon* [the plaintiffs]
arrangement of features 'will hinder competition or impinge upon the
rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of goods."" 99 The court
cited Inwood, but focused entirely on whether there was a competitive
need to use the plaintiff's design." ° The second part of the Inwood
definition, with its Restatement-like standard, was ignored.2"'
One of the most important functionality decisions ofthe modem period
came from the Seventh Circuit. In W.T Rogers Co. v. Keene," 2 Judge
Posner, writing for the panel, provided the following explanation of the
functionality doctrine:
If the feature is ornamental, fanciful, decorative, like the
patterns on a piece of china or of silverware, then the
manufacturer can use it as his name, his symbol, his
identifying mark. Ornamental, fanciful shapes and patterns
are not in short supply, so appropriating one of them to serve
as an identifying mark does not take away from any
competitor something that he needs in order to make a
competing brand. But if the feature is not ornamental or
fanciful or whimsical or arbitrary, but is somehow intrinsic to
the entire product consisting of this manufacturer's brand and
his rivals' brands, trademark production will be denied. The
name of this principle is "functionality"... 203
Judge Posner then gave two examples of functional product designs:
the shape of an airplane and the shape of a football.

198. Id. at 976.
199. Id. at 977 (quoting Sicilia Di IR Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 429).
200. Id. at 975-76.
201. See id.
202. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
203. Id. at 339 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338-41 (C.C.P.A.
1982)). This discussion was part of a general overview of the functionality doctrine. It was not
provided as a working standard for determining when a particular feature or group of features is
functional. Judge Posner's distinction between source-identifying features and features that are
"somehow intrinsic to the entire product" may have been borrowed from the aesthetic functionality
decisions. Though the seminal case in this line, Paglierov. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1952), did not describe functionality in these terms, later cases did. See Int'l Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[In the context of this case,
the [Job's Daughters] name and emblem are functional aesthetic components of thejewelry, in that
they are being merchandised on the basis of their intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or
sponsorship"); Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
("Functionality in this context means that consumers desire the mark for its intrinsic value and not
as a designation of origin.").
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[T]he first company to make an airplane cannot use the
characteristic shape of an airplane as its trademark, thereby
condemning its rivals to build airplanes that won't fly. A firm
that makes footballs could not use as its trademark the
characteristic oval shape of the football, thereby forcing its
rivals to find another shape for their footballs; since they
wouldn't be able to sell any round or oblong or hexagonal
footballs, that firm would have, not an identifying mark, but
a product monopoly, and a product monopoly not for a term
of years as under the patent laws but forever."
These shapes are functional, Judge Posner explained, because
"competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design around,
as they would have to do if they wanted to come up with a nonoval
substitute for a football. 2 °5 On the other hand:
if an automobile manufacturer places at the front end of its
hood a statue of Mercury, it can if it wants make this its
trademark (or one of its trademarks), because its competitors
do not need a statue of Mercury on the hoods of their cars in
order to be able to compete.20 6
The Tenth Circuit continued the trend toward adoption of the competitive
need rationale in Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co. 20 ' At issue were the
designs of competing fishing reels.208 Zebco, a division of the plaintiff
Brunswick, introduced a closed face spin-cast reel in 1954.209 According
to the court, the Zebco reel "differs in appearance from any spin-cast reel
in the market except the SR 210," the product made by Spinit, the

204. W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 339 (citations omitted).
205. Id.
This statement, if considered alone, is consistent with the second prong of the Inwood
standard. If it would cost money to design around a feature, then the feature must be one that
"affects the cost" of the article, to use the Inwood language. Judge Posner's other statements,
however, make clear that he believed functionality must be linked to the ability to compete. When
explaining why the oval shape of a football is functional, Judge Posner emphasized that if
competitors were forced to find other shapes, they would fail in the market "since they wouldn't
be able to sell any round or oblong or hexagonal footballs." Id.
206. Id.The Seventh Circuit cited Morton-Norwichand Inwood, but relied more on the force
of Judge Posner's own analysis than on the particular holdings of other courts. See id.at 339-40.
There is, for example, no discussion in Rogers of the functionality definition provided in Inwood,
just a citation to the decision and a parenthetical note that the Supreme Court's discussion of
functionality was "dictum." Id.
207. 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987).
208. Id. at 516.
209. Id.
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defendant.21 ° Spinit responded to Brunswick's allegations of trade dress
infringement by arguing that the Zebco reel design was functional.21 '
Spinit presented evidence showing the useful nature ofthe various features
comprising the trade dress of the Zebco reel.2 2 Spinit argued for "an
expansive definition of functionality," that is, a standard under which most
useful features would be deemed functional 1
The Tenth Circuit treated functionality as an issue of first
impression,"" an important point given the definition of functionality
provided by the Supreme Court in Inwood. The Inwood definition was not
binding precedent, the Tenth Circuit concluded, because "the Supreme
Court stated the standard for determining functionality only 'in general
' The Tenth Circuit then
terms,' and that in dictum."215
adopted "a test
whose focus is the effect on competition.... Thus, the question ofwhether
the feature is functional should turn on whether the 'protection of the
configuration would "hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of
others to compete effectively in the sale of goods.""' 2 6 The language of
this test can be traced directly to the Morton-Norwich decision.217 The
Second Circuit relied upon the same language in its leading functionality
decisions.218
Between 1984 and 1987, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
all faced questions concerning the proper functionality standard, and all
adopted the competitive need rationale. These courts considered the
Morton-Norwichand Inwood cases and all followed Morton-Norwich. The
courts either rejected the Inwood Court's discussion of functionality as
dicta, or reconciled the Inwood definition with the competitive need
rationale so strongly endorsed in Morton-Norwich. By the late 1980s, the
competitive need rationale was used by most circuit courts of appeals.219

210. Id.
211. Id. at517.
212. Id. at519-20.
213. Id. at517.

214. Id. ("[Wie are faced with an issue of first impression.").
215. Id.
216. Id. at 519 (quoting Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423,426 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)).
217. The Tenth Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sno- Wizard, which quoted from
the earlier Fifth Circuit decision in Sicilia di R Biebow, which quoted In re Morton-Norwich
Products, 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
218. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
219. The cases described in the preceding text illustrate use of the competitive need rationale
by the CCPA/Federal Circuit, Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Tenth Circuit. See
In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d
1482, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Brandir Int'l,
Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v.
Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423,426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
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In an important, but somewhat ironic move, the American Law
Institute endorsed the competitive need rationale in its 1990 draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
The design... is "fimctional" if the particular design affords
benefits to the person marketing the goods or services, apart
from any benefits attributable to the design's significance as
an indication of-source, that are important to effective
competition by others and that are unavailable through the
use of alternative designs.2 °
Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1988). The Seventh Circuit wavered a bit from the
competitive need rationale, but strongly returned to the rationale in subsequent decisions. Compare
Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1987) (purporting to use
the competitive need rationale, but focusing more on the defendant's motives in copying than on
the utility or competitive importance of the copied features), and Serv. Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp.,
846 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting functionality defense because the defendant
"could have adopted other functional features to distinguish its product from the [plaintiff's coffee]
server"), with Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1989)
(criticizing Vaughan and Service Ideas for improperly elevating the functionality standard and
confirming the court's adoption of the competitive need rationale).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the competitive need rationale in Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co.,
870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Morton-Norwich). The Third Circuit and Eighth
Circuit had returned to a competitive need standard prior to 1982, as noted in the preceding section
of this article. See supra notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
The general functionality standard was less clear during the 1980s in the First, Fourth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits. There were no decisions directly addressing the issue in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. The First and Eleventh Circuits did consider functionality and seemed to move toward a
competitive need standard, but the decisions are not very clear on the issue. See Fisher Stoves, Inc.
v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that functional features
are denied trademark protection because of the "public's 'interest in free competition and in
economic and technological progress"' (quoting Keelber Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366,
378 (1st Cir. 1980))); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982 n.27, 983-84
(1 th Cir. 1983) (discussing functionality issue and criticizing an "affects" standard as too low, but
failing to adopt any specific definition of functionality).
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIRCOMPETrION § 17 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990). The

Reporters' Note explains that this definition "clarifies the former statement of the rule in
RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 742 (1938)." Id.§ 17 reporters' note. The definition did much more than
that. It was a clean break with the approach taken in the Restatement of Torts, and a return to the
standard in use by most courtsprior to the publication of the original Restatement. Indeed, the new
Restatement definition focused on "effective competition" and the availability of "alternative
designs," just as courts had during the years prior to the release of the original Restatement. See
supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
One could read the new Restatement as endorsing something of a middle position, with its
"important to effective competition" standard, but that is not a fair reading. A reading of the full
text of the Restatement definition, together with the comments, makes clear the Reporters' intention
to embrace the competitive need standard was explained in decisions like Morton-Norwich and the
other decisions discussed in the preceding text. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17 (1995) (defining a functional feature as one providing benefits "important to
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Much had changed in the fifty-two years since the Restatement of Torts
rejected the competitive need rationale and adopted a more restrictive
functionality standard. The Restatement (Second) of Torts was published
during the intervening period, but a decision was made to exclude the
trademark and unfair trade provisions from that publication because the
law in this area had developed into a distinct field.22' By the time work
began in earnest on the Restatement (Third)of UnfairCompetition,222most
courts had rejected the definition of functionality provided in the
Restatement of Torts and instead defined functionality in terms of
competitive need. 223 The competitive need rationale was well-established
by 1995, the year the final version of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition was published.224

effective competition . . . and that are not practically available through the use of alternative
designs" (emphasis added)); id. § 17 cmt. a ("[I]n determining whether a particular design is
'functional' and therefore ineligible for protection as a trademark, the ultimate inquiry is whether
a prohibition against copying will significantly hinder competition by others.").
221. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition reporters provided the following
explanation:
The Restatement of Torts, promulgated by the Institute in 1938, contained a
comprehensive treatment of trademark law in Chapter 35. A revision to Chapter
35 was prepared for inclusion in the Restatement, Second, Torts, but was deleted
by the Council of the Institute because the subjects were "governed extensively
by legislation and largely divorced from their initial grounding in the principles
of torts." The current project is an independent restatement of the law relating to
unfair trade practices, of which trademark law is a central part.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION reporter's memorandum to the members of the
institute (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) (citation omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS director's introduction (1977)).
222. Work on the unfair competition restatement began in 1987. Harvey S. Perlman, The
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition:A Work in Progress,80 TRADEMARK REP. 461,464
(1990). A draft of the unfair trade sections to be included in the Restatement (Second)of Torts was
completed in 1963, and initially approved by the American Law Institute. Id. at 463-64. "However,
when the Restatement (Second) ofTorts was finally published in 1979, the material relating to trade
practices was omitted.. . ." Id. at 464. Eight years later, the Institute appointed a Reporter for the
new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and work on the project began. Id.
223. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
224. The Restatement provided the following definition of a functional product feature:
A design is "functional" for purposes of the rule stated in § 16 if the design
affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services
with which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design's
significance as an indication of source, that are important to effective competition
by others and that are not practically available through the use of alternative
designs.
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There remained, however, the nagging question of how to deal with the
Inwood case. Some courts had effectively reconciled Inwood with MortonNorwich and the competitive need rationale,225 but the fact remained that
the second part of the functionality definition provided in Inwood was
plainly inconsistent with such an approach.226
The Supreme Court removed this final obstacle in a pair of important
trademark decisions issued during the 1990s. In the first case, Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,227 the Court held that trade dress can be
inherently distinctive, and thus resolved an issue that had split the circuit
courts. 22 8 The defendant, the petitioner before the Supreme Court, argued
that such a holding would effectively open the floodgates and allow for
unbridled trade dress protection.229 The Supreme Court responded by
emphasizing the functionality limitation on such protection:
Suggestions that under the Fifth Circuit's law, the initial user
of any shape or design would cut off competition from
products of like design and shape are not persuasive. Only
nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under
§ 43(a). The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally
functional, and thus unprotectible [sic], if it is one of a
limited number of equally efficient options available to
competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered
by according the design trademark protection. This serves to
by the exhaustion
assure that competition will not be stifled
3
of a limited number of trade dresses.10
The Court's apparent approval of the competitive need standard used
by the Fifth Circuit was important, but the Court did not directly address
" ' The Supreme Court finally dealt with this issue in
the Inwood problem.23

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). Though this version differs

somewhat from the 1990 draft, it retains the emphasis on competitive need.
225. See supra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
226. The second part of the Inwood definition was, if not plainly inconsistent with the
competitive need approach, an incomplete statement of the law. As discussed above, virtually all
features will have some impact on the cost or quality of a product. See supra note 180. But under
the competitive need approach, only those features that affect cost or quality enough to impact
competition are deemed functional. If the second part of the Inwood definition had said "affects the
cost or quality in a competitively significant way," the definition would have been consistent with
the competitive need approach.

227. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
228. Id. at 767.
229. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14-19, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc., 505 U.S.

763 (1992) (No. 91-971).
230. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 774-75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
231. The Supreme Court's reference to the Fifth Circuit functionality rule in Two Pesos was
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Qualitex Co. v. JacobsonProducts.23 2 In Qualitex,the Court addressed the
question of whether a color, standing alone, can be protected as a
trademark. 233 It was well-established that color could be protected as apart
of a trademark, 234 but the courts divided on the specific question raised in
Qualitex.235 The Supreme Court held that when a color satisfies236the
"ordinary legal trademark requirements," it is entitled to protection.
In the course of its analysis, the Qualitex Court noted that one of the
reasons given for denying trademark protection to colors was the notion
"that colors are in limited supply. '237 Protecting colors as trademarks, the
argument went, would soon result in a depletion of the available colors.238
The Supreme Court rejected this color depletion argument because "the
trademark doctrine of 'functionality' normally would seem available to
prevent the anticompetitive consequences" of such a depletion.239
This Court consequently has explained that, "in general
terms, a product feature is functional," and cannot serve as a
trademark, "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article," that is,
ifexclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
24o
significant non-reputation-relateddisadvantage.

dicta, but so was the explanation of functionality provided in Inwood. Some commentators have
given weight to the Inwood comment, while giving little or no weight to the precedentially
comparable, but substantively quite different, comment in Two Pesos. See, e.g., Kratzke, supra note
7, at 80-81, 86-93 (describing the functionality standard from Inwood and providing a lengthy
review of the Two Pesos decision, but concluding that the decision contained no guidance on the
functionality issue). But see Weinberg, supra note 7, at 17-19, 20-21 (identifying the Inwood
definition as dicta, noting that many courts nevertheless gave significant weight to that definition,
but also noting the Two Pesos Court's approval of the competition-based functionality standard
used by the Fifth Circuit).
232. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
233. Id. at 160-61.
234. Id. at 163.
235. Id.at 161.

236. Id
237. Id.at 168.

238. Id.
239. Id. at 168-69.
240. Id. at 165 (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10
(1982)). The Qualitex Court went on to note:

Although sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to source
identification) in making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not. And,
this latter fact---the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product's use or
purpose and does not affect cost or quality-indicates that the doctrine of
'functionality' does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark.
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With this explanation, the Supreme Court reconciled its prior statement
from Inwood with the competitive need rationale, and thus joined the
numerous lower courts that had already done the same thing. 4 ' The
reconciliation of Inwood was complete, and the second part of the Inwood
test was a relic of the past, much like the old Restatement of Torts standard
it resembled.
Qualitexprovided the final nudge needed to move all the circuit courts
to the competitive need standard. Prior to Qualitex, the circuits remained
somewhat divided over how to best apply the competitive need rationale.
For example, in TESCO,242 the Eighth Circuit was the first regional circuit
to return to a competition-based functionality standard in the period
following the publication of the Restatement of Torts. In fact, the TESCO
decision was quite influential in leading other courts to embrace the
competitive need rationale.2 43 But the Eighth Circuit did not define
functionality strictly in terms of competitive need in TESCO. Instead, the
241. Though one could argue that the quoted language from Qualitex was dictum, see, e.g.,
Jenkins, supranote 42, at 354, 1 disagree with that argument. In Qualitex,the Court considered and
rejected a number of arguments advanced in support of a per se rule prohibiting trademark
protection for colors. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65. The analysis of each of those arguments was
necessary to the result in Qualitex,because if the Court had agreed with any of the arguments, the
result would have changed. The question is closer on the specific functionality discussion quoted
above, because it is not entirely clear that the Court would have reached a different conclusion
concerning the protection of color as a trademark if it had endorsed a different functionality
standard. The Qualitex Court's rejection of the color-depletion argument, however, was based on
its understanding of the functionality doctrine. See id.168-69. Though it is a somewhat close
question, I read the Court's explanation of the functionality standard as a ratio decidendi, or
binding holding, of the Qualitex case. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When The CourtDivides:
Reconsidering The Precedential Value of Supreme Court PluralityDecisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419,

423 (1992) (explaining that the ratiodecidendi consists "of the postulates or conclusions necessary
to reach the result in that case").
In the end, it does not matter how one characterizes the Qualitex Court's explanation of the
Inwood functionality standard. The Inwood statement was dictum. If the Qualitex discussion also
was dictum, then we have a subsequent nonprecedential statement by the Supreme Court explaining
an earlier nonprecedential statement. Surely the Qualitex explanation is entitled to at least as much
weight as the earlier statement from Inwood. If so, it would seem that Qualitex, at a minimum,
neutralized the previous Inwood statement, leaving only the circuit court decisions to define the
proper functionality standard. As noted above, the clear majority of the circuits used the
competitive need rationale, the same functionality standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Qualitex. See supra note 219.

242. Truck Equip. Serv. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
243. In Morton-Norwich,Judge Rich explained that "recent cases also discuss 'functionality'
in light of competition." In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
TFSCO is the first case cited in support of this proposition and the only decision from a U.S. court
of appeals, other than the CCPA. Id at 1339-40; see also Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1984) (giving similar weight to the TESCO decision); Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
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court focused on whether the product feature at issue was "'an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product,' ' 244 a test that fails to
fully advance the competitive need rationale.
Before Qualitex was decided, the Eighth Circuit used the "important
ingredient" test. 245 After Qualitex, the Eighth Circuit adopted the same
competitive need standard endorsed by the Supreme Court. 246 The
functionality standard used in earlier Eighth Circuit decisions, the court
held, "must be read in light of the Supreme Court's later discussion in
Qualitex and the result it reached in Two Pesos.2 47 Other courts gave
similar weight to the Qualitex explanation of the functionality doctrine.248

244. Truck Equip.Serv., 536 F.2d at 1217 (quoting Bliss v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848,
855 (9th Cir. 1963)). This standard comes from a controversial Ninth Circuit decision involving a
decorative pattern used on hotel china. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,343 (9th Cir.
1952) ("'Functional' in this sense might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose. If the
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest
in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.").
245. See, e.g., Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[I]fthe trade dress
is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, it is clearly functional.");
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1994) (following TESCO and
Prufrock).
246. Home Builders Ass'n v. L & L Exhibition Mgmt., Inc., 226 F.3d 944, 948 n.5 (8th Cir.
2000) ("Before a trademark or trade dress will be denied Lanham Act protection under the
functionality doctrine, Qualitex requires a court to find that exclusive use of that feature would put
competitors at a significantnon-reputation-related disadvantage.").
247. Id. At least some district courts in the Eighth Circuit used the competitive need standard
from Qualitexeven before the Eighth Circuit formally adopted that test in Home Builders. A good
example is found in an interesting case involving a claim by 3M that the canary yellow color used
with its Post-it Notes was a trademark. Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Beautone Specialties Co., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 997, 999 (D. Minn. 2000). The parties agreed that functionality should be determined
based on competitive need, but differed sharply on whether the canary yellow color was needed to
compete in the market for sticky notes. Id. at 1001-02 ("Both parties appear to agree that the
availability similarly of beneficial alternative colors is the critical consideration in determining
whether canary yellow is functional or not."). The reported decision was issued about nine months
prior to the Eighth Circuit's Home Builders decision. See also Ark Plas Prods. v. Value Plastics,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (W.D. Ark. 1996) (using a competitive need standard and citing
Qualitex and the Restatement).
248. The competitive need rationale was well-established prior to Qualitex in the Second, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits. See supra note 219. After Qualitex, these courts
continued to use a competitive need standard, but began using the explanation ofthe standard provided
by the Qualitex Court. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1005-06 (2d Cir.
1995); Sunbeam Prods. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246,255-56 (5th Cir. 1997); Thomas & Betts Corp.
v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998); Disc GolfAss'n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158
F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998); Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507
(I0th Cir. 1995); Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its adoption of the competitive need rationale as the general
functionality standard, but held that some features of previously patented inventions must be denied
protection even if non-functional. Vornado Air CirculationSys., 58 F.3d at 1507, 1510. This holding
created the split that led the Supreme Court to intervene in TrajFix.See infra Part I.D.2.
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2. Clarifying the Competitive Need Rationale
With the general functionality rationale established, courts turned to
other issues, including an examination of the practical issues raised by the

In I.P. Lund TradingApSv. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998), the First Circuit seemed
to clearly endorse the Qualitex competitive need rationale. The court noted, "The core inquiry into
whether trade dress is functional requires examination of the effect that granting protection to a
product will have on the ability of others to compete." Id at 37. But the I.P. Lund court's discussion
was dicta and the court made clear that it did "not attempt a complete definition of functionality."
Id. at 37 n.5. It seems clear from these comments, and the state of the law in other circuits, that the
competitive need rationale was the proper standard in the First Circuit. Indeed, upon remand, the
district court used the functionality standard from Qualitex.I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.,
118 F. Supp. 2d 92, 102 (D. Mass. 2000) ("To determine whether a product configuration is
functional or non-functional, the Court must inquire into the effects that granting protection to a
product will have on competition. A product feature is functional ... 'ifexclusive use of the feature
would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."' (quoting Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995))).
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits also adopted the functionality standard set out in
Qualitex. See Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654,
657-59 (4th Cir. 1996); Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 375-76
(4th Cir. 1999); Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 938-39 (6th Cir.
1999); Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 1999). The
Supreme Court reversed much of the functionality holding of the Sixth Circuit decision in TrafFix,
see infra Part II, but the decision clearly exhibited the Sixth Circuit's use of the competitive need
rationale before the Supreme Court decision.
The functionality standard in the Third Circuit did not seem to change materially after Qualitex,
but that may be a result of the court's adoption of an advanced competitive need standard earlier
than some other courts. In Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981),

the Third Circuit held that the ultimate functionality inquiry was "'whether prohibition of imitation
by others will deprive the others of something which will substantially hinder them in
competition."' Id. at 827 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a. (1938)). This language
is strikingly similar to that used by the QualitexCourt to explain the Inwood standard. See Qualitex,
514 U.S. at 165. Keene predated Inwood, so in a sense, the Third Circuit started where all the other
circuits ended.
This explanation of the Third Circuit's modern functionality jurisprudence, however, may be
too kind. The Third Circuit, perhaps more than any other court, failed to develop a consistent and
coherent functionality standard during the modem period. Indeed, some Third Circuit decisions
seemed to employ contradictory concepts of functionality in the same case. See, e.g., Merchant &
Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628,633-35 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing competitive
need, alternative designs, and then seeming to equate functionality with an absence of any "purpose
other than identification"). There are no Third Circuit cases addressing the functionality issue
during the 1995-2001 period (i.e., after Qualitex and before TrafFix), but it seems fair to assume
the court would have followed the lead of the other circuits and taken notice of the similarities in
its own Keene decision and the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex.There is at least one Third
Circuit district court decision during this period that used a competitive need standard and focused
on the availability of alternative designs. Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068,
1082 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff's design "was the best of [the] alternatives," and that
"there are [a] limited number of alternative designs").
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use of this rationale. Though courts agreed that functionality should be
defined in terms of the impact protection would have on competition, there
was a growing concern during the modem period that trademark law was
providing too much protection for product designs. 249 This concern was
not new, as courts expressed similar concerns during the early
development of the functionality doctrine.250 Unfortunately, the
Restatement of Torts, and its apparent rejection of the competitive need
rationale, was published while the early period courts were refining the
competitive need standard. Courts in the modem period, therefore, were
working in largely uncharted waters as they attempted to refine the
standard.
The competitive need rationale was refined in two important respects
during the modem period. First, courts held that absolute competitive
necessity was not the proper standard. A feature is functional, the modem
courts held, if it is one of a few available alternatives. Second, some courts
began to focus more carefully on the analysis of alternative designs,
holding that alternatives must be truly equivalent to the claimed design to
support a finding that the design is non-functional.
a. Focusing on the Number of Available Alternatives
As courts embraced the competitive need rationale and either ignored
or modified the second prong of the Inwood standard, some claimants
urged courts to adopt the first prong of Inwood as the entire test for
functionality.251 These claimants argued that a feature is functional only if
it is absolutely essential to the operation or marketability of the goods.
This approach takes the competitive need rationale to its logical end: only
items that are absolutely necessary would be deemed functional and thus
denied trademark protection.
Courts rejected these efforts, but recognized the need to better define
the competitive need functionality standard. The result was a focus on the
number of available alternatives, not on whether the feature was essential.

249. A number of commentators expressed this concern. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1700-01 (1999); J.
Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,63-64(1996); J.H. Reichman, DesignProtectionandtheLegislative Agenda,
55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 289 (1992); Dowell, supra note 59, at 191-92; Melissa R.
Gleiberman, Note, From FastCars to FastFood: OverbroadProtectionof Product Trade Dress
UnderSection 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2037,2058 (1993); Laba, supranote 42,
at 1649-50.
250. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
251. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) ("a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of
the article").
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The nation's specialized patent court again led the way, with the new
Federal Circuit holding in 1985 that the key question is whether the feature
' If such
at issue "is the best, or at least one, of a few superior designs."252
a design is protected as a trademark, the court held, "competition is
hindered. Morton-Norwich does not rest on total elimination of
competition in the goods."' 53
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of this issue provides a good example
of the problem and solution. In W T Rogers Co. v. Keene,254 a case
discussed above,255 the court defined functionality in terms of competitive
need. 6 In two subsequent cases, however, the Seventh Circuit focused on
whether the design claimed as a trademark was "'superior or optimal."' 2"5
"This [approach] would not be troubling," the court held in a later case, "if
'superior or optimal' were the same thing as 'something costly to do
without,' but it is not. 'Superior' could mean something that is costly to do
without, but 'optimal' implies that unless the feature in question is the best
possible way to achieve a result, it is not 'functional. "258 The court then
explained that "[a] feature is functional if it is ...costly to design around
or do without," regardless of whether the feature is optimal, superior, or
essential. 9
This clarification of the competitive need rationale is important. It
prevents the rationale from being used as an excuse to deem virtually all

252. In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
253. Id.
254. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
255. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
256. W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 339.
257. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Serv. Ideas, Inc.
v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 350).
258. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
259. Id. The Third Circuit and at least one commentator also have emphasized the need to
focus on the number of available alternatives rather than whether a feature is essential. See
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1992) ("This court,
like the Morton-Norwich court, has held product configurations to be functional when only a
limited number of viable alternatives exist."). Professor Jay Dratler has argued for the same
approach:
Consequently, the best approach to defining the standard for functional
features relies on the concept of features 'dictated by function.' Properly
understood, this approach asks not whether the feature is the only way to
implement the desired utility, but whether the class of alternative designs that, by
virtue of their utilitarian characteristics, have the same competitive potential is
small or large. If that class is small, the feature is functional. If it is large, the
feature is nonfunctional.
Dratler, supra note 35, at 946.
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features non-functional. By emphasizing the need to ensure that a
reasonable number of viable alternative designs remain available, this
approach results in a robust competitive environment.
b. Focusing on the Proper Alternatives
The competitive need rationale, when properly understood, has
something of a self-regulating nature. To show that a feature is not needed
by competitors, claimants present evidence of alternative designs. The
alternatives must be available and equivalent to the claimant's design. The
first of these requirements-availability of the alternative
designs-produces the self-regulating characteristic of the competitive
need rationale.
Consider, for example, a plaintiff arguing that the color of its product
is a trademark. To prove the color is non-functional, the plaintiff probably
will present evidence of alternative colors that work just as well as the
claimed color. There is, however, a risk in the presentation of such
evidence. Alternatives must be available, which, in this context, means
noninfringing. By identifying a particular color or shade as an alternative,
a plaintiff may also be admitting that the proffered color or shade does not
infringe its rights in the claimed color. In so doing, the plaintiff may be
defining the outer limits of its trademark protection, or at least some points
outside those limits.
Alternative designs also must be equivalent to the claimed design. The
Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the importance of this point in
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.26° Leatherman
260. 199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999). The Leatherman litigation involved another important
issue that ultimately reached the Supreme Court: the proper standard of review in appeals of
allegedly excessive punitive damages awards. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 435-37 (2001). The issue, and the Ninth Circuit's treatment of it, arose in a rather
odd way. As explained in the text above, the Ninth Circuit found the Leatherman tool design
functional, and therefore reversed the jury's finding of trade dress infringement. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 199 F.3d at 1013. That decision, however, did not dispose of the entire dispute.
The Leatherman case also included a claim of unfair competition based on Cooper's
unauthorized use of photographs of a modified Leatherman tool. CooperIndus., Inc., 532 U.S. at
427-28. When Cooper introduced its new ToolZall multi-purpose tool at a trade show in 1996,
Cooper "used photographs in its posters, packaging, and advertising materials that purported to be
of a ToolZall but were actually of a modified [Leatherman] PST." Id. at 427. The photographs
apparently were used because Cooper did not have a prototype of its own tool in time to prepare
materials for the trade show. Id. at 442-43.
The jury awarded Leatherman Tool Group $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million
in punitive damages. Id. at 426. The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, affirmed the jury's
finding of unfair competition based on Cooper's use of the photograph of a modified Leatherman
PST and, somewhat suprisingly, affirmed the damages awards. Id. at 430. The Ninth Circuit held
such awards were not an abuse of the district court's discretion. Id. at 431.
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision on the damages awards, holding that
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involved a trademark claim based on the design of the popular Leatherman
" ' In an effort
Pocket Survival Tool (PST), a multi-purpose handheld tool.26
to prove the design was non-functional, the plaintiff introduced evidence
of many competing multi-purpose tools, all with designs differing from
that of the Leatherman PST.262 A jury found the PST design nonfunctional, but the Ninth Circuit reversed because the alternative designs
were not equivalent to the plaintiff's tool:
While it is appropriate to look to possible alternatives when
judging whether a design is functional, the evidence here was
unequivocal that none of the alternatives offered the same
functionality as the PST. Even though many of the tools
likely are highly functional and useful, none of them offer
exactly the same features as the PST.... Leatherman does
not have the right to preclude competition in any particular
subset of the overall market.263
The Leatherman case provides a good example of the importance of
these requirements and the resulting self-regulation of the competitive
need rationale. The plaintiff presented evidence of many different multi24
purpose tools in the same general competitive group as its own tool.
There was little risk in presenting such evidence because the differences
questions as to the constitutionality of punitive damages awards must be reviewed de novo by an
appellate court. Id The Court noted with approval the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the functionality
question, and concluded the punitive damages award might well be constitutionally suspect given
the rather thin basis upon which the award ultimately rested. Idl at 44 1. The photograph was neither
intentionally nor materially misleading, the Court noted, because it showed the same design and
features found in Cooper's new tool. Id.at 442. Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit capped the punitive
damages award in the case at a maximum of $500,000. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Supreme Court's decision may not end the controversy over the proper standard of review
of punitive damages awards. The Court held that questions as to the constitutionality of such awards
(i.e., whether an award is so excessive it is unconstitutional under the Court's holding in BMW of
NorthAmerica, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)) must be reviewed de novo, but the Court did not
reach the question of what standard should be used to resolve other questions concerning the
propriety of punitive damages awards. CooperIndus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 431. The limited nature of
the Court's holding in Cooper Industriessuggests that the Court resolved an issue that did not really
exist. Surely an unconstitutional punitive damages award constitutes an abuse of discretion, since
no court has the discretion to issue unconstitutional judgments. Given this reality, it is not clear how
a de novo standard of review, if limited to the constitutionality question, will make any difference.
The Supreme Court's ruling, of course, did make a difference in the Leatherman case, but it is
unclear whether that result was due to the changed standard ofreview or the Supreme Court's rather
clear suggestion that the $4.5 million award, was in fact, unconstitutionally excessive.
261. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 199 F.3d at 1010.
262. Id. at 1013-14.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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likely sufficed to eliminate any serious risk of consumer confusion.
However, the evidence failed to prove that the plaintiff's design was nonfunctional. To prevail on the functionality issue, the plaintiff would have
had to present evidence of designs performing exactly the same functions
as its own tool. That may have been possible, but such designs probably
would have looked much like the plaintiff's own tool, thus severely
limiting the scope of the plaintiff's trademark rights.
By refining the alternatives analysis in this way, the courts created a
coherent, workable, and somewhat self-limiting functionality standard. It
is not, as some critics have argued, a meaningless standard that allows
trademark protection of almost any product design.26 Such arguments are
based on an incomplete understanding of the competitive need rationale
and the alternatives analysis.
D. Secondary FunctionalityIssues
By the end of the modem period, the federal courts had settled on the
competitive need rationale as the proper general functionality standard.
Two other functionality issues, however, were not so clearly resolved.
First, courts continued to struggle with the concept of aesthetic
265. It is certainly true that a great many product or packaging features will be deemed nonfunctional under a competitive need standard. This standard is not particularly limiting, though one
must remember that the functionality rule is only of consequence when the feature or features at
issue are distinctive. When distinctive features are denied protection, some confusion is likely to
follow. A strong justification is needed to support such a result. The competitive need standard
provides that justification by allowing protection except where it would significantly hinder
competition. The patent bargain and right-to-copy rules provide little social benefit beyond that
already provided by a competition-based functionality rule. For a more complete discussion of
these points, see infra Part III.A.3. Most criticisms of the competitive need functionality standard
are presented in support of either a patent bargain or right-to-copy rule. See infra notes 288, 301.
These criticisms are often overly formalistic, focusing on the perceived need to ensure that
unpatented articles are free for all to copy. See, e.g., Marshall, supranote 7, at 639-40 (arguing for
a constitutional right to copy all features of unpatented articles and criticizing the TrafFix Court
for failing to adopt such a rule); Pollack, supra note 42, at 295-98 (presenting a patent bargain
argument based, in large part, on Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938)
(discussed in supra note 78)); Dowell, supranote 59, at 168-70 (arguing for a constitutional right
to copy); Weitzer, supra note 42, at 195-96 (arguing for a per se rule preventing trade dress
protection for any feature disclosed in an expired utility patent).
At least one commentator sees the TrajFix decision as a move "that hopefully restores the
interests of consumers to a position paramount to the interests of competitors." Kratzke, supranote
7, at 74. The commentator argued for "a broad right to copy product features not sufficiently
reflecting invention or creativity to be worthy of a patent or copyright." Id. at 106. These arguments
miss the mark. A right to copy does not protect consumers. It protects competitors who copy
distinctive product features, a practice that clearly increases the risk of consumer confusion. The
arguments presented by Professor Kratzke are an example of the tendency of many commentators
to overlook the confusion costs imposed by adopting a restrictive functionality rule or an even more
restrictive right-to-copy rule. See infra Part III.A.2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/1

60

Thurmon: The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law's Fuctionality Doctrine
TRADEMARK LA WS FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE

functionality-the notion that a feature might be functional based solely
on the feature's aesthetic value. Second, courts struggled with the patent
bargain concept, an issue that arose during the early development of the
functionality doctrine. These two issues were not fully resolved by the end
of the modem period, but the courts were close to agreement on both
points.
1. Aesthetic Functionality and the Competitive Need Rationale
During the early development of the functionality doctrine, courts
recognized that in certain product markets aesthetic features provide
important competitive advantages."" For example, in a 1913 case, the
Third Circuit refused to protect the design of a small bottle shaped like a
desk telephone.267 The court held that the bottles' "function as a container
of anything is negligible.... They are not articles of utility, and the only
reason assignable for their production is that, being diminutive replicas of
things in common use, they appeal to a certain sense akin to that of humor,
' Various courts reached similar decisions in cases
especially in children."268
involving toys that resembled trucks or animals.2 69
These cases were not treated as exceptions to any general rule. The
same competition-based standard was used, whether the competitive
advantage resulted from utilitarian or aesthetic value. The Restatement of
Torts endorsed the aesthetic functionality concept in a comment and
suggested the use of a competition-based analysis in cases involving
aesthetic features.27° In one early case, a court followed the Restatement
266. Some commentators have overlooked the early origins of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine. See, e.g., Harriman, supra note 35, at 280 ("The first notions of aesthetic functionality
were derived from a comment to the 1938 Restatement of Torts."); Kellner, supra note 30, at 935
("Paglierov. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952), was the earliest attempt to
formulate a definition of aesthetic functionality.").
267. John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 F. 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1913).
268. Id.
269. Moline Pressed Steel Co. v. Dayton Toy & Specialty Co., 30 F.2d 16, 18 (6th Cir. 1929)
(allowing the defendant to copy aesthetic features of a toy truck because the features were needed
to create a miniature version of a real truck); Margarete Steiff, Inc. v. Bing, 215 F. 204, 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1914) ("Name, color, form, and shape are rarely essentials in function, yet they may be,
and are here. In so far as the Steiff animals copy or reproduce nature, so far they can claim no
protection, for every one can do that."). In an early action involving the shape of a shredded wheat
biscuit, Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, found certain aspects of the shape functional,
despite an apparent lack of utility in the shape. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250
F. 960, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1918) ("[T]o require the defendant to adopt a shade different enough for
commercial distinction would be to force them to bake their biscuits so that they would be repellant
to most tastes.").
270. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938):
The determination whether or not such features are functional depends upon
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analysis and found aesthetic features functional because the defendant and
others needed the features to effectively compete with the plaintiff. 7
Despite this early application of the Restatement, the aesthetic
functionality concept was largely ignored for the next fourteen years. All
that changed, however, in 1952.
The aesthetic functionality doctrine leaped into the limelight with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. 272 The case
involved an unfair competition claim based on the design of a hotel china
pattern, a design feature that clearly provided no utilitarian advantage.27 3
In a strong endorsement of aesthetic functionality, the court held the
pattern was functional because its aesthetic appeal was "an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product."2 4 The Pagliero
decision has been widely criticized, by both courts and commentators.275

the question of fact whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the
others of something which will substantially hinder them in competition.
A feature is nonfunctional if, when omitted, nothing of substantial value in the
goods is lost.
Id. There is some ambiguity in the comment's reference to a competition-based analysis. The
comment could be read as supporting the use of a competition-based functionality standard in all
cases because it is not clear whether the reference to "such features" was limited to aesthetic
features or included both utilitarian and aesthetic features. The courts quickly mooted this point as
different functionality standards developed in utilitarian and aesthetic cases following the
Restatement. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (reviewing applications of the
Restatement in utilitarian cases); infra notes 272-78 and accompanying text (reviewing
development of the "important ingredient" standard for aesthetic functionality).
271. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183, 186-87 (E.D. Pa. 1938). The case
involved the design of a "semi-indirect" lighting fixture, a fixture with an opaque, metallic lower
bowl and a translucent top section. Id at 184. The plaintiff held a patent on its fixture and sued for
patent infringement and unfair competition. Id. The court found the patent invalid and held the
design functional. Id at 185, 187.
The court's functionality analysis was based on a Third Circuit precedent and the Restatement
comment. The court recognized "the principle that there may be functional features, not protected
against imitation, which impart no mechanical or structural advantages to the goods." Id. at 186
(citing Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Frances Denney, Inc., 99 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1938)). The Ainsworth
court went on to quote the Restatement comment as further support for its decision that the
aesthetic elements of the lighting fixture were functional. Id.at 186-87 ("'When goods are bought
largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely contribute
to that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended."')
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938)).
272. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
273. Id.at 340.
274. Id.at 343.
275. The Third Circuit provided the following criticism of the Pagliero holding in an
influential decision:
The difficulty with accepting such a broad view of aesthetic functionality, which
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For many years after Paglierowas decided, courts seemed to focus
more on the question of whether aesthetic value can ever be a legitimate
basis to deny trademark protection, rather than on the question of what
functionality standard should be used in cases involving aesthetic features.
Some courts reacted to Pagliero by rejecting aesthetic functionality
entirely. The CCPA, and later the Federal Circuit, under the leadership of
Giles Rich, took the lead in this movement.276 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits

relates the doctrine to the commercial desirability of the feature at issue without
consideration of its utilitarian function, is that it provides a disincentive for
development of imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the design,
the less protection it would receive.
Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Sicilia Di R.
Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,427-28 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Defining functionality as anything
that is 'an important ingredient in the commercial success' ofa product would almost always permit
a second comer freely to copy the trade dress of a successful product that has accumulated
goodwill."); Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327,331 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
the "functionality defense ... is designed to encourage competition and the broadest dissemination
of useful design features," and analogizing the functionality defense to the useful article doctrine
of copyright law); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[W]e consider
such a broad definition to be at odds with this court's precedent in this area.").
A number of commentators have criticized Pagliero,too. See, e.g., Dufi, supra note 37, at 178
(criticizing the "important ingredient" test from Pagliero because all valuable trademarks are
important ingredients in the success of the products they identify); Harriman, supra note 35, at 281
(the Pagliero"test suffers from overbroadness"); Kellner, supra note 30, at 935 ("[T]he Pagliero
definition threatens to cut off protection for product configurations at a point where they are most
successfully performing the trademark function of identifying a particular source"); Krieger, supra
note 37, at 375 ("[Ujnder this [Pagliero] approach, an attractive design adopted and used to
distinguish one's goods and thus serving as a valid trademark may be in danger of losing its legal
protection whenever it becomes an important ingredient in the commercial success of a product.").
276. Though the CCPA and Federal Circuit led the movement against aesthetic functionality,
both courts seemed to stop short of an outright rejection of the doctrine. For example, in DC
Comics, the court reversed a TTAB holding because the designs at issue provided "no engineering
advantage," a view clearly at odds with the aesthetic functionality concept. DC Comics, 689 F.2d
at 1045. The court's functionality analysis essentially concluded with the following explanation:
"We find no merit in the argument that, by virtue of the aesthetic features identified by the board,
appellant's drawings are unable to perform as trademarks for toy dolls." Id. This statement might
reflect an outright rejection of aesthetic functionality, as it is possible that the "aesthetic features
identified by the board" would not make the drawings functional, no matter how much their
aesthetic appeal affected competition. The statement also can be read as leaving room for a finding
of aesthetic functionality in a later case. One could conclude that sufficient alternatives were
available in the DC Comics scenario to justify a conclusion that the drawings' aesthetic appeal was
not sufficient to render them functional.
In later cases, the Federal Circuit interpreted the DC Comics decision as a rejection of the broad
aesthetic functionality position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Pagliero.See, e.g., Brunswick Corp.
v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he per se doctrine of aesthetic
functionality [was] rejected in DC Comics."). But it turns out this "per se doctrine" was a somewhat
narrow view of aesthetic functionality. In the Brunswick case, the court held that the black color
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followed this lead,277 while the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits followed
278
cases.
some
in
least
at
Pagliero,
In retrospect, it seems the Pagliero court erred not so much in its
endorsement of aesthetic functionality, as in the specific standard it
adopted. 279 The court expressly relied on the free competition policy,280 but
of Brunswick's Mercury outboard engines did not "serve[] purely aesthetic functions." Id. Black
was a competitively important color, the court held, because "the color black exhibits both color
compatibility with a wide variety of boat colors and ability to make objects appear smaller." Id. at
1531. Setting aside the questionable view that owners of boats with outboard engines want their
engines to "appear smaller," these benefits seem more aesthetic than utilitarian. Unless boats with
color-coordinated engines or with engines that "appear smaller" go faster or attract more fish, these
features probably do little to increase the utility of the boats or engines.
The Brunswick analysis illustrates the problems posed by different functionality standards for
aesthetic and utilitarian features. When features of primarily aesthetic value are clearly important
to competition, as appeared to be true in the Brunswick case, courts are forced to engage in a rather
tortured analysis to reach the desired result. In any event, Brunswick represented the Federal
Circuit's reluctance to embrace aesthetic functionality. The result reached in Brunswick, denial of
Brunswick's application to register the color black for outboard engines, id.at 1529, was probably
correct, but it seems a bit silly to characterize the benefits of the black color as utilitarian.
277. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the court's prior decisions had "implicitly rejected
Pagliero'saesthetic functionality test"); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423,
426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,428-29 (5th Cir. 1984)
(criticizing Paglieroand rejecting aesthetic functionality as a bar to trademark protection).
278. The actual aesthetic functionality rule in the Ninth Circuit was not clear during much of
the modem period, as illustrated by its decision in Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises,644
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 198 1). The dispute involved a fabric design used on luggage and hand bags. Id.
at 771. The district court used the Paglierostandard and found the design functional. Id.On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the design at issue was not needed for effective competition.
Id. at 777. Though the court did not reject the aesthetic functionality doctrine, it clearly signaled
a retreat from the Paglierodecision.
Just one year earlier, however, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision that seemed to go beyond
even the Paglierorule. In InternationalOrder of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980), the court held that an organization's logo was functional when used with
jewelry items. In this case, the logo at issue was clearly a trademark, and a non-functional mark
when used in connection with the organization's services. The china pattern at issue in Pagliero
had no role other than as a decorative china pattern. In Job's Daughters,the court effectively
eliminated the trademark owner's ability to control the quality of certain goods bearing its mark.
The rule in the Eighth Circuit also was somewhat unclear. However, the court's decision in J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941), can be read as an early
endorsement ofthe aesthetic functionality doctrine. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text
(discussing the J C. Penney case). During the modem period, the Eighth Circuit seemed to use the
Pagliero standard in a case involving cellophane packaging used with a line of potpourri.
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the various
elements of the plaintiff's packaging "are important ingredients in the commercial success of
Aromatique's products").
279. It also appears that the rather extreme rejections of the aesthetic functionality doctrine
by the Fifth and Federal Circuits were overreactions to the Ninth Circuit's Paglieroanalysis. These
courts were correct to criticize Pagliero, but they went too far in the opposite direction. The
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the functionality test it used was not well-tailored to advance that policy.
While it is surely true that "an important ingredient in the commercial
success of a product" is a competitively advantageous feature, it does not
follow that competitors need to use the feature. Only by evaluating
alternative designs can a court accurately determine the competitive
significance of a particular feature or design. The Paglierotest does not
require any analysis of alternatives. Indeed, the Paglierofacts suggest that
1
the defendant could have used any one of many other china patterns."
Denying protection to the plaintiffs design probably did very little to
enhance the competitive market for hotel china.
Over time, some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, moved away from
the "important ingredient" standard in aesthetic functionality cases and
relied instead on the same competitive need standard used in utilitarian
functionality cases.2" 2 This trend is reflected in the Restatement (Third)of

adoption of a competition-based analysis for all functionality issues, as illustrated by the Seventh
Circuit's analysis in W T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985), see supranotes 20206 and accompanying text, and by the Restatement (Third)of UnfairCompetition, see supra note
220, reflects a better-reasoned position.
280. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,343 (9th Cir. 1952) (basing its functionality
standard on "the interest in free competition").
281. Id. at 344 (noting that the defendant "can also compete by developing designs even more
aesthetically satisfying").
282. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit provided the following discussion of the challenge
posed by aesthetic functionality disputes:
The difficult cases, and this is one, are cases in which the feature sought to be
trademarked can be said to be functional only if giving aesthetic pleasure is a
function....
It is doubtful that any simple rule could be devised to decide these cases. On
the one hand it would be unreasonable to deny trademark protection to a
manufacturer who had the good fortune to have created a trade name, symbol, or
design that became valued by the consuming public for its intrinsic pleasingness
as well as for the information it conveyed about who had made the product ....
But it would also be unreasonable to let a manufacturer use trademark law to
prevent competitors from making pleasing substitutes for his own brand; yet that
would be the effect of allowing him to appropriate the most pleasing way of
configuring the product.
W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 340 (citations omitted). The court concluded that a competitive need
functionality standard provided the proper balance. Id. at 343 ("Ifeffective competition is possible
without copying that feature, then ... it is not a functional feature."); see also Wallace Int'l
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding a claim to
the general design elements of baroque-style silverware functional because the elements copied by
the defendant were "necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware"); Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 644 F.2d at 777 (rejecting an aesthetic functionality argument because protection of the
features at issue would not unduly hinder competition).
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Unfair Competition, which endorses a competition-based functionality
standard for all cases." 3 The Supreme Court's endorsement of the same
approach in Qualitex seemed to solidify the move toward a single
functionality standard, regardless of the aesthetic or utilitarian nature of
the feature at issue.2 The TrafFix decision confirmed the legitimacy of
the aesthetic functionality concept and the propriety of a competitionbased standard in aesthetic functionality cases.285 On these two points,
TrafFix simply confirmed the existing state of the law. It was the TrafFix
Court's adoption of a different utilitarian functionality standard, and the
problems caused by that standard and the now-important aesthetics/utility
distinction, that make TraiFix such a troubling decision.
2. The Patent Bargain, the Right to Copy, and the Competitive
Need Functionality Standard
During the early development of the functionality doctrine, courts
frequently expressed concern that unfair competition protection for
product designs could conflict with the patent system.28 6 These concerns,
however, did not lead to any special functionality rules. Instead, courts
during the early period consistently used a competition-based functionality
standard.28 7 It seems clear that the courts of this period believed a
competitive need standard was sufficient protection against such conflict.
There is, however, more to the story. During the same period, the
Supreme Court decided three cases that seemed to recognize a right to
copy previously patented inventions. 28 The right-to-copy concept and the
283. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c. (1995).
284. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995) ("The 'ultimate test of
aesthetic functionality... is whether the recognition oftrademark rights would significantly hinder
competition."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c. (1985))).
285. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) ("It is proper to
inquire into a 'significant non-reputation-related disadvantage' in cases of esthetic [sic]
functionality ... " (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165)).
286. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
287. Note, supra note 49, at 552-53.
288. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). A careful
analysis of this trio of cases is beyond the scope of this Article, but I should express my own
interpretation in the interest of full disclosure. I believe the right-to-copy language in all three cases
is dicta and not relevant to the question of whether trademark law can or should extend protection
to unpatented articles. In all three cases, the ultimate decision was based on other grounds, and the
Court seemed to be making general statements concerning the public's right-to-copy articles
otherwise in the public domain. I provide additional comments on the Singer and Kellogg decisions
in earlier notes. See supra notes 59, 78.
A number of commentators have read these cases differently, with some arguing that the
Supreme Court confirmed in this trio of decisions a constitutional right to copy any unpatented
article. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 249-51 (reviewing the decisions and concluding that the
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functionality doctrine developed along separate paths until the modem
period. The functionality cases cited in the preceding sections illustrate
one path. The right-to-copy path, on the other hand, led to a series of
preemption decisions, beginning in 1964 with the companion Sears and
Compco2 89 cases.

In the Sears and Compco cases, the Supreme Court held that federal
patent law preempted certain unfair competition claims brought under
state law.2 90 Both cases began with patent infringement and unfair
competition claims.2 9 In both cases, the district court invalidated the
patents, thus eliminating the patent infringement claims.2 92 The plaintiffs,
however, prevailed in both cases on the unfair competition claims.2 93 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unfair competition claims
presented in the cases were preempted by federal patent law.2 94 The Sears
and Compco decisions were clear enough on this point, but unfortunately
the decisions did not clearly indicate what room, if any, was left for unfair
competition claims based on product configurations. It was this issue that
proved the most controversial in the wake of the Sears and Compco
decisions.

Supreme Court adopted a patent bargain rationale that precludes trademark protection for any
features claimed in an expired utility patent); Davis, supra note 35, at 641-46 (arguing that
functionality is a constitutionally required limitation on trade dress protection); Fischer, supranote
42, at 33-35, 59-60 (reviewing the Kellogg decision and arguing for a "bright-line rule that
precludes the trade dress protection of any feature disclosed in a patent"); Jenkins, supranote 42,
at 346-48 (arguing that Singerand Kellogg recognized a right to copy previously patented designs);
Marshall, supra note 7, at 639-40 (arguing that the TrajFix Court erred in not enforcing a
constitutional right to copy unpatented articles; it should be noted that Marshall represented the
defendant in the TrajFix litigation); Pollack, supra note 42, at 295-98 (arguing that the Kellogg
decision recognized a right-to-copy features included in an expired patent); Taylor, supra note 7,
at 215 ("During the 19th century, the Supreme Court recognized the dominance of patent law over
trademark law for protecting functional innovations."); Dowell, supra note 59, at 168-71 (arguing
that the right to copy is grounded in the Constitution's Patent and Copyright Clause); Geremia,
supranote 42, at 793-95 (reviewing the trio of decisions and arguing for a right to copy unpatented
articles); Gill, supra note 42, at 1282-85 (arguing that the Supreme Court's early decisions
recognized the "public's right to copy expired patents"); Weitzer, supranote 42, at 195 (reviewing
the trio of decisions and concluding that "Supreme Court precedent clearly instructs lower courts
that configurations included within a patent should be dedicated, without restriction, to the public
upon expiration of the patent . . . [T]rade dress protection should not be available for such
configurations").
289. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
290. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco Coip., 376 U.S. at 235.
291. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 226; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 235.
292. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 226; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 235.
293. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 226; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 235.
294. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237-38.
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The two decisions contain somewhat conflicting explanations of the
sweep of federal preemption. In Sears, the Supreme Court viewed the
district court's decision as imposing unfair competition liability "based
only on the fact that Sears' lamp was copied from Stiffel's unpatented
lamp and that consequently the two looked exactly alike."2 95 This
interpretation of the claim seemed to leave room for unfair competition
claims based on product designs proven distinctive. Indeed, the Sears
Court explained that its ruling should not be read as preempting state
unfair competition or trademark laws requiring use of distinctive labels or
other source identifiers. 9 6
Compco presented a somewhat more difficult question, because the
district court expressly found that the plaintiff's design was distinctive. 7
This finding took Compco a step beyond Sears and raised questions about
whether the two decisions could be limited to unfair competition claims
based solely on copying.
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those
who, knowing that the public is relying upon an original
manufacturer's reputation for quality and integrity, deceive
the public by palming off their copies as the original. That an
295. Sears, Roebuck& Co., 376 U.S. at 232. The district court found that the "Sears' lamp was
'a substantially exact copy' of Stiffel's and that the two lamps were so much alike, both in
appearance and in functional details, 'that confusion between them is likely, and some confusion
has already occurred."' Id. at 226. The district court's finding that confusion was likely could be
read as implicitly including a finding that the plaintiff's lamp design was distinctive. The Supreme
Court, however, did not read the district court's analysis in this way. The Supreme Court concluded
that the district court required the plaintiff "only to prove that there was a 'likelihood of confusion
as to the source of the products'--that the two articles were sufficiently identical that customers
could not tell who had made a particular one." Id. at 227.
296. The Sears Court explained:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to
prevent customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect
businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the
packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from
misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.
Id.at 232.
297. Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 235 (explaining that the district court found "the appearance
of Day-Brite's design had 'the capacity to identify [Day-Brite] in the trade and does in fact so
identify [it] to the trade' (alteration in original)). The Compco Court seemed to gloss over this
point when it explained that Compco had been held liable "based wholly on the fact that selling an
article which is an exact copy of another unpatented article is likely to produce and did in this case
produce confusion as to the source of the article." Id at 237. Relying on this explanation, the
Compco Court applied the reasoning from the Sears decision and held that the unfair competition
claim in Compco was preempted. Id.at 237-38.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/1

68

Thurmon: The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law's Fuctionality Doctrine
TRADEMARK LAW SFUNCTJONAUY DOCTRINE

article copied from an unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not
essential to the use of either article, that the configuration of
the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which
identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be
"confusion" among purchasers as to which article is which or
as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying
a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however,
and regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.298
Courts were reluctant to take the Sears and Compco decisions as far as
the Supreme Court's language seemed to go.2 State trademark and unfair
competition claims were still allowed for unpatented product designs, so
long as the designs were proven distinctive (i.e., had a secondary
meaning)" ° and non-functional.3"' Though some argued that such
protection violated the holdings in the Sears and Compco decisions, °2 this
position never received significant support in the courts. Moreover, when
the Supreme Court revisited the preemption issue twenty-five years later,
it made clear that the federal right to copy does not extend to distinctive,
non-functional product features.
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that federal patent law preempted a Florida boat hull protection
statute.3"3 The Florida statute prohibited a particularly inexpensive method
of copying an existing boat hull and thus created a significant barrier to

298. Id. at 238.
299. Brown, supra note 179, at 1360-62 (noting that "Sears and Compco... have had a hard
life" and reviewing decisions that read the cases narrowly); Note, The Public Interestand the Right
to Copy Nonfunctional ProductFeatures,19 WM. &MARY L. REv. 317,335-39 (1977) (reviewing
cases showing a "significant judicial dissatisfaction with the rationale of Sears and Compco").
Some courts avoided the Sears and Compco rulings in Lanham Act cases because the Act is itself
federal law and thus cannot be preempted by another federal law. See Dratler, supra note 35, at 923
(noting this practice and collecting cases).
300. A symbol may be inherently distinctive or may become distinctive through use and
promotion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2000) (discussing
concepts of inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning). It was possible, at least in theory, to
prove a product design was inherently distinctive during this period, but the courts generally
required proof of secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness. Id (reviewing development of
trade dress distinctiveness rules).
301. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979);
Truck Equip. Serv. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
302. See, e.g., Note, supra note 115, at 557-59.
303. 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
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competitive copying of unpatented boat hulls.3 °4 The Court held that this
protection was an end-run around the federal patent laws and therefore was
preempted.3 5 In the course of its analysis, the Court noted the controversy
caused by its Sears and Compco decisions:
The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in Sears and
Compco has been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial
debate.... Read at their highest level of generality, the two
decisions could be taken to stand for the proposition that the
States are completely disabled from offering any form of
protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad
scope of patentable subject matter.... [T]he broadest reading
of Sears would prohibit the States from regulating the
deceptive simulation of trade dress or the tortious
appropriation of private information.
That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive
principle from Searsis inappropriate is clear from the balance
struck in Sears itself. The Sears Court made it plain that the
States "may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks,
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to
prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading
purchasers as to the source of the goods." Trade dress is, of
course, potentially the subject matter of design patents. Yet
our decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may
place limited regulations on the circumstances in which such
used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to
designs3are
6
source.

0

This statement was not all the Supreme Court had to say about trade dress
and unfair competition claims in Bonito Boats. The Court also noted that
the state law claim preempted in Sears had protected "the functional
aspects of a product which had been placed in public commerce absent the
protection of a valid patent. '307 A trade dress claim would not be
preempted, the Court later explained, because "the common law tort of
unfair competition has been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary

304. Id. at 158 ("[T]he beneficiary of the Florida statute may prevent a competitor from
'making' the product in what is evidently the most efficient manner available and from 'selling'
the product when it is produced in that fashion.").
305. Id. at 159-61.
306. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
307. Id. at 156. This statement is a bit misleading because the lamp design at issue in Sears
was patented. The patents were held invalid in the litigation, but when the product was placed in
public commerce, it had what was presumptively a valid patent. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (patents are presumed valid).
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meaning such that they operate as a designation of source."308 The Court
distinguished the Florida boat hull protection law from unfair competition
claims, noting that the Florida law was enacted to protect boat makers and
to encourage the development of new and improved boat hull designs.3" 9
In unfair competition law, on the other hand, "the focus is on the
protection of consumers,
not the protection of producers as an incentive to
310
product innovation.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Bonito Boats is striking. While the
Court recognized a federal right to copy unpatented products, the Court
also was very careful to note the limited nature of this right. Only claims
seeking "patent-like protection"3 " run afoul of the federal right to copy.
The Florida boat hull statute, in this sense, was analogous to the
application of the state unfair competition law in Sears, because the
Florida statute protected all hull designs against copying.312 Copying was
the only element of the unfair competition claim in Sears,3 13 and copying
was the only element of the hull protection claim in Bonito Boats.31 4 It was
in this sense that these laws provided "patent-like protection." The Bonito
Boats decision made it clear that trademark protection for product designs
does not result in "patent-like protection," because trademark law imposes
35
the non-patent requirements of distinctiveness and non-functionality.
Bonito Boats should have ended any debate on the right-to-copy issue
in trademark cases. There is no federal right to copy a distinctive, nonfunctional design. Despite the clear guidance provided in Bonito Boats,
many commentators continued to argue for a right to copy even distinctive
and non-functional product features.31 6 These arguments largely fell on

308. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 157.
309. Id
310. Id.
311. Id. at 156.
312. Id. at 144-45.
313. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232; supra note 295 and
accompanying text.
314. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 144-45.
315. At least one commentator takes a similar view of the Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats
decisions. See Paul Heald, FederalIntellectualProperty Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IowA L. REV. 959, 968-88 (1991) (noting the Court's focus on the criteria for protection and
arguing the Court's preemption analysis is consistent across these and other decisions when
evaluated in this way).
316. Kratzke, supra note 7, at 106 ("In Sears/Compco/BonitoBoats, the Court established a
broad right to copy product features not sufficiently reflecting invention or creativity to be worthy
of a patent or copyright."); Mohr, supra note 42, at 365-67 (noting the "narrowing of the Sears
preemption language" in Bonito Boats,but arguing that the decision "strongly reaffirmed the right
of the public to copy freely and use whatever patent law has deemed is in the public domain");
Moskin, supra note 7, at 684 (claiming that a "federal right to copy and to use subject matter not
protected by patent or copyright was acknowledged again by the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats"
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deaf ears, as the federal courts continued to use a competitive need
functionality standard as the only limitation on the scope of trademark
protection for distinctive product designs.3" 7
The significance of the Bonito Boats decision was directly challenged
just a few years later in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.318 The case, heard by the
Seventh Circuit, presented a very specific question: "does the § 45
definition of 'Trademark' in the Lanham Act ... exclude trademark
protection of product configurations?"3 9 The majority noted the
differences between trademark and patent protection and observed that
"courts have consistently held that a product's different qualities can be
protected simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the
statutory means for protection of intellectual property. "320 Bonito Boats
supported trademark protection of distinctive, non-functional product
configurations, the majority held, because "the underlying policies of
federal trademark law, and the nature of the protection afforded, do not
approximate the sweeping, perpetual patent-like state statutes that the
Supreme Court found impermissible in Sears, Compco, and Bonito
Boats. 321

(internal quotations omitted)); Pollack, supra note 42, at 297-98 (arguing that Kellogg remains a
controlling precedent, even after Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats, and that Kellogg precludes
trade dress protection for all features of a previously patented product); Dowell, supra note 59, at
165 (arguing "the [Bonito Boats] Court reaffirmed the Sears/Compco policy of the right to copy");
Geremia, supra note 42, at 798-99 (recognizing that "[m]uch of the Court's Bonito Boats opinion
is devoted to refining the right to copy," but concluding that "there is an unqualified right to copy
subject matter disclosed in expired utility patents"); Gill, supra note 42, at 1289, 1296-97 (briefly
discussing Bonito Boats and later arguing for a broad right to copy previously patented inventions);
Laba, supra note 42, at 1669 (arguing that Bonito Boats "affirmed [the] holdings in Sears and
Compco that states cannot offer protection to products that are unprotected as a matter of federal
law"); Weitzer, supra note 42, at 188 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats "reaffirmed
the holdings in Sears and Compco").
Some commentators have noted the importance of the BonitoBoats dicta discussed in the text.
See, e.g., Taylor,supra note 7, at 216-17 (explaining that BonitoBoats limits the broad preemption
language in Sears and Compco and recognizing that "[u]nder BonitoBoats, the key to establishing
trademark protection for a product feature was demonstrating a lack of functionality"); John B.
Pegram, The Scope of Industrial Design Protection Under Trademark and Unfair Competition
Laws, 19 U. BALT. L. REv. 333, 345-47 (1989) (reviewing the Bonito Boats dicta and explaining
its relevance to trademark protection for product designs).
317. See sources cited in supra note 301.
318. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
319. Id.at 633 (citation omitted).
320. Id. at 638.
321. Id. at 641-42. There was a vigorous dissent in the Kohler case. Judge Cudahy concluded
that the early Supreme Court cases cited above (i.e., Singer, Kellogg, and Scott Paper), see supra
note 288, created a broad federal right to copy any unpatented product. Id.at 644-45 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting). He saw federal trademark protection for such products as a direct violation of this right.
Id. at 647-48 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy also relied on the broad preemptive statements
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Three years after the Kohler decision, the Tenth Circuit considered
somewhat similar arguments in Vornado Air Circulation Systems v.
Duracraft Corp.322 The case involved a trade dress claim based on the
design of a spiral fan grill.323 Certain parts of the fan were claimed in
utility patents owned by the plaintiff Vornado, but the defendant's fan was
designed in a manner that avoided infringement of the patent.324 The
district court found the Vomado grill design non-functional, in part
because "other feasible grill structures could easily do as well on other
relevant performance tests, and the spiral grill was not shown to be
cheaper to manufacture. 325 In short, the district court found no
competitive need to use the spiral grill design developed by Vornado.
Because the court also found the Vornado grill design distinctive and the
confusion, Duracraft was enjoined
Duracraft fan likely to cause consumer
326
from selling its spiral grill fan.
Duracraft challenged the district court's factual findings on appeal and
presented the legal argument that Vornado's trade dress claim was barred
by federal patent law. 327 The district court's findings of distinctiveness and
likelihood of confusion seemed suspect, 328 but the Tenth Circuit focused
instead on the legal issue.329 Indeed, the court framed the issue in a way
that suggested it had no option but to resolve the difficult patent/trademark
conflict question: "We must decide whether a product configuration is
entitled to trade dress protection when it is or has been a significant
330
inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent.,

in the Sears and Compco decisions, id. at 645-46 (Cudahy, J., dissenting), but failed to appreciate
the importance of the Bonito Boats clarification of the Sears and Compco preemption holdings.
Judge Cudahy's dissent cannot be squared with the Bonito Boats dicta discussed in the preceding
text.
322. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
323. Id. at 1499.
324. Id. at 1500-01 (identifying the Vornado patents and noting "both sides agreed that the
[Duracraft] Turbo Fan did not infringe Vornado's patents").
325. Id. at 1501.
326. Id. at 1502.
327. Id. at 1501 n.4, 1502.
328. Id. at 1502. The district court found the Vornado spiral grill design inherently distinctive,
id., despite the fact that various types of spiral grills have been used on fans for many years. Id. at
1500. On the likelihood of confusion issue, the district court found that consumers would be
confused, id. at 1502, despite Duracraft's use of distinctly different brand names, packaging, and
labels. Id. at 1501. In fact, Duracraft offered to take additional steps to distinguish its fan from
Vornado's fan, but the district court rejected the proposal and issued a broad injunction against
further sales of the Duracraft fan. See id at 1502. These findings are highly questionable and would
have provided a more reasonable basis for reversal than the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the right-tocopy issue.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1499.
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The Vornado court found a conflict between trademark and patent
protection for the same product features because of the difference between
the competitive need functionality standard of trademark law and the
utility standard of patent law.33 1 The court was moved by the patent
bargain concerns and found the functionality doctrine to be an incomplete
solution to the conflict.332 Rather than modifying its competitive need
functionality standard, which was consistent with the standard used in
other circuits, the Tenth Circuit decided to impose an additional limitation
on the scope of trademark protection:
Where a product configuration is a significant inventive
component of an invention covered by a utility patent, so that
without it the invention cannot fairly be said to be the same
invention, patent policy dictates that it enter into the public
domain when the utility patents on the fans expire. To ensure
that result, it cannot receive trade dress protection under
section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act].
No other court adopted such a rule, either before or after Vornado was
decided. Many courts have held that a utility patent can be important
evidence of functionality, particularly where the patent's disclosure touts
the utilitarian benefits of a feature later claimed as trade dress.3 34 But
Vornado marked the first time a court adopted a per se rule prohibiting
trademark protection for features previously disclosed or claimed in a
patent. The Vornado decision sparked a flurry of commentary335 and led

331. Id. at 1506-07.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1500.
334. See, e.g., In reMorton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting
the relevance "of an expired utility patent which disclosed the utilitarian advantage of the design
sought to be registered as a trademark"); Dogloo, Inc. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., 893 F. Supp. 911,919
(C.D. Cal. 1995) ("A careful review of Dogloo's utility patent reveals that the patent does not attach
any particular functional significance to the igloo configuration itself. Thus, the existence of a
utility patent is not particularly probative of the functionality of the igloo configuration."); see also
infra note 336.
335. See sources cited supranote 42. Though many commentators were critical of the specific
rule adopted by the Vornado court, the decision clearly breathed new life into the right-to-copy
movement, a movement that seemed to be going nowhere prior to Vornado. Some commentators
approved of the Vornadorule, but most of those who supported a broad right to copy used Vornado
as a springboard for advancing alternative rules. See Fischer, supra note 42, at 52-54 (evaluating
the practical effect of the Vornado rule and finding it "excessively narrow"); Pollack, supra note
42, at 294, 297-98 (finding the Vornado approach better than the use of a unitary functionality rule,
but ultimately arguing for a right to copy "'the article as it was made during the patent period'
(quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938))); Falk, supranote 42, at 83638, 842 (criticizing the Vornado rule and suggesting that "a configuration that alone qualifies for
a utility patent would necessarily meet the definition of functionality"); Geremia, supra note 42,
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to a series of circuit court decisions addressing the question of whether a
per se rule was needed. Five other circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Federal) considered the issue raised in Vornado, and all five
rejected the adoption of a per se rule.336
Perhaps the most persuasive treatment of the patent bargain question
came from the Federal Circuit.337 In Midwest Industries,Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered and rejected the Vornado
analysis.33 The court relied heavily on prior CCPA and Federal Circuit
decisions, which consistently treated utility patents as relevant, but not
dispositive evidence of functionality.339 The proper focus, the Federal
Circuit reiterated, was on the competitive significance of the design in
question.3 40 The court held that if the design is disclosed or claimed in a
utility patent, but is of little importance in the market, the design is not

at 805-06, 816 (reviewing the Vornado rule, but concluding that "[alnything short of a bright line
preclusion rule-a rule precluding trade dress protection for product configurations disclosed in
expired utility patents-fails to protect the right to copy adequately"); Perez, supra note 42, at 41012 (agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the probleni-the gap between patent utility and
trademark functionality-but criticizing the Vornado rule); Weitzer, supra note 42, at 196-97
(arguing the Vornado rule did not go far enough to prevent conflict between trade dress protection
and the patent system).
336. Sunbeam Prods. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 n.20 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[Tihe mere
fact that a feature is named in a utility patent does not automatically render it functional" because
a "'patent must be examined in detail to determine whether the disclosed configuration is really
primarily functional or just incidentally appears in the disclosure of a patent."' (quoting 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7:89); Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929,
939-40 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no need for a per se rule); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.,
138 F.3d 277,283-89 (7th Cir. 1998) (conducting acareful analysis of the right-to-copy precedents
and rejecting arguments for a per se rule); Disc GolfAss'n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002,
1006 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n expired utility patent is weighty evidence of functionality, although
that fact alone is not dispositive."); Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding no conflict between trade dress protection and patent protection
and noting that "[tihe Tenth Circuit stands alone in holding to the contrary").
337. My claim of persuasiveness is somewhat speculative because the Supreme Court
intervened only two years later in TrafFix, leaving rather little time for other courts to consider the
Federal Circuit's position. But given the prominent role of the Federal Circuit in matters of patent
law, it seems fair to say the court's views on whether trademark and patent law conflict would be
of particular interest to the other circuit courts. Moreover, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
all rejected per se rules before the Federal Circuit directly addressed the issue. See supranote 336.
Given the Federal Circuit's endorsement of the majority view and its heightened persuasive
authority on patent law issues, it seems fair to assume the court's views would have been quite
persuasive had the Supreme Court not derailed the common law process in TrafFix.
338. 175 F.3d at 1364.
339. Id. at 1362 ("[T]his court and its predecessor have repeatedly held that the availability
of trade dress protection does not depend on whether a patent has been obtained for the product or
feature in question.").
340. Id. at 1364.
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functional.3 4' "The fact that a curved winch post was disclosed and

claimed in [a utility] patent is not a sufficient basis for granting judgment
against Midwest .... ,342 If Midwest's particular winch post design:
is sufficiently distinctive to serve as a designation of source
and if the protection of that particular design does not result
in a meaningful restriction on Karavan's ability to compete
in the market, either before or after the expiration of
[Midwest's] patent, then Midwest's state law claims, as well
as its Lanham Act claim,
343 would not be barred by any
overriding federal policy.
It is hardly surprising that in the TrafFix case the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals followed the lead of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits, rather than the solitary position taken by the Tenth Circuit in
Vornado. Indeed, after the Sixth Circuit joined the persuasive Federal
Circuit and the three other regional circuits in holding that a utility patent
may contain evidence of functionality but is not necessarily more
probative of functionality than other evidence, it seemed likely other
circuits would follow suit. The Vornado rule appeared destined to become
a "derelict[] on the waters of the law."' 3" If that had happened, it is also
possible that the Tenth Circuit would have overruled its own decision at
some point.3 45 In any event, the split in the circuits on the right-to-copy
issue was becoming less significant as more
courtsjoined the trend toward
36
rules.
bargain
patent
special
of
rejection

341. Id (noting the feature at issue was part of a utility patent claim, but "that is not to say that
the curved winch post is 'functional,' i.e., that Midwest's right to exclude others from using that
feature 'would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"' (quoting
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995))).
342. Id. The curved winch post was a feature of the personal watercraft trailer disclosed and
claimed in U.S. Patent No. 5,518,261. Id. at 1357. The patent's disclosure says little about the
curved winch post, but this feature is clearly illustrated in three of the patent drawings. U.S. Patent
No. 5,518,261 (issued May 21, 1996), at 2, 4 figs. 1, 3, 8. The patent describes the winch post as
having "an integral free end curved upwardly in an arcuate manner.. . ." Id. at 6 col. 3, 11.25-26.
The curved winch post is an element of one claim in the patent. Id. at 7, col. 5, 11.14-19 (Claim 10).
This feature does not appear to be a particularly important aspect of the invention.
343. Midwest Indus., Inc., 175 F.3d at 1365.
344. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 357 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
345. The Tenth Circuit, like other circuit courts, has an internal rule prohibiting subsequent
panels from overruling prior panel decisions. See United States v. Berryhill, 880 F.2d 275, 277
(10th Cir. 1989). An en banc decision would have been required to overrule Vornado.
346. It is also worth noting that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not have as many
intellectual property appeals as some other regional circuits. Peters, supra note 42, at 138. In other
words, it might have been some time before a court in the Tenth Circuit heard another case with
a fact pattern like the one presented in Vornado. Indeed, one commentator criticized the Tenth
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When the trend away from Vornado is taken together with the circuit
courts' move toward use of a single competition-based functionality
standard in aesthetic and utilitarian cases, one begins to get a true sense of
the state of the law prior to the TralFix decision. Despite decades of
struggle and division, the common-law process was working. The federal
courts had settled on a competitive need functionality standard and for the
most part were using that standard to resolve all functionality issues. The
functionality doctrine was more coherent and workable by the end of the
twentieth century than it had ever been.47That was the status quo when the
Supreme Court intervened in TrafFix.1
II. THE FALL
A. TrafFix-The Supreme Court Ignores
the Lessons of the Past
The TrafFix litigation involved the design of temporary road signs,
such as the kind used near road construction sites.348 Because these signs
"must withstand strong gusts of wind," they incorporate certain structural
components that allow the signs to bend or flex with the wind.3 49 These
components typically employ springs to ensure the signs will flex with the
wind and return to the upright position when the displacing force ends.35 °
The road signs at issue in TrafFix used a dual-spring mechanism for this

Circuit for taking such a bold position on a matter outside the court's core areas of expertise. Id.
("A court such as the Tenth Circuit, which does not handle a large volume of intellectual property
cases, should not have attempted such a sweeping decision in a particularized area of law."). I
believe this criticism may go a bit far, but it is consistent with the general observation that the
Vornado case was less important, as a practical matter, than the same holding would have been
from the Second, Seventh, or Ninth Circuit.
347. Should the Supreme Court have left well enough alone and denied the petition for
certiorari in TraJFix? Perhaps, but the TrafFix case did present an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to confirm the important functionality work done by the lower federal courts. The TrafFix
Court could have, and should have, rejected the Vornado analysis and confirmed the competitive
need functionality standard as the only necessary policy-based limitation on the scope of trademark
protection for product features. Given the outcome of the TrafFix decision, I certainly believe the
law would have been better off if the Court had denied certiorari. That reflection, however, is made
with the benefit of hindsight. When the Court decided to intervene, I was optimistic because the
timing appeared right for a decision that would close the book on most functionality issues. Instead,
the Court revisited previously resolved issues and left the functionality doctrine in much worse
shape than it was in before the Court's intervention. The functionality wars are now far from over.
348. TratFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001).
349. Id.
350. Id. at31.
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purpose.351 It was this mechanism, combined with the rest of the visible
structure of the signs, that the plaintiff claimed as its trade dress in the
TrafFix litigation.352 There was, however, more to the story.
The plaintiff, Marketing Displays, Inc., developed its dual-spring sign
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 353 The signs were sold under the
brand name WINDMASTER and became successful.3 54 Marketing
Displays owned two U.S. utility patents for different parts of the structure
of its signs, including the dual-spring mechanism. 355 These patents expired
in 1989.356
The defendant, TrafFix Devices, Inc., was formed in 1986 to sell
temporary road signs.357 In 1994, TrafFix introduced a sign using a dualspring mechanism copied from the Marketing Displays sign.358 The overall
structure of the TrafFix sign was quite similar to the WINDMASTER sign
made by Marketing Displays. 359 The new TrafFix sign was sold under the
name WINDBUSTER.3 ° Marketing Displays sued TrafFix, alleging (1)
trademark infringement of the federally registered W1NDMASTER mark;
and (2) trade dress infringement of the overall design of the
WINDMASTER sign. 36' The latter claim was not limited to the dualspring mechanism, but was based on the overall impression created by
Marketing Displays' WINDMASTER sign.362 The district court resolved
the majority of the parties' claims on summary judgment.363 In its first
ruling, the court granted Marketing Displays' motion for summary
judgment on its trademark infringement claim, holding that TrafFix's use
of the trademark WINDBUSTER infringed the plaintiffs registered
WINDMASTER trademark. 3" The court also granted summary judgment
365
for the plaintiff on an antitrust counterclaim brought by the defendant.

351. Id.at 25-26.
352. Id. at 30.
353. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953, 955-56 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
354. Id.at 955-56.
355. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262,264 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district ruled on those motions in
separate decisions. Id. at 263, 277.
356. Id. at 264.
357. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 967 F. Supp. at 956.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. Id.
362. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TralFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262,265 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
363. See id.at 264-65.
364. Mktg. Displays,Inc., 967 F. Supp. at 962, 965 ("[Tlhere is aclear likelihood of confusion
between the WINDMASTER and WINDBUSTER marks.").
365. Id.at 965 ("[T]he mere assertion of trademark rights does not constitute a dangerous

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/1

78

Thurmon: The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law's Fuctionality Doctrine
TRADEMARK LA WS FUNCTIONALTY DOCTRINE

In a second decision, the district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the trade dress claim.366 The court found that the
design of the WINDMASTER sign was functional and not distinctive.36
Either conclusion would have required a dismissal of the trade dress
claim.36 On the functionality issue, the district court noted that during
prosecution of its patent application, Marketing Displays "argued that...
the dual-spring design was superior to the single-spring design taught by
the prior art."369 This argument and other evidence convinced the district
court that the dual-spring design was functional.37 The district court used
a competitive need functionality standard, but gave significant weight to
the utility patents and, in particular, to statements made during the efforts
to obtain those patents.37 ' Though the district court may have given more
weight to the plaintiff's utility patents than some courts have, the court's
analysis was generally consistent with the competition-based functionality
standard used in the Sixth Circuit and other courts. 3" The decision
represented no break with established functionality standards. The court
did not adopt the Vornado rule or any other special patent bargain rule.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
rulings on the trademark infringement claim and the antitrust
counterclaim, but reversed the district court on the trade dress claim.3"3
There was sufficient evidence, the Sixth Circuit held, to justify a trial on
the distinctiveness and functionality issues.' Though the grant of
summary judgment was reversed, the Sixth Circuit did not alter the
competition-based standard it had used in prior cases.3" Instead, the Sixth
Circuit found errors in the district court's application of this standard,
including the district court's emphasis on the existence of utility patents
for the dual-spring design.376 In the Sixth Circuit's view, the district court
applied something close to the per se rule adopted by the Tenth Circuit in

probability that MDI would gain monopoly power in the market of wind-resistant signs.").
366. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 971 F. Supp. at 263.
367. Id. at 269 ("[N]o reasonable trier of fact could determine that MDI has established
secondary meaning."); id. at 276 ("[T]he dual-spring design asserted by MDI as trade dress is
functional as a matter of law.").
368. See id. at 276.
369. Id. at 274.
370. See id. at 276.
371. See id. at 273-74.

372. In fact, the district court's summary judgment decision provided a more detailed and
careful analysis of the functionality issue than is found in most other decisions. See id. at 273-76.
373. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 932 (6th Cir. 1999).
374. Id. at 939-40.
375. Id. at 940 ("The appropriate question is whether the particular product configuration is
a competitive necessity.").
376. Id. at 939.
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Vornado.3" By focusing so much of its attention on the patents for the
dual-spring mechanism, the district court failed to give sufficient weight
to the evidence of alternative designs, or so the Sixth Circuit concluded.37

377. The Sixth Circuit described the district court's analysis of the patents as creating "a
presumption against a trade dress claim." Id. From this starting point, the Sixth Circuit went on to
review the Vornado decision and its progeny. Id. This analysis seems a bit misplaced given the
district court's careful analysis of the patents. The district court did not merely cite the patents and
conclude the dual-spring design was functional. To the contrary, the district court presented a
detailed review of the patent claims, disclosures, and prosecution histories. Mktg. Displays,Inc.,
971 F. Supp. at 273-74. The district court noted the significant overlap between the claimed
inventions and the trade dress claim. Id. at 274 ("[AIIl of the various 'Windmaster' sign stands
incorporate all of the features, perform in the same manner, and achieve the same results as the sign
stands disclosed and claimed in the '696 and '482 patents." (quoting Marketing Displays' Brief)).
The district court also noted that during the prosecution of the patent applications, the plaintiff had
"argued that the functioning of the dual-spring design was superior to the single-spring design
taught by the prior art." Id The Sixth Circuit may have been correct in its criticism of the district
court for focusing almost entirely on the dual-spring mechanism, to the exclusion of other parts of
the plaintiff's design, but the district court's analysis of the utility patents was not the equivalent
of a per se rule prohibiting trade dress protection for any previously patented invention. The district
court's consideration of the patent question covered nearly two full pages of the reported decision.
Id. at 273-74.
378. Mktg. Displays,Inc., 200 F.3d at 939-40. I disagree with the Sixth Circuit on this point.
The district court gave the following explanation of its focus on the dual-spring mechanism:
At the outset, this court notes that when determining whether a product
configuration is functional, the product configuration must be looked at in its
entirety, not as discrete features that may be functional ....However, the only
significant distinction in appearance between MDI's sign stands and the sign
stands of MDI's competitors is the vertical dual-spring design or configuration.
Each of the competitors' sign stands identified by MDI includes the other four
features claimed as elements of the alleged trade dress. Thus, while this court
must look to the entire claimed trade dress, it is clear that the only element of
MDI's alleged trade dress that arguably sets MDI's product apart from its
competitors, and thus could operate as a source identifier, is the pair of vertically
arranged closely spaced coil springs.
Mktg. Displays,Inc., 971 F. Supp. at 273. This analysis is quite reasonable if non-functionality is
an element of the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff must establish that its trade dress is a valid
trademark symbol. The dress, therefore, must be both distinctive and non-functional. If only one
element of the trade dress is distinctive, then it follows that the functionality analysis should be
directed to that same element. A claimant should not be allowed to characterize its trade dress in
one way for the distinctiveness analysis and in another for the functionality analysis. The district
court did a better job on this important point than did the Sixth Circuit.
Perhaps more importantly, the Sixth Circuit's alternative analysis was more theoretical than
real. The district court did not overlook the evidence of alternative designs. See id. at 275-76.
Instead, the court found the evidence lacking. Id. The alternatives either were unavailable (some
of the disclosed designs were covered by existing patents) or unequal (other designs would not
withstand strong winds as well as the plaintiff's dual-spring design). Id. As the district court
correctly noted, "[i]f the purported alternatives are not available and equal, then they are not true
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In the end, the reversal merely sent the matter back to the district court for
trial. The Sixth Circuit's decision did not include any predictions about the
outcome of such a trial.
At this point, the TrafFix litigation appeared unremarkable. Both the
Sixth Circuit and the district court used a competitive need functionality
standard, and neither adopted a per se rule like the one used by the Tenth
Circuit in Vornado. The district court gave more weight to the statements
made during the prosecution of the patent applications than the Sixth
Circuit believed was warranted,3 79 and the district court gave less weight
to the evidence of alternative designs than the Sixth Circuit believed was
warranted.380 Neither decision, though, was a break with established
principles. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit merely followed the clear trend
when it rejected the Vornado rule and held that a competitive need
functionality standard was sufficient to prevent conflict between patent
and trademark protection.
The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in TrafFix was,
therefore, a bit surprising. It was certainly true that a split existed on the
need for a special patent bargain rule. The Vornado rule was a singular
exception, and five other circuits-the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Federal Circuits-had rejected arguments for similar rules.38' It seemed
likely the Supreme Court would endorse the majority view, particularly
given the Federal Circuit's strong rejection of the Vornado analysis.382
Such a decision by the Supreme Court would have eliminated the final
obstacle to uniformity in the federal courts' application of the functionality
doctrine. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

at 276. The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, concluded that even patented designs
alternatives." Id.
must be treated as alternatives in the functionality analysis. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 940.
This approach is inconsistent with the modern trend toward focusing on truly equivalent
alternatives. See supra Part I.C.2.b. The competition-based functionality analysis should be
grounded in the practical realities of the market, and patent-based exclusivity can be an important
part of these realities.
The district court's functionality analysis was more solid than that of the Sixth Circuit.
Nevertheless, the summary judgment question was a close one. The plaintiff did present evidence
of alternative designs and made an effort to rebut the functionality evidence arising from its utility
patents. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 971 F. Supp. at 273-75. I agree with the district court's analysis of
this factual evidence (i.e., I agree that the plaintiff's trade dress was functional), but I am in less
agreement with the court's conclusion that the design was so clearly functional that summary
judgment was appropriate.
379. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 939.
380. Id. at 940.
381. See supra notes 331-46 and accompanying text.
382. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
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The Supreme Court began its analysis in TrafFix by focusing on the
patent bargain issue.3" 3 This starting point made sense, given the Court's
reason for hearing the case, but it was not the correct starting point from
which to understand the broader functionality issues. The Court never
discussed the competition concern or the potential for consumer confusion
that will result when distinctive product features are deemed functional
and thus denied trademark protection. Instead, the Court myopically
focused on the patent question. That was a grave mistake, and it led to a
series of errors that effectively turned the entire functionality doctrine on
its head.
Before even considering what the general functionality standard should
be or what policy should define that standard, the TrafFix Court held "[a]
utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional."3" The Court put the cart before the horse; it weighed the
evidence before explaining the substantive issue. By starting with the
conclusion that a patent is "strong evidence," the Court had little choice
but to adopt a functionality standard consistent with that evidentiary
conclusion.
The great weight the Court placed on the mere existence of a utility
patent is difficult to square with a competition-based functionality
standard. An invention must be "useful" to be patented, but there is no
requirement of commercial importance.385 Patents sometimes are granted
for silly and obscure inventions.38 6 Patents frequently are granted for very
narrow advances over the existing state of the art, a fact that sometimes
results in patents with quite narrow scope.8 7 Patents also are granted for
inventions that prove less significant than might have been expected. For
these reasons and others, a great many patents lapse, for failure to pay
periodically required maintenance fees, well before their statutory

383. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001).
384. Id. at 29.
385. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
386. There are a number of Internet sites featuring patents for silly or obscure inventions.
Perhaps the most widely publicized site is Delphion's Gallery ofObscure Patents. DelphionGallery
of Obscure Patents,at http://www.delphion.com/gallery (last visited Nov. 9, 2003); see also Crazy
Patents.com, at http://www.crazypatents.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2003); ABC News, Patently
WeirdArchive, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/patentlyweird/patentlyweird index.html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003); Weird and Wonderful Patents, at http://www.lightlink.com/bbm/
weird.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003); Patently Absurd! (identifying a number of other obscure
patent sites), at http://www.patent.freeserve.co.uk/othersites.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
387. At least one commentator has been quite critical of these patents. See, e.g., Joshua
McGuire, Intellectual Property: Patent: Patentability: Nonobviousness: Nonobviousness:
Limitationson EvidentiarySupport, 18 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 175, 185-86 (2003) (describing these
patents as "parasitic incremental patents protecting trivial inventions").
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expiration dates.3"' A utility patent, standing alone, is therefore no
evidence whatsoever of the competitive significance of "the features
' It is difficult to determine whether the TrafFix Court
therein claimed."389
fully appreciated this important point. Whether or not the Court
understood what it was doing, the next step in the Court's analysis was
preordained by its analysis of the patent issue.
When the TrafFix Court turned to the Sixth Circuit's competitive need
analysis, the Court had little choice but to reject that analysis. Without
discussing the enormous body of case law endorsing the competitive need
functionality standard, the TrafFix Court declared this standard "incorrect
as a comprehensive definition" of functionality.3 90 In place of the
competitive need rule, the TrafFix Court substituted the Inwood standard:
"a feature is... functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the
device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device."'3 9' When the
TrafFix Court resurrected this internally inconsistent and unworkable
standard, the trademark bar and the lower federal courts probably let out
a collective groan. The competitive need standard was discarded, and in
its place came a standard no one really understood.
That was not the worst of what the TrafFix Court did to the
functionality doctrine. In Qualitex, the Supreme Court reconciled the
Inwood standard with the competitive need standard in use by most
courts.3 92 This clearly posed a significant problem for the TrafFix Court.
How could the Supreme Court reject the competitive need standard and
replace it with a standard that the same Court had equated with the
competitive need standard only six years earlier? A dilemma, indeed.
Not to worry-the TrafFix Court merely moved on to yet another
controversial functionality issue: aesthetic functionality. Qualitex was a
case about whether a color, standing alone, could be protected as a
trademark.3 93 Qualitex was, the TrafFix Court explained, an aesthetic
functionality case, and TrajFixwas not.3 94 The Court held that the Qualitex
functionality analysis and, in particular, the competitive need functionality
standard, applied only in aesthetic functionality cases.39 5 Never mind that

388. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignoranceat the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495, 1503-04 (2001) (providing statistics and possible explanations for the large number of patents
that lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees).
389. TrajFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29.
390. Id. at 33.
391. Id. (citing Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
392. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
393. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1995).
394. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33 ("In Qualitex, by contrast, aesthetic functionality
was the central question .... ").
395. Id. ("It is proper to inquire into a 'significant non-reputation-related disadvantage' in
cases of aesthetic functionality, the question involved in Qualitex.").
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the Qualitex Court made no distinction between aesthetic and utilitarian
functionality.3 96 Never mind that the Qualitex Court relied on the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which made no distinction
between aesthetic and utilitarian functionality.397 The Traffix Court
needed a distinction, and it found one. The TrafFix Court held the
competitive need standard was fine for aesthetic functionality cases, but
in utilitarian functionality disputes, the Inwood standard should be used.3 98
What a disaster. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in TrafFix to
resolve a relatively minor question concerning the relevance of an expired
utility patent and ended up rewriting the entire law of functionality. Gone
is the uniform use of a competitive need functionality standard. Gone is
the consistent treatment of all functionality questions, whether aesthetic
or utilitarian. In their place are inconsistent and largely incomprehensible
standards and distinctions.
B. The Aftermath-Division and Confusion in the Courts
1. Division-What Is the Proper General
Functionality Standard?
Within one year of the Traf ix decision, the lower federal courts
divided on the question of which general functionality standard should be
used.3 This split is much more harmful than the minor split that led the
Court to intervene in TrafFix, and this time the split is the direct result of

396. The Qualitex Court referred to "the important 'functionality' doctrine of trademark law,"
not to a pair of different functionality rules. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164. Moreover, when the
Qualitex Court provided examples of functional designs, it.gave both utilitarian and aesthetic
examples. Id. at 165 (noting that a "special illumination-enhancing shape" of a light bulb would be
functional because protecting the shape "would impede competition"); id. at 169-70 (citing Deere
& Co. v. Farmhand,Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), as finding functional "the green
color of farm machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to match)").
397. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c. (1995) (noting the
controversy over aesthetic functionality and recommending use of a competitive need standard
regardless of the aesthetic or utilitarian nature of the product features at issue).
398. See Tra Fix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
399. Compare Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(continuing to apply a competitive need standard in a utilitarian functionality case), with
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) ("TrafFix
supersedes the definition of functionality previously adopted by this court."), Eco Mfg. LLC v.
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 03-2704, U.S. App. LEXIS 26430, *13 (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003)
("TraJFix rejected an equation of functionality with necessity; it is enough that the design be
useful."), and Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming, Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(TrafFix altered the functionality standard).
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the Supreme Court's own decision. To understand why courts have
divided on this crucial issue, one must take a closer look at the TrafFix
decision.
It is the TrafFix Court's treatment of its earlier Qualitex decision that
lies at the core of the problem. Qualitex was an extremely important final
step in the common-law development of the functionality doctrine.4 °0
When the Qualitex Court adopted a competitive need standard, it
confirmed what other federal courts had been doing for years. By
reconciling the old Inwood test with the competitive need standard,
Qualitex seemed to eliminate one of the final functionality problems.
TrafFix brought the problems back, and this time, the problems are more
difficult to avoid.40 '
In a remarkably short-sighted move, the TrafFix Court recast both
Inwood and Qualitex. According to the TrafFix Court, Qualitex did not
explain Inwood; it expanded on the Inwood standard. After quoting the
Inwood definition, the TrafFix Court continued: "Expanding upon the
meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a functional feature is one
the 'exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage." ' ' 2 The Sixth Circuit, as well as other
circuit courts, read this language from Qualitex as confirmation of the
competitive need functionality standard. 0 3 Indeed, that confirmation was
perhaps as important as the Qualitex Court's primary holding, because by
confirming the circuit courts' adoption of the competitive need standard
and eliminating the Inwood problem, Qualitex provided the final nudge
needed to move the courts to complete uniformity on a general
functionality standard.4°
Despite this uniformity, the TrafFix Court declared the competitive
45
need standard "incorrect as a comprehensive definition" of functionality.
In place of the competitive need standard, the TrafFix Court simply
restated the old Inwood definition and noted that Qualitex "did not purport
to displace this traditional rule." ' The Inwood "rule" was anything but
"traditional." It was unworkable. It seemed to simultaneously offer a

400. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
401. The Inwood functionality definition was dicta. See supra note 177. The TrafFix
functionality analysis was not dicta. The lower federal courts, therefore, have much less flexibility
in applying the Tra/Fix functionality analysis.
402. Tra.fFtx Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
403. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TraflFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929,938-40(6th Cir. 1999); see,
e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. L & L Exhibition Mgmt., Inc., 226 F.3d 944,948 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000)
(noting the significance of the Qualitex Court's focus on competitive disadvantage).
404. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
405. Tra/Fix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
406. Id.
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standard less restrictive than the competitive need standard (i.e., "essential
to the use or purpose") and much more restrictive than a competitionbased test (i.e., "affects the cost or quality")." 7 The only reason Qualitex
did not "displace" the Inwood definition is that Inwood was not the "rule"
when Qualitexwas decided. The lower courts already had rejected a literal
reading of Inwood."' At least the Qualitex Court recognized the state of
the law. The TralFix Court could not have been more wrong in its
characterizations of both Inwood and Qualitex.
The TrafFix Court provided almost no additional guidance on how to
use the Inwood standard. The Court found that the plaintiff s "dual-spring
design provides a unique and useful mechanism to resist the force of the
wind. Functionality having been established, whether MDI's dual-spring
design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered."40 9 The
Court went on to note that the dual-spring design "is the reason the device
works."4' 0 These comments are not very helpful. It is not at all clear from
the TrafFix decision whether the mere utility of the dual-spring design
rendered it functional or whether it was the utility combined with the
expired utility patents.
One point is clear from the TrafFix analysis: the reconciliation of
Inwood with the competitive need standard has been undone. While it
remains unclear what the Inwood test means, it is not a competitive need
test. "Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there
is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity
for the feature," the TrafFix Court explained.4 '
What, then, is the proper general functionality standard after TrafFix?
The easy answer is "the Inwood standard," but we have seen that the
conventional interpretation of Inwood was rejected by the TralFix Court.
What is the correct understanding of Inwood? If the standard is applied
literally, virtually all designs will be functional because almost every
product feature has at least some effect on the cost or quality of the
product. Any useful feature affects the quality, but is that enough? Did the
TrafFix Court really intend to shift the general functionality standard in
such an extreme way? Was the Supreme Court trying to effectively end all
trademark protection for useful product features? If so, one would have
expected the Court to provide at least some discussion or justification of
the change. Yet on this point, the TrafFix Court was silent.
After TralFix, the lower federal courts struggled to determine what
should be the general functionality standard. This struggle was particularly

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 219-41 and accompanying text.
TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
Id at 34.
Id. at 33.
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important within the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) and the
Federal Circuit, because these two tribunals tend to resolve most
substantive issues relating to the right to register a trademark.412 In a
somewhat surprising move, the TTAB did not adopt a new functionality
standard after TrafFix.Instead, the TTAB continued to define functionality
in terms of competitive need.41 3 The TTAB noted, however, that "it is not
clear, after [Traffix] whether the availability of alternatives weighs as a
factor" in the functionality analysis. 414 This makes no sense. If
functionality is defined in terms of competitive need, there is no greater
direct evidence of non-functionality than the availability of equivalently
performing alternative designs.
The Federal Circuit took a similar approach in its first decision
evaluating TrafFix.In Valu Engineering,Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., the court
considered whether the design of a conveyor guide rail was functional. 41
Though the dispute raised only utilitarian functionality issues, the Federal
Circuit applied a competitive need functionality standard:
We do not understand the Supreme Court's decision in
TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich analysis. As
noted above, the Morton-Norwich factors aid in the
determination of whether a particular feature is functional,
and the third factor focuses on the availability of "other
alternatives." We did not in the past under the third factor
require that the opposing party establish that there was a
"competitive necessity" for the product feature. Nothing in
TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative designs is
not properly part of the overall mix, and we do not read the
Court's observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability
of alternative designs irrelevant. Rather, we conclude that the
Court merely noted that once a product feature is found
functional based on other considerations there is no need to
consider the availability of alternative designs, because the
feature cannot be given trade dress protection merely because
there are alternative designs available. But that does not mean
that the availability of alternative designs cannot be a
legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a feature

412. The TTAB was established by the Lanham Act and is bound by the precedents of the
Federal Circuit. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1071 (2001). The TI'AB is an administrative tribunal that hears
interferences, oppositions, petitions for cancellation, and appeals from registration decisions. Id.
§ 1067.
413. See, e.g., In re Gibson Guitar Corp., No. 75-513,342, 2001 TrAB LEXIS 835, at *2-4
(Trademark Trial App. B. Dec. 19, 2001).
414. Id. at *5.
415. 278 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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This reading of TrafFix may be reasonable on the specific issue of
whether alternative designs are ever relevant to the functionality analysis.
The more problematic part of the Federal Circuit's position is its continued
reliance on Morton-Norwich, a decision that expressly defined utilitarian
functionality in terms of competitive need. 17 It is true, as the quoted
excerpt explains, that the Morton-Norwich functionality standard does not
require a showing of absolute necessity, but that fact does little to
reconcile the competition-based Morton-Norwich standard with the
TrafFix Court's rejection of essentially the same standard. The Federal
Circuit may be challenging the Supreme Court on that point418 by
continuing to use a competitive need functionality standard.419
Other federal courts have read TrafFix quite differently. A recent
decision by the Fifth Circuit provides a good example.42° The case
involved a trade dress claim based on the design of certain laboratory

416. Id. at 1276 (citations omitted).
417. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982):
[I]t is clear that courts in the past have considered the public policy involved in
this area of the law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles which are not
protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more
properly termed the right to compete effectively.
Id.
418. The Federal Circuit's reluctance to change the functionality rules is understandable. Not
only is the Federal Circuit responsible for certain appeals in federal civil court actions (e.g., appeals
of cases with claims arising under the Patent Act), but it also sets many of the substantive legal
standards for the Patent & Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(B) (2000). The Trademark Office has been using the Morton-Norwich standards for
about twenty years, and it has developed a great deal of experience in evaluating functionality
issues. The TrAB, too, has seen many functionality disputes and has developed a substantial body
of its own case law applying the Morton-Norwich analysis. If the TrafFix Court really intended to
change all the rules, it would have a profound impact on the operations of the PTO. The Federal
Circuit judges may be more observant of these complications than the Supreme Court. Although
the convenience of the PTO is surely not a sufficient reason to continue using an improper legal
standard, it may be a good reason to ask the Supreme Court for a better explanation of why it
changed the rules and what the new rules mean.
419. The Federal Circuit is not alone in the use of a competitive need analysis in utilitarian
functionality cases after TrafFix, but it is the only court to expressly reconcile this analysis with the
TrafFix decision. The other courts that continue to use a competitive need standard have either
overlooked or badly misconstrued the TrajFix analysis. See infra notes 434-35.
420. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002).
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instruments.42 ' A jury trial was held about ten months before the TrafFix
decision, and the jury received the following instruction:
A design or characteristic is nonfunctional if there are
reasonably effective and efficient alternatives possible.
Hence, a product's trade dress is functional only, one, if
competitors need to incorporate it in order to compete
effectively because it is essential to the product's use, or, two,
if it significantly affects the cost or quality of the article. A
design is functional and thus unprotectable if it is one of a
limited number of equally efficient options available to
competitors and free competition would be significantly
disadvantaged by according the design trademark
protection."'
This instruction was based on the Fifth Circuit's pre-Tra]Fix
functionality decisions, which defined functionality in terms of
competitive need. "Relying on this instruction, the jury determined that the
[plaintiff's designs] were non-fnctional."" The district court entered
judgment based on the jury's findings and awarded the plaintiff $1.75
million in damages.424 The defendant was permanently enjoined from
copying the plaintiffs designs.42 The defendant appealed.426

421. Id. at 353. The claims were based on "Eppendorf's line of disposable pipette tips and
dispenser syringes capable of accurate and rapid 'multiple dispensing' of liquids." Id. (footnote
omitted).
422. Id. at 356.
423. Id. at 357.
424. Id. at 354. The jury awarded $750,000 in lost profits and $250,000 in lost licensing fees.
Id. It also found the defendant had willfully infringed upon the plaintiff's trade dress rights-a
finding that led the district court to impose an additional $750,000 in enhanced damages. Id. The
latter part of the award is questionable because the plaintiff brought only a Lanham Act claim and
courts have consistently interpreted the Lanham Act as prohibiting punitive awards. See, e.g., Dial
One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 269 F.3d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 2001);
Balance Dynamics, Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683,695 (6th Cir. 2000); Sands, Taylor
& Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1347 (7th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit did not
address the propriety of the district court's monetary award because it held that the claimed trade
dress was functional. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH, 289 F.3d at 357.
The Fifth Circuit not only reversed the district court's judgment on the functionality issue, but
it also rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. Id.at 358. This result seems rather harsh, given
the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the substantive law changed after the trial. The plaintiff could
hardly have been expected to present evidence based on a legal standard that did not exist at the
time of the trial. This situation, it would seem, would necessitate a new trial to give the claimant
a fair chance to present its case based on the changed law. The Fifth Circuit apparently concluded
that the plaintiff could not possibly prove its trade dress was non-functional based on the standards
adopted by the Supreme Court in Traf/Fix.
425. Eppendorf-Netheler-HinzGmbH, 289 P.3d at 354.
426. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit held that the jury was properly instructed based on
Fifth Circuit law at the time of the trial, and it further held that the jury's
findings were supported by the evidence. 4" However, the court reversed,
because "TrajFix supersedes the definition of functionality previously
adopted by this court."42 Relying on the TrafFix analysis, the Fifth Circuit
held that "if a product feature is 'the reason the device works,' then the
feature is functional. The availability of alternative designs is
'
The Fifth Circuit concluded that every feature of the
irrelevant."429
plaintiff s product had an effect on the product's performance.43 ° That was
enough to render the features, and the product as a whole, functional.431
The "extensive testimony in the record regarding available alternative
designs,"" was irrelevant, the court held, because after TrafFix,
are not germane to the traditional test for
"alternative designs
functionality."433

427. Id. at 357.
428. Id.at 356; see also id.at 357 ("Eppendorfts argument, while consistent with this circuit's
utilitarian definition of functionality, is unpersuasive in light of the [Supreme] Court's discussion
of functionality in Tra/Fix.").
429. Id. at 355 (citations omitted) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532

U.S. 23, 34 (2001)).
430. Id. at 357.
431. Id. at 356-57.
432. Id. at 357.
433. Id. at 358. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted a similar reading of
TrafFix. In Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 03-2704 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26430, * 13
(7th Cir. Dec. 31,2003), the court explained that "TrafFix rejected an equation of functionality with
necessity; it is enough that the design be useful."
Another striking example of the TrajFix decision's significance on the general functionality
standard is provided by two district court decisions in the same case. In Antioch Co. v. Western
Trimming Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 635 (N.D. Ohio 2002), the court granted a renewed motion for
summary judgment of functionality. Id. at 640. The motion was renewed because of the TrafFix
decision. Id. In an earlier ruling, the court denied the same motion because the plaintiff presented
evidence of alternative designs. Id. The court agreed with the defendant, who argued that TrafFi
had changed the general functionality standard. Id. ("Accordingly, this Court will not apply the
rejected competitive need test when ruling upon the Defendant's [motion]. As a consequence, the
Court will not consider whether alternative designs exist, when ruling upon that motion."). Because
the features in question had a role in the operation of the plaintiff's product, the district court found
the features functional, as a matter of law. Id. at 643.
Dicta in a Second Circuit decision suggests that the court also reads TrafFix as equating
functionality with utility. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 120
n.4 (2d Cir. 2001). The case involved a trade dress claim based on the design of a plastic water
bottle (i.e., the kind used to sell spring water or other drinking water). Id. at 117. According to the
court, the plaintiff "admit[ed] that its design is useful, but argue[d], incorrectly, that this does not
render it 'functional."' Id. at 120 n.4. The court went on to note that the bottle design made it easier
to hold the bottle, and that such utility probably was enough to render the design functional. Id.The
district court had not considered the functionality issue, id., apparently because it found for the
defendant on other grounds. The Second Circuit affirmed, id. at 125, so the functionality issue was
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While the Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit have reached conflicting
interpretations of the TrafFix decision, some courts simply seem confused
about what TrafFix means. The Ninth Circuit, for example, applied the
competitive need functionality standard in a post-Traffix case and cited
TrafFix as being in "accord" with Qualitex on this issue.""4 The TrafFix
Court distinguished Qualitex, and it is hard to see how one could read the
two decisions as supporting the same rule. Other courts, however, have
reached the same conclusion.435 In addition, a number of courts have
discussed the TrafFix decision, without providing any clear indication of
how they interpret the case.4 36 These decisions make it difficult to predict

never adjudicated. Nevertheless, the court's comments may shed some light on the question of how
courts will interpret the Trai'ix decision.
434. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).
435. See Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7600 (WHP), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17086, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003) (citing TrafFix and Qualitex as support
for a competition-based functionality standard); Logan Graphic Prods. v. Textus USA, Inc., No.
02 c 1823,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24547, at *27-32 (N.D. III. Dec. 23, 2002); Waddington N. Am.
Bus. Trust v. EMI Plastics, Inc., No. 02-cv-3781 (FB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16634, at *9-10
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002). Logan Graphic Products is particularly interesting because the court
examined the patent issue from TrafFix. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24547, at *27-32. The court noted
the importance of evaluating the patent claims and held that there was not enough evidence that the
trade dress claim was based on the same elements previously covered by the patent. Id. at *27-29.
After rejecting the defendant's patent-based functionality argument, the court used a competitive
need functionality standard, despite the utilitarian nature of the product features at issue. Id. at *2931. The claims were based on a matte cutter used for preparing prints, photos, or other items for
framing. Id. at *3.
436. The Third Circuit recently discussed Tra/Fix in the context of a trade dress dispute
between two pharmaceutical companies. Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir.
2003). At issue was the design of a prescription medication. Id. at 349. The district court, in a postTrajFxdecision, used the Inwood functionality standard and found that the plaintiff's tablet design
was likely functional. Id. at 354. The Third Circuit affirmed, but seemed to hedge on the meaning
of TrajFix,noting the Court's discussion of both the Inwood standard and the competitive need
standard. Id. at 353 ("In TrafFix, the Supreme Court set forth two tests for functionality."); see also
Am. Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 805 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
DaimlerChrysler's competitive need functionality argument "seems right and is unrebutted," but
failing to evaluate the relevance of the TrafFix decision to this issue); E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof I
Prod. Research Co., No. 00 civ. 8670(LTS)(GWG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15364, at *66-72
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (finding a utility patent highly relevant to the functionality analysis (i.e.,
following Traj.Fix in this respect), but then using a competition-based functionality standard);
Straumann Co. v. Lifecore Biomed., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133-34 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing
the TrajFixdecision, but equating non-functionality with arbitrariness); David White Instruments,
L.L.C. v. TLZ, Inc., No. 02 c 7156, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8375, at *22 (N.D. I11.May 16, 2003)
("A feature is functional when (1) it is essential to the use or purpose of the article, (2) it affects the
cost or quality of the article, or (3) exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.").
At least two courts have treated the Inwoodtest and the Qualitex test as alternative functionality
standards, denying trademark protection if the features at issue are functional under either test. See
Mark Bric Display Corp. v. Joseph Struhl Co., No. 98-532ML, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12933, at
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what the law will be in many courts. The current division and confusion
in the lower federal courts is much more significant than the minor split
on the patent/trademark conflict issue that led the Supreme Court to
intervene in TrafFix. Moreover, the TrafFix Court's resolution of that
issue has caused problems as well.
2. Using Patents to Defeat Trademarks
One thing is clear about the TrafFix decision: the Supreme Court
believed utility patents should have a strong impact on the functionality
analysis.437 The TrafFix Court based its analysis on the patent bargain
concept and held that a "utility patent is strong evidence that the features
therein claimed are functional."" 8 Though this focus on the claims of a
utility patent makes sense-as the patent bargain concept seems to demand
such an analysis-it poses problems of its own.
A recent dispute involving the ASICS athletic shoe Stripe Design
provides a good illustration of the problem and the risk posed by the
TrafFix Court's emphasis on examining the claims of a utility patent.439
The case arose when Target, a large national retailer, began selling an
athletic shoe with a stripe design resembling the well-known design used
by ASICS. 440 When ASICS moved for a preliminary injunction, Target
argued the ASICS Stripe Design was functional."' Target's argument was
based, in large part, on two utility patents owned by ASICS. 442 One of the
patents disclosed and claimed a shoe having a skeleton-shaped outer

* 18-20 (D.R.I. July 9,2003); In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litig., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1371-74 (N.D.

Ga. 2003). The Dippin'Dotscourt used the Inwood standard, the competitive need standard, and
even employed the four-factor approach based on Morton-Norwich. Id.The latter test is just a
framework for applying the competitive need standard, but the court used it with an abundance of
caution. In the end, the court found the product design at issue functional under all the possible
standards. Id. This analysis was accepted by another court in a related proceeding. Frosty Bites, Inc.
v. Dippin' Dots, Inc., No. 3-10-CV-1532-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8472, at *16-20 (N.D. Tex.
May 19, 2003).
437. As Professor McCarthy has noted, the TrajFix Court used the phrase "strong evidence"
four times when referring to the relevance of a utility patent. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7:89.
438. TralFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
439. ASICS Corp. v. Target Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024 (D. Minn. 2003). A drawing
of the ASICS Stripe Design is provided in the Appendix to this Article. The drawing is taken from
ASICS' U.S. trademark registration for the design. U.S. Regis. No. 937,464 (July 11, 1972).
440. ASICS Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
441. Id. at 1025-26.
442. Id.at 1026.
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carapace. 443 The other patent claimed an improved tightening member for
an athletic shoe."
The district court focused primarily on the patent for the shoe with the
skeleton-shaped carapace and found at least two claims from this patent
covering the ASICS Stripe Design." 5 These claims required a number of
structural elements, including separate internal and external carapaces, a
rather uncommon design. Many athletic shoes have a removable sock
liner, a soft insert that rests between the wearer's foot and the sole of the
shoe. But the ASICS patents require a shoe with a full sock-like internal
shell that is separate from the outer, structural shell of the shoe. Moreover,
the outer carapace must include "a toe reinforcement portion, a heel
reinforcement portion, an eyelet portion," and longitudinal and lateral
reinforcement portions." 6 The ASICS Stripe Design was disclosed in the
patent's description as one means of providing the longitudinal and lateral
reinforcement required by the patent's claims." 7 Because a patent's claims
must be interpreted in light of the patent's written description of the
invention, the district court held the ASICS Stripe Design was covered by
the patent claims." 8 In other words, use of the Stripe Design by another,
the court concluded, would infringe the ASICS patent." 9
The ASICS case illustrates three problems with the TrafFix holding on
the patent issue. First, a patent for a structural feature could be infringed
by a feature whose structural role is clearly secondary to its role as a
distinctive trademark. That seems to be what happened in the ASICS
443. U.S. Patent No. 5,533,279 (issued July 9, 1996) at col. 6,1.15. The carapace of a shoe is
the upper shell portion of the shoe. In the invention claimed in the ASICS patent, the shoe has two
distinct carapaces. Id.at col. 1,11. 50-56. The inner carapace is soft and surrounds the wearer's foot
like a sock. Id. The outer carapace provides the structural support for the shoe and has a "skeletonshaped" structure, allowing for more use of mesh or other breathable material in the outer shell. Id.
at col. 1,1. -col. 2,1.20. This design purportedly provides a better fit for an athletic shoe and allows
for greater use of a breathable material in the upper, thus enhancing the aeration function of the
shoe. Id. at col. 1, 11.46-56.
444. U.S. Patent No. 5,430,959 (issued July 11, 1995). This patent disclosed and claimed a
tightening structure for an athletic shoe using a flexible strap around the heel portion of the shoe
and other straps connecting the eyelet portion of the shoe to the area where the upper and sole are
joined. Id. at col. 1, I1.38-50. This patent resulted from a continuation application based on the
application that led to the carapace patent. For this reason, both patents contain identical drawings
and very similar written disclosures.
445. ASICS Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
446. Id. at 1027.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 1027-28.
449. Id. This conclusion, standing alone, is clearly incorrect because the patent claims required
a number of different elements. The court apparently meant that if the other structural elements
were present together with the ASICS Stripe Design--the embodiment of the ASICS shoe and
description of that shoe provided in the patent contained these other claim elements--the resulting
shoe would infringe the claims.
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case.45 ASICS makes many types of athletic shoes, but few seem to use
" ' This fact, however, matters
the Stripe Design in a structural manner.45
little in the TrafFix analysis because the Stripe Design could be used in a
manner that, when combined with other potentially infringing features,
would infringe at least one claim of the skeleton-shaped carapace patent.
The ASICS Stripe Design, therefore, is likely functional under TrafFix.
The second problem presented by the TrafFix analysis is the potential
for a single patent claim element to render a distinctive design feature
functional. The primary patent involved in the ASICS case did not require
use of the ASICS Stripe Design. In fact, a number of different longitudinal
and lateral reinforcement designs could satisfy this structured element of
the patent claims. It is true, as the court noted, that claim two of the
skeleton-shaped carapace patent requires the use of two "substantially
parallel" lateral and two "substantially parallel" longitudinal reinforcement
portions.452 This claim does require a design that may resemble the ASICS
Stripe Design, to some extent,453 butdoes not require use of the particular
ASICS Stripe Design. TrafFix, nonetheless, suggests that a design feature
is functional if it meets the requirements of a single claim element.454

450. Id. at 1024 (noting that the Stripe Design was registered as a trademark in 1972 and has
been in use since 1966).
451. The ASICS Internet site lists over ten different types of shoes ranging from cheerleading
shoes, to running shoes, to youth shoes. ASICS U.S.A., at http://www.asicstiger.com/indexno
_intro.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). Many of the shoes in these categories appear to lack the
structural elements of the patent claims at issue in the dispute with Target. Indeed, the product
information provided on the ASICS Internet site identifies the structural role of the leather uppers
of some shoes, and other structural features, including stabilizing materials used in the sole and arch
regions of the shoes. A review of the product information on every shoe identified on the ASICS
site revealed no mention of any structural support role of the ASICS Stripe Design. Id.(presenting
information on 100 shoe models).
452. ASICS Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
453. See Appendix for a drawing of the ASICS Stripe Design. In the ASICS design, the lateral
stripes (i.e., those beginning at the heel section of the shoe and running along the length of the shoe)
clearly begin as a single stripe. This stripe then separates, forming two stripes that flare outward
and curve down toward the sole of the shoe. It may be reasonable, as the court held, to consider the
lateral stripes in the ASICS design "substantially parallel," ASICS Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1027,
but it is easy to construct other "substantially parallel" lateral stripes that would look quite different
from those used in the ASICS Stripe Design trademark. The two longitudinal stripes in the ASICS
design are always two distinct stripes and are more consistently parallel than the lateral stripes.
454. In Tra/Fix, the Court held the dual-spring design functional because it was within the
scope of an element of an expired utility patent claim. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays Inc.,
532 U.S. 23, 30-31 (2001). A number of other elements in the patent claims were at issue in
TrafFix, but because the dual-spring design was deemed the "essential feature of the trade dress,"
id. at 30, the Court focused on whether that element was within the scope of the patent claims. The
first claim from one of the two patents at issue in TrajFix is presented below to better illustrate the
point that a single claim element can now render a design functional:
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The third, and perhaps most troubling, problem with the ASICS court's
analysis of the patent issue is the focus on the claimant's design rather
than the allegedly infringing design. 5 ASICS owned the two patents
involved in the Target dispute, and both patents were unexpired.5 6 Yet
ASICS did not sue Target for patent infringement. This fact strongly
suggests that the Target shoe was not using a stripe pattern for structural
reasons that met the requirements of the ASICS patent claims. 4" If this
assumption is correct, Target avoided liability for trademark infringement
despite the fact that it was using a design not covered by the claims of a
utility patent and one that presumably did little or nothing to enhance the
quality of its shoe. In other words, Target was using a design that would
be non-functional even under the TrafFix analysis, but Target nevertheless
avoided liability and effectively invalidated a well-known athletic shoe

1.A display device comprising an unanchored base, said base including a pair
of spaced-apart elongated ground-engaging means, an upstanding frame structure
having a relatively large surface area for receiving display indicia, a spring
structure mounting the frame structure onto the base, said spring structure
comprising an elongated torsion spring extending entirely across the base, a pair
of spaced-apart brackets securing the frame structure to the torsion spring, said
spring structure being mounted centrally of the ground-engaging means with the
plane of the frame structure at substantially right angles to the longitudinal axis
of said ground-engaging means, the surface area of the frame being of a size
which normally causes displacement of the base upon application of a sufficient
wind force thereagainst, said spring structure normally maintaining the frame
structure in an upright position and being yieldable in either direction along an
axis generally parallel to the plane of the frame structure to permit downward
deflection thereof, the area of the frame structure being proportioned to the size
of the base to result in downward deflection of the frame structure upon a force
applied thereto without displacement of the base.
U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued Mar. 7, 1972) at col. 3,1. 59-col. 4,1. 20. Though this claim may
not be easy to read and understand, it is clear the claim requires much more than just a dual-spring
design. The same was true of the claims at issue in the ASICS case.
455. This focus is almost certainly a result of the modem trend in the functionality analysis
noted above, which asks whether the claimant's design is non-functional, rather than whether the
copied features are non-functional. See supratext accompanying notes 98-101. 1 argue for a change
to this approach below. See infra Part III.B.
456. The skeleton-shaped carapace patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,533,279 (issued on July 9, 1996),
is assigned to ASICS Corp. and expires on July 9, 2013. The tightening member patent, U.S. Patent
5,430,959 (issued on July 11, 1995), is also assigned to ASICS Corp. and expires on January 29,
2013. The expiration date determinations for these two patents is somewhat complicated by the fact
that the patents are entitled to a term of either twenty years from their earliest priority filing date
(January 29, 1993), or seventeen years from issuance, whichever is longer. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1)
(2000).
457. It also is likely the Target shoe did not utilize a separate inner and outer carapace, as
required by the claims of the ASICS patents.
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trademark.45 Such a result does nothing to advance the patent bargain. If
Target was not infringing the ASICS patents, then it makes little sense to
let Target off the hook for trademark infringement in order to avoid a de
facto extension of the term of the patents. 459 The ASICS decision is the
most60troubling of its kind, but it is not the first, and it is not likely to be the
4
last.
3. Confusion-What Is the Difference Between
Aesthetic and Utilitarian Value?
In addition to the problems described in the two preceding sections,
courts now face another daunting challenge: drawing a line between
aesthetic and utilitarian features. This distinction was less important before
TrafFix because most courts used a competitive need standard regardless
of the nature of the feature at issue. 46' However, with the starkly different
functionality standards now used in some circuits for utilitarian and
aesthetic functionality cases, it is likely that disputes
will arise over where
462
utility.
and
aesthetics
between
line
the
to draw

458. The court's ruling denied a motion by ASICS for a preliminary injunction and therefore
did not constitute a final judgment on the merits of the functionality issue. ASICS Corp., 282 F.
Supp. 2d at 1032. Despite the preliminary nature of the ruling, it seems unlikely that the court will
change its mind on the functionality issue. In fact, ASICS requested reconsideration of the court's
functionality determination, but the request was denied. ASICS Corp. v. Target Corp., No. 03-3486
(RHK/AJB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14876, at '1-2 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2003).
459. The scenario presented in the ASICS case is even more striking an example of this
problem given the unexpired status of the two patents.
460. InEcoManufacturingL.L.C.v. HoneywellInt'l,Inc., No. 1:03-cv-0170-DFH, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11384 (S.D. Ind. June 20,2003), affid, No. 03-2704, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26430
(7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003), the court found the round shape of Honeywell's thermostat functional
based largely on a 1946 patent for an early version of the thermostat. Id. at *5. The court found the
patent contained a claim (Claim 23) that included the round shape as an element. Id.at * 10-11. This
claim was "'strong evidence"' that the round shape was functional. Id. at *31 (quoting TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)). The court noted other evidence of
functionality, including the limited number of other available shapes and the apparent utilitarian
advantages of the Honeywell round shape. Id. at *49, *57-58. The outcome in Honeywell may have
been correct, but the court's willingness to place great weight on a single claim for a 1946 patent
illustrates the potential significance of the Traflix Court's patent analysis.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, but said little about the evidence of
alternative designs. Eco Mfg., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26430, at * 11-i2. The court did, however,
read TrafFix as equating functionality with utility. Id. at 13 ("TrajFix rejected an equation of
functionality with necessity; it is enough that the design be useful.").
461. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
462. One court recently avoided a dispute by holding that "aesthetic appeal... should not be
considered in the functionality analysis." Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 244 F. Supp.
2d 1086, 1091 (D. Haw. 2003). The court's conclusion was based on a line of Ninth Circuit
decisions that backed away from the aesthetic functionality analysis presented in the Pagliero
decision. Id. at 1090. For a discussion of Pagliero and the development of the aesthetic
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The TralFix Court's treatment of this issue is not helpful. The Court
characterized Qualitex as an aesthetic functionality case, explaining that
"there [had] been no indication that the green-gold color of the laundry
press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost
or quality."463 This characterization may not be entirely correct. There was
evidence in Qualitex that the green-gold color of the plaintiff's press pads
helped the "pads to maintain a clean appearance,"4 apparently by hiding
the stains that typically occur on such pads. The district court in Qualitex
concluded that "'hundreds if not thousands"' of other colors would have
performed this task just as well,465 and the Ninth Circuit found no error in
this conclusion. 4
One can certainly argue that the value of the green-gold color of the
Qualitex press pads (i.e., its ability to hide stains) was an aesthetic benefit.
But was it? The Federal Circuit held in a leading functionality decision
that the black color of Mercury outboard engines is functional because
black makes the engines look smaller and better matches a variety of boat
colors. 461 The Federal Circuit held that those two attributes were "not in
this case mere aesthetic features. 4 6' The stain-hiding ability of a press pad
color would seem to have at least as much utility as the black color of
Mercury outboard engines. Yet the TrafFix Court characterized Qualitex,
with its stain-hiding, green-gold press pads, as an aesthetic functionality
case.

4 69

functionality doctrine, see supra Part I.D. I. The court's conclusion in the Big Island Candiescase
is questionable, given the Supreme Court's express endorsement of aesthetic functionality in
TrafFix. It was the existence of this concept that allowed the TrajFix Court to distinguish that case
from Qualitex. In any event, the Big Island Candiesdecision illustrates the continuing difficulty
courts have in dealing with functionality disputes involving features with aesthetic value.
463. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
464. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 13 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
465. Id.
466. The Ninth Circuit explained:
Although evidence was presented that there may be a functional reason to have
colored press pads to maintain a clean appearance, we conclude that it was not
error for the district court to conclude that "there is no competitive need for the
green-gold color, since other colors are equally usable" and that "the range of
tones of available distinctive suitable colors .. .is in the hundreds if not
thousands."
Id.(omission in orginal).
467. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532-33 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
468. Id. at 1533. The Federal Circuit had previously rejected the aesthetic functionality
doctrine, a holding that seemed to force the court in Brunswick to stretch the notion of utility.
469. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
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What are the lower federal courts to do when faced with the difficult
task of distinguishing between aesthetic and utilitarian features? In one
post-TrafFix case, a district court found yellow plastic tubing used for
underground drainage functional because the yellow color was useful.4 7 °
The court acknowledged that in some applications the yellow tubing might
be used for aesthetic reasons, but concluded that in most applications, the
aesthetic appeal of such tubing was unimportant to potential purchasers.47
Because the yellow color was easy to see during installation or removal
and was less vulnerable to heat damage than black tubing, the court
concluded the yellow color was functional.472
The court's analysis of the yellow tubing seems correct, but the role of
the yellow color is not so different from the role of the green-gold press
pads at issue in Qualitex. The green-gold color served to hide stains, but
was non-functional because many other colors could do the job just as
well. In the tubing case, one probably could have reached a similar
conclusion. The yellow color of the plaintiff's tubing may have provided
certain advantages over black tubing, but many other colors probably
would have provided the same benefits. The yellow color had no effect on
how well water or other fluids flowed through the tubing. Yet in the tubing
case, the court used a functionality standard quite different from the
competitive need standard endorsed in Qualitex. The plaintiff won in
Qualitex, but the plaintiff lost in the yellow tubing case. Much now rides
on the distinction between aesthetics and utility although, as one
prominent judge has noted, the line separating the two is far from clear.473
III.

THE RECOVERY

In this Part, I identify three possible solutions to problems caused by
TrafFix. First, a competiton-based standard could be reestablished as a
unitary functionality standard. This change would essentially restore the
law to its pre-TrafFixstate, at least in most circuits. 474 There would be no
470. Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720,724-25 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
471. Id. at 722 n.2.
472. Id. at 723-24.
473. In W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge Posner noted
that "the word 'utilitarian' is ambiguous. It can mean anything which gives pleasure, which is the
approximate sense in which 'utility' and 'utilitarian' are used by philosophers; or it can mean useful
in a sense which excludes beauty, which is the commoner lay meaning of 'utilitarian."'
474. One post-TrafFx commentator has made a similar suggestion. Weinberg, supra note 7,
at 61. Professor Weinberg argued for the competitive need standard and criticized the TrafFix Court
for rejecting or raising doubts about that standard, but he concluded that most courts will eventually
return to a competition-based analysis. Id. I held the same optimistic view in the months just after
TrafFix. There was, it seemed, enough ambiguity in the Traf/Fix analysis to allow courts room to
continue using the competitive need standard, or at least some variation on that standard. The
Federal Circuit's decision in Valu Engineering,Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir.
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special patent bargain or right-to-copy rules and the aesthetics/utility
distinction would be of no consequence. The functionality doctrine would
be a clear and workable limitation. It would not, however, be a very
limiting rule. Many, perhaps most, product features would be nonfunctional under this standard.
The second fix replaces the modem functionality rule (i.e., the
requirement that a claimant prove its overall design is non-functional) with
a limited functionality defense. This solution changes the focus from the
plaintiffs product to the defendant's product, or more specifically, to
those features of the defendant's product copied from the plaintiffs
product. Functionality wouldbe defined based on competitive need, just
as in the first proposal, but the question would be whether the defendant
needs the copied features, not whether the overall design of the plaintiff's
product is competitively significant. This solution is based, in part, on the
practice during the early development of the functionality doctrine.
My third proposal is a combination of the first two solutions. Such a
combination may be the most acceptable approach to fixing the
functionality doctrine. Under this combined approach, a claimant would
have to prove its overall design is non-functional to bring a trade dress
infringement claim or to obtain a trademark registration from the Patent
& Trademark Office. The limited functionality defense would be available
in litigated disputes. Thus, even where a plaintiff proves its design is
distinctive and non-functional, a defendant could avoid broad injunctive
relief by proving the copied features were functional. This solution would
combine the benefits of focusing on the defendant's design with the need
for some front-end filtering to prevent harassment suits and the registration
of distinctive, but purely functional, designs.
A. Solution One-Returning to the Competitive Need Standard
The TrafFix Court erred when it rejected the competitive need
functionality standard. The Court failed to appreciate the significance of
the lower federal courts' use of that standard to resolve most functionality
issues.475 Not only did the TrafFix Court introduce, or reintroduce,
depending upon the circuit, the difficult and controversy-laden distinction
between aesthetic functionality and utilitarian functionality, 476 but the
Court also returned to the inconsistent and unworkable Inwood standard

2002), relied on the TraFTix ambiguity and reiterated that court's use of a competitive need
standard. Unfortunately, since Valu Engineeringwas decided, most courts have read TrafFix as
rejecting the competitive need standard, adopting instead a much less rigorous functionality
standard. See supra notes 420-33 and accompanying text.
475. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 7, at 17-21, 37-38.
476. See Discussion, supra note 7, at 533 n.113.
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without acknowledging the important history of that standard in the lower
courts. In short, the TrafFix Court turned its back on almost 100 years of
common-law progress 77 and left the lower federal courts with a confusing,
yet controlling, new precedent.478 In the following sections, I argue for a
return to the competitive need standard. This functionality standard best
balances the competing interests at stake.
1. Two Policies and Three Rules
Before turning to the relative merits of the different functionality rules,
it is important to review the exact meaning of those rules. There are, in
fact, many possible variations on the functionality rules discussed in the
preceding parts of this article. A unitary competition-based standard could
be used to resolve all functionality questions, or different competitionbased standards could be used in aesthetic and utilitarian functionality
cases, with a more restrictive rule applied in utilitarian functionality
disputes.479 A competition-based standard could be used in aesthetic
functionality disputes and a utility-based standard could be used in
utilitarian functionality disputes (this is a leading interpretation of the
TrafFix holdings). A special, patent-based, per se rule could be used in
cases involving trade dress claims for features previously claimed or
disclosed in a patent, with the possibility of different rules depending upon
whether a utility or design patent is involved. An absolute right to copy all
unpatented articles could be used, either as a functionality standard or as
an alternative to the functionality doctrine. Each of these approaches has
received at least some support.
The situation, thankfully, is not as difficult as it may appear. Courts
have identified two primary policies supporting the functionality doctrine:
(1) the free competition concern, or more specifically, the concern that
overly broad trade dress protection could unduly hinder free and vigorous
competition;4 ° and (2) the patent/trademark conflict concern, or more
specifically, the concern that overly broad trade dress protection might
conflict with, and undermine, the role of patent protection in stimulating

477. Weinberg, supra note 7, at 10-22 (reviewing the historical development of the
competitive need standard); supra Parts I.A.-I.C.
478. See Discussion, supra note 7, at 534.
479. It is, of course, possible to use a more rigorous functionality standard for either utilitarian
or aesthetic functionality disputes. But because many courts and commentators have expressed
concern about the propriety of an aesthetic functionality doctrine, the approach described in the text
probably would receive more support.
480. See Davis, supra note 7, at 249-50; Discussion, supranote 7, at 557; Kratzke, supra note
7, at 84; A. Samuel Oddi, The Functionsof "Functionality"in TrademarkLaw, 22 Hous. L. REV.
925, 927-28 (1985); Weinberg, supra note 7, at 38; Note, supra note 49, at 551-52.
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innovation.4"' These two policies have been used to support different
functionality standards. Three standards have received the most support.
The free competition policy leads, rather directly, to the competitive
need functionality standard. If the desire is to protect the competitiveness
of markets, it makes sense to define functionality in terms of the
competitive significance of the feature or features at issue.
The concern over conflict between trademark and patent protection has
led to two functionality rules. The first I call the patent bargain rule. It is
a per se rule denying trademark protection for product features claimed in
expired utility patents.4" 2 The rule is designed to prevent de facto
extensions of the patent term through use of trademark law.48 ' This rule is,
however, only a partial functionality solution. The patent bargain rule says
nothing about how to deal with general functionality disputes (i.e., those
cases where the design at issue was not part of a previously patented
invention). The Tenth Circuit adopted a special patent bargain rule in
Vornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corp., but retained the
competitive need standard for other functionality issues. 4" This is the
second approach of interest.48"
The third rule, which also is based on the patent/trademark conflict
concern, seeks to completely separate patent and trademark protection by
recognizing an absolute right to copy all unpatented articles. This rule
establishes and polices a border between the subject-matter domains of
patent law and trademark law. To achieve this result, the rule equates
functionality with utility,4 6 thus barring trademark protection for all useful

481. See Discussion, supra note 7, at 528; Kratzke, supra note 7, at 84; Oddi, supranote 480,
at 927; Taylor, supra note 7, at 205; Welkowitz, supra note 36, at 299-300; Fuller, supra note 7,
at 306.
482. This rule could, and for conceptual consistency probably should, extend to features
covered by expired design patents, too. It is clear, however, that many courts and commentators
believe utility patents wan-ant special rules limiting trademark protection, but that design patents
do not justify similar restrictions. See infra Part III.A.4.
483. See Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 712; Discussion, supra note 7, at 537; Dratler, supra
note 42, at 531; Fischer, supra note 42, at 59; Groff, supra note 42, at 74; Marshall, supra note 7,
at 638-39; Taylor, supra note 7, at 208; Dowell, supra note 59, at 138, 151; Note, supra note 115,
at 568.
484. 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995).

485. It is possible to define the per se patent bargain rule in different ways. For example, the
Tenth Circuit held a design may not receive trade dress protection when it is or has been "a
significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent." Id. A patent bargain
rule could be based more directly on the patent claims. The question of how to best construct a
patent bargain rule is outside the scope of my analysis, largely because I conclude that potential
rules, however constructed, impose too much social cost while providing too little benefit. See infra
Parts III.A.3.-5.
486. This approach-limiting the right to copy to useful articles-is common, but flawed.
Advocates of a limited right to copy fail to adequately explain why the right does not extend to
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product features." 7 This rule goes well beyond the patent bargain rule set
forth above.488
In the following sections, I evaluate these three rules, a unitary
competitive need standard, a per se patent bargain rule coupled with a
competitive need standard, and a right-to-copy rule, to determine which
rule best balances the competing interests at stake. The result is not close.
Only a unitary competitive need functionality standard provides a
reasonable balance between the need to limit trade dress protection and the
need to prevent consumer confusion. The two patent-based rules present
a number of problems.
2. Functionality Cost and the Problem of Perspective
The functionality doctrine imposes a real cost on society. When a
distinctive product identifier is deemed functional, consumer confusion is
likely to follow. Consider, for example, a recent case involving yellow
plastic tubing used for underground drainage.4 89 The court found the
yellow color functional because it made the tubing less vulnerable to heat
damage and easier to see during installation and removal.49 0 In reaching
this conclusion, the court compared the yellow tubing at issue to black
tubing used by other companies.4 9 1 The court's conclusion is likely correct
if functionality is equated with utility. Though a different conclusion
might have been reached under a competitive need standard, the important
point here is the effect of the court's decision.
The plaintiff in the yellow tubing case had an incontestable federal
trademark registration for the yellow color of its tubing.4 92 This fact is
significant because the incontestable status of the registration effectively
eliminated the distinctiveness issue from the case.49 3 Assuming the yellow

unpatented ornamental designs; i.e., to those designs within the subject matter of design patent law.
I address this point in more detail below. See infra Part III.A.4.
487. Welkowitz, supra note 36, at 367-68; Dowell, supra note 59, at 190-92; Weitzer, supra
note 42, at 195; cf Note, supra note 115, at 568 (arguing that any potentially patentable article
should be deemed functional, including ornamental designs within the scope of the design patent
provisions).
488. Mohr, supra note 42, at 428-29 (arguing for an extension of the patent bargain rule to
invalidated patents and to inventions where patent protection was sought but denied); Pollack,
supra note 42, at 298-99.
489. Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720, 721 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
490. Id. at 723-24.
491. Id. at 723-25.
492. Id. at 721-22.
493. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985) ("[L]anguage of
the Lanham Act also refutes any conclusion that an incontestable mark may be challenged as
merely descriptive."). The defendant could have argued the yellow color was generic, but the
court's references to black tubing seem to refute such a challenge.
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color was distinctive, the court's judgment means that the plaintiff's
competitors may make and sell yellow tubing that looks just like the
plaintiff's tubing. Those consumers who were familiar with the plaintiff s
tubing, and who associated the yellow-colored tubing with the plaintiff,
probably would be confused by the appearance of the same color tubing
made by other companies. Yet this is precisely the result sanctioned by the
court's decision.
Functionality cost is real, but it is easy to miss. When courts and
commentators consider the patent bargain arguments, the focus is on
patent law, not trademark law.494 This perspective tends to blind advocates
to the consumer confusion cost, because such a concern forms no part of
patent law. The TrafFix decision provides a good example.495 The
Supreme Court never considered the consumer confusion cost of the
functionality rules it adopted. Instead, the TrafFix Court focused entirely
on the rights of competitors to copy previously patented articles.4 96 This
concern is important, but it cannot be addressed in a vacuum. The
functionality doctrine should reflect a balancing of competing interests.
This problem is one of perspective. It is a particularly persistent
problem because one of the primary justifications for the functionality
doctrine is the prevention of harmful conflict between patent and
trademark law.4 97 To evaluate this concern, one must consider the nature
of patent law and the importance of the patent bargain. That bargain
requires a patentee to surrender her invention to the public domain upon
expiration of the patent.4 98 When one starts the analysis from this
perspective, it is an easy step to the per se patent bargain rule discussed
above. At some point, however, one must take into account the potential
consumer confusion cost. This consideration does not necessarily mean a
patent bargain rule is improper, but it does illustrate the need to weigh the
benefits of such a rule against its costs. This balancing analysis is absent
from most patent bargain arguments.49 9

494. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 42, at 524-27; Pollack, supra note 42, at 293-94; Fuller,
supra note 7, at 306; Geremia, supra note 42, at 781; Recent Case, supra note 42, at 1459-62;
Weitzer, supra note 42, at 195. In one rather extreme example of the patent perspective, a
commentator explained that "[t]he [functionality] doctrine exists only to prevent conflict between
the coequal federal patent and trademark acts." Dowell, supranote 59, at 169. Dowell's description
of the patent and trademark acts as "coequal" is somewhat misleading, given his argument for a
denial of trademark protection when there is a potential conflict with patent law. Id. at 190-92.
495. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
496. Id. at 29, 33-34.
497. See Jenkins, supranote 42, at 331; David, supra note 42, at 262; Dowell, supranote 59,
at 170; Geremia, supra note 42, at 781; Recent Case, supra note 42, at 257.
498. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 7, at 214; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 181.
499. TrajFix again provides a good example, as the Court never considered the consumer
confusion cost likely to result from the new functionality rules it adopted. 532 U.S. at 33-34.
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The patent perspective also leads to another common analysis error.
Patent bargain advocates often describe trademark protection for useful
articles as "patent-like" protection" or, in the case of a previously
patented article, as a de facto extension of the patent monopoly.'O° The
commentators who make these arguments seem to jump from the notion
of patent protection to trademark protection without considering the
requirements of either." 2 Some commentators have pointed out the
significant differences between patent and trademark protection, including
the different requirements for protection and the different scope of
protection." 3 Yet despite these helpful explanations, many commentators
continue to push for strong patent bargain rules without recognizing the
4
importance of the differences between trademark law and patent law.'
The most important difference in this context is the distinctiveness
requirement of trademark law. To obtain trademark protection for any
product feature, whether useful or not, a claimant must prove the feature
is distinctive. 55 This requirement is more onerous for product designs
today than it was some years ago because the Supreme Court recently held
that a product design cannot be inherently distinctive."° As a result of this

500. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 88, at 146.
501. See McLean, supranote 36, at 128; Mohr, supranote 42, at 371-72; Oddi, supra note 88,
at 140; Dowell, supranote 59, at 138, 151; Laba, supranote 42, at 1676; Note, supra note 115, at
558.
502. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 42, at 372-74; Dowell, supra note 59, at 173-74.
503. See Cotter, supra note 42, at 61; Dratler, supranote 42, at 565-70; Oddi, supranote 88,
at 146-59; Opderbeck, supra note 42, at 38; David, supranote 42, at 280-8 1; Marcotte, supra note
7, at 329.
504. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 638 (arguing that the TrajFix case presented a situation
where trade dress protection would have been "'the practical equivalent of an expired utility
patent"' (quoting TratFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,35 (2001))); McLean,
supra note 36, at 128 (equating trade dress and patent protection); Mohr, supranote 42, at 373
(describing alleged "ease" with which trade dress protection may be obtained); Pollack, supra note
42, at 293-94 (arguing that functionality is not a sufficient protection of the right to copy); Taylor,
supranote 7, at 214 ("Patent law advocates dedicating innovations to the public, while trademark
law favors perpetual protection ....
"); Dowell, supra note 59, at 173 (arguing that trade dress
protection for a product feature would eliminate competition); Fuller, supra note 7, at 306-07
(arguing that trade dress protection threatens to extend the patent monopoly); Geremia, supra note
42, at 816 (a competition-based functionality standard, "coupled with the unpredictable nature of
contemporary trade dress law, threatens to effectively extend patent monopolies into perpetuity");
Laba, supranote 42, at 1676 (equating trade dress and patent protection); Weitzer, supra note 42,
at 195 (arguing that any restriction on the public's right to copy, including restrictions resulting
from protection of distinctive trade dress, "harms the public good and undermines the policies of
patent law").
505. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining trademark as a symbol used by a person "to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown").
506. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) ("We hold that, in an
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holding, claimants seeking trademark protection for a product design have
to prove the design has become distinctive (i.e., that it has a secondary
meaning). 7 By requiring proof of secondary meaning, the Supreme Court
eliminated the risk of ajury finding of inherent distinctiveness where there
is little evidence of actual distinctiveness.0 8

action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a
product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary
meaning."). The Wal-Mart Court distinguished product design from product packaging and left
open the possibility that product packaging trade dress can be inherently distinctive. Id. at 212-15.
507. There are a number ofways to prove secondary meaning, including showing substantially
exclusive and continuous use for a significant period of time. This principle is codified in the
Lanham Act, which provides that "the Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark
has become distinctive, . . . proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a
mark.., for.., five years.... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f) (2000). Courts also have used the five-year
period as a benchmark for measuring the time needed to develop secondary meaning. See, e.g.,
Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1995). This statutorily defined
period raises the possibility that a party might claim secondary meaning for a previously patented
product design based solely on the long period of exclusive use resulting from the patent rights.
Though this concern is somewhat justified, the PTO rejects these claims, and an informed court
would likely do the same.
For a matter which does not inherently function as a mark because of its nature (e.g.,
nondistinctive product container shapes, overall color of a product, or mere ornamentation),
evidence of five years' use is not sufficient to show acquired distinctiveness. In such a case, actual
evidence that the feature is perceived as a mark for the relevant goods or services would be required
to establish distinctiveness. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.05 (a)
(2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tec/tmep/1200.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2004).
508. This risk was real under the pre-Wal-Mart rule, and it remains real in product packaging
cases. To appreciate the nature of this problem, one need look no further than the Two Pesos case,
one of the Supreme Court's most important trade dress decisions. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). The Supreme Court held in Two Pesosthat trade dress may be inherently
distinctive. Id. at 776. This holding was distinguished in Wal-Mart,529 U.S. at 214-25. There was,
however, much more to the Two Pesos dispute.
The defendant, Two Pesos, obtained copies of blueprints for the plaintiffs, Taco Cabana's,
restaurants, and used the blueprints to build its own restaurants. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two
Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1991). There was evidence the defendant obtained
the plans through deceptive and improper means, though the defendant's witnesses denied these
charges. Id. The jury found that Two Pesos misappropriated the plans. Id. The jury further found
that Two Pesos willfully infringed Taco Cabana's trade dress, a conclusion also reached by the
district court and the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 1127 & n.20 ("The weight of the evidence persuades us,
as it did Judge Singleton, that Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco Cabana's successful trade
dress ...").
The jury essentially found that Two Pesos was a bad actor, having improperly obtained and
used blueprints of the Taco Cabana restaurants. But the jury also found that Taco Cabana failed to
prove its restaurant design had a secondary meaning, a finding that raises questions about the
distinctiveness of the design at the time of the litigation. Id. at 1120 n.7. By finding the Taco
Cabana trade dress inherently distinctive, the jury was able to find Two Pesos liable for trade dress
infringement. A skeptical reader, or a losing defendant, could easily conclude the jury's finding of
inherent distinctiveness was simply a means to an end (i.e., the jury wanted Two Pesos held
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Under this new rule, only product designs that are proven distinctive
will receive trademark protection. Relatively few designs will satisfy this
requirement, but those that do carry with them an added assurance that we
have not erred in extending protection. This assurance also means
confusion is more likely when such a design is copied by a competitor. In
other words, by making the distinctiveness requirement more difficult to
satisfy, the Supreme Court's new rule will weed out many of the weaker
product design trademark cases. Those cases left present a much stronger
justification for protection.
The TrafFix Court failed to consider this fact when it rejected the wellestablished competitive need functionality standard. Again, the problem
of perspective likely explains the Court's failure to appreciate the
importance of its prior decision. When the functionality doctrine is
evaluated from the perspective of patent law, the distinctiveness
requirement of trademark law is unlikely to be a consideration. By
adopting a new functionality rule that will deny protection to even those
designs proven distinctive, the TrafFix Court adopted a rule that goes
further than necessary. Consumer confusion is quite likely in such
situations.
I suspect that much of the opposition to trademark protection for useful
product features is based on the belief that such features are not really
distinctive product identifiers. This view is seldom articulated, but it may
be responsible for much of the hostility to trademark protection for
product designs. After all, useful features such as the shape of a plastic
spray bottle" 9 or the round design of a thermostat 0 are quite common and
are not the kind of stimuli consumers are accustomed to viewing as source
identifiers." The shape of a plastic bottle of Fantastik® cleaner, for

accountable for its bad acts). Because there is no meaningful or quantifiable measure of inherent
distinctiveness, the jury's finding on this issue was largely insulated from review by the district
court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Supreme Court.
Though I do not mean to suggest that the Taco Cabana restaurant design is not distinctive-I
am familiar with the restaurant, having practiced law in Austin, Texas for several years, and believe
it is distinctive-the facts and findings in the litigation with Two Pesos suggest the jury may have
had other reasons for finding the Taco Cabana trade dress inherently distinctive. This is the risk
posed by a rule that allows juries to find trade dress inherently distinctive. It is a risk the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Wal-Mart, but did not address in Two Pesos. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529
U.S. at 214 ("Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but also by the
plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying
design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth
the candle."); Two Pesos,Inc., 505 U.S. at 774 ("We see no basis for requiring secondary meaning
for inherently distinctive trade dress protection under § 43(a) but not for other distinctive words,
symbols, or devices capable of identifying a producer's product.").
509. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
510. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
511. These symbols, if distinctive, are likely to serve as secondary source identifiers. The Wal-
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example, is likely to be much less distinctive-if distinctive at all-than
the Fantastik® brand name. To the extent this concern motivates some of
those who have pushed for patent bargain rules, these persons have been
pushing for the wrong reform. A more rigorous distinctiveness
requirement, a more demanding infringement standard, and more flexible
remedial measures, 12 would more directly address the problem than would
a functionality rule that simply denies protection to more designs. The
latter approach is a rather crude solution and one that imposes substantial
consumer confusion cost.

Mart Court provided the following explanation of this point:
The attribution of inherent distinctiveness to certain categories of word marks and
product packaging derives from the fact that the very purpose of attaching a
particular word to a product, or encasing it in a distinctive packaging, is most
often to identify the source of the product. Although the words and packaging can
serve subsidiary functions-a suggestive word mark (such as "Tide" for laundry
detergent), for instance, may invoke positive connotations in the consumer's mind,
and a garish form of packaging (such as Tide's squat, brightly decorated plastic
bottles for its liquid laundry detergent) may attract an otherwise indifferent
consumer's attention on a crowded store shelf-their predominant function
remains source identification. Consumers are therefore predisposed to regard
those symbols as indication of the producer, which is why such symbols "almost
automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand," and "immediately...
signal a brand or a product 'source."' And where it is not reasonable to assume
consumer predisposition to take an affixed word or packaging as indication of
source-where, for example, the affixed word is descriptive of the product
("Tasty" bread) or of a geographic origin ("Georgia" peaches)-inherent
distinctiveness will not be found. That is why the statute generally excludes, from
those word marks that can be registered as inherently distinctive, words that are
"merely descriptive" of the goods, or "primarily geographically descriptive of
them." In the case of product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer
predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist. Consumers are
aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product
designs-such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin-is intended not to
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more appealing.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212-13 (citations omitted).
512. This concept-that some types of symbols are more likely to serve as source identifiers
than others-can be extended to the infringement context, where the use of similar secondary
identifiers, like color or product design, should be deemed less likely to cause actionable confusion.
Moreover, when the use of such identifiers is found to be likely to confuse consumers, courts
should recognize the potential to significantly reduce, ifnot eliminate altogether, the risk of further
confusion by ordering the defendant to adopt distinctly different primary identifiers. See infra text
accompanying notes 520-22.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

107

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

3. The Patent Bargain and Right-to-Copy Rules
Provide Little Social Benefit
Patent bargain and right-to-copy advocates tend to overlook the cost of
the rules they promote, but that is only half the analysis. If the patent
bargain and right-to-copy rules provide important social benefits, such
benefits might outweigh the confusion costs imposed by the rules.
Much literature evaluates the patent bargain and right-to-copy
arguments. Those sources supporting the arguments suggest that any
restriction on the right to make and use a previously patented invention
will upset the balance struck by the patent system' 13 These arguments, and
those supporting the right-to-copy rules, tend to be formalistic, and seldom
address trademark policies. But these arguments suggest that the rules are
needed to protect the patent system. If such a limitation on trademark
protection were needed to avoid threatening the patent system, the rules
might well be justified.
It is this issue that seems to divide the commentators. The patent
bargain advocates argue that trademark protection offers perpetual patentlike protection without the rigorous requirements of patent law.514
Opponents of the patent bargain rules argue that trademark law is different
from patent law."' Trademark protection for a product feature, opponents
argue, does not extend the patent term because trademark law protects
only the distinctiveness of the feature and only prevents uses of the feature
that are likely to cause confusion." 6
I believe the opponents of the patent-based rules have the better
argument, though some who oppose such rules may understate the

513. See sources cited supra note 504.
514. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 42, at 357 (arguing that trade dress protection for a feature
of a previously patented invention is a windfall for the inventor); McLean, supra note 36, at 128
(equating trade dress and patent protection); Mohr, supra note 42, at 373 (describing the alleged
ease with which trade dress protection may be obtained); Pollack, supranote 42, at 293-94 (arguing
that functionality is not a sufficient protection of the right to copy); Fuller, supra note 7, at 306
(arguing that trade dress protection threatens to extend the patent monopoly); Geremia, supra note
42, at 816 (arguing that a competition-based functionality standard, "coupled with the unpredictable
nature of contemporary trade dress law, threatens to effectively extend patent monopolies into
perpetuity"); Laba, supra note 42, at 1676 (equating trade dress and patent protection).
515. See Oddi, supra note 88, at 144-45; Opderbeck, supra note 42, at 38-39; David, supra
note 42, at 262-63 & n.84; Marcotte, supranote 7, at 369-71.
516. Cotter, supra note 42, at 63 n.231 (noting importance of the likelihood-of-confusion
standard in trade dress infringement disputes); Dratler, supra note 42, at 555-65 (discussing several
key differences between patent protection and trademark protection); Gary Myers, Statutory
Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in
TrademarkDilution,Trade Dress,andProductConfigurationCases, 23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS
241, 263-64 (2000).
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potential for conflict between trademark and patent protection. 17 It is true
that trademark protection is quite different from patent protection.5 1 It is
also true and highly significant that trademark infringement does not
automatically follow from the act of copying a distinctive design.5 9 For
example, when a distinctive product design is copied, it is quite possible
that confusion can be avoided through the use of other distinctive and
different identifiers. 2 ° If one copies another's product design but uses her
own distinctive brand name on the copied product, the risk of confusion
will be reduced."' Product features are, at best, secondary product
identifiers, and the use of a prominent primary identifier (e.g., a brand
name or logo) may be enough to prevent confusion and, thus, avoid
infringement in most situations.522
517. Professor Cotter, for example, argues that no real conflict exists because patents seldom
confer true monopoly power. Cotter, supra note 42, at 61-63. A competition-based functionality
standard, Cotter argues, prevents claimants from obtaining market power via trademark law. Id. at
62-63. Thus, "if competitors do not need access to a feature in order to compete, allowing the
patentee to exert exclusive rights in that feature from now until Judgment Day will not confer any
monopoly power and... will instead bestow some limited benefits on consumers." Id. I agree with
this analysis, but it does not fully respond to the patent bargain argument. Professor Cotter
concludes that the patent bargain and right-to-copy arguments "elevate form over substance," id.
at 63, another correct observation in my view. There is, however, some merit (i.e., substance) to
the patent bargain concerns, namely the question of whether a competition-based functionality
standard will lead to practices that undermine patent law's incentive system. Though I agree with
Professor Cotter's analysis, I don't believe his arguments provide a sufficient basis, standing alone,
for rejecting the patent bargain and right-to-copy rules.
518. Dratler, supra note 42, at 555-65; Myers, supra note 516, at 257.
519. Cotter, supra note 42, at 63 n.23 1; Weinberg, supra note 7, at 9.
520. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor'sNew Clothes: Why Trade DressDoes
Not Belong on the PrincipalRegister,51 HAsTINGsL.J. 1131, 1175-78 (2000) (arguing that product
features are rarely used by consumers as source identifiers, particularly when labels or other source
indicia are present); Dowell, supra note 59, at 191-92; Note, supra note 49, at 556-57.
521. Note, supra note 49, at 556 & n.80.
522. A number of commentators have discussed the importance of labeling and brand usage
to prevent or reduce the risk of confusion where product configurations are similar. Lunney, supra
note 520, at 1164-65, 1177-78; James M. Treece, ProtectabilityofProductDifferentiation:Is and
Ought Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1041-42 (1964); see also Welkowitz, supra note 36,
at 367-68; supra note 511.
There is, however, an important context in which labeling may do little to reduce the risk of
harmful confusion. I am speaking of post-sale confusion, a form of confusion that occurs when the
goods are viewed or used afterthe sale is completed. Post-sale confusion can be a sufficient basis
for relief under the Lanham Act, but it is important to recognize that not all confusion after the
point of sale constitutes infringement. Only where the post-sale confusion is likely to influence a
purchasing decision should a finding of infringement follow. See, e.g., Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech
Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding post-sale confusion relevant to a trade dress
claim where the appearance of the goods might be used by future purchasers to identify the goods
they desire); RESTATEMENT (Tum) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 20 reporters' notes cmt. b (1995)
("Confusion of persons other than the actual purchaser is actionable, however, only if it is likely
to cause harm to the commercial interests of the trademark owner."). See generally Ann K.
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But what about the scenario where a distinctive product design cannot
be effectively copied without causing consumer confusion? In this
situation, trademark law would provide a level of exclusivity approaching
that of patent law. Even in cases where it is possible to avoid confusion,
a party found to be infringing may still be required to make changes to its
product.523 In either case, the party found to infringe trademark rights in
a product design may be no better off than a party found to infringe patent

Wooster, Annotation, "Post-SaleConfusion" in Trademarkor Trade DressInfringement Actions
Under § 43 of Lanham Trade-Mark Act (15 US.C.A. § 1125), 145 A.L.R. FED. 407 (1998)
(explaining the significance of post-sale confusion).
523. A number of leading trade dress cases have involved situations where the risk of
confusion probably could have been greatly reduced through use of distinctive product labeling and
branding. The trial courts, nevertheless, tend to issue injunctions prohibiting losing defendants from
further use of the product configuration at issue. Results of this type contribute to the growing sense
that trade dress protection has gone too far. Such a conclusion is too simplistic. The real problem
in many of these cases is the failure of the trial courts to find the least restrictive remedy available.
It is, after all, very well-established that courts must impose no more relief than is needed to prevent
consumer confusion and to remedy any monetary harm suffered by the trademark owner. See, e.g.,
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947).
Two leading, and somewhat controversial, trade dress decisions provide a good illustration of
my point. In Sunbeam Prods.v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 1997), the district
court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendant from selling a particular type of
stand mixer. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction without considering whether a less restrictive
remedy would have been sufficient. Id. The products at issue (stand mixers) were large enough to
allow prominent labeleling. If the defendant had clearly used its own brand name in prominent
places on the body of the mixer, the risk of confusion surely would have decreased. The result in
Sunbeam is significant because a preliminary injunction in like cases can effectively end the
dispute. The defendant faced with an injunction must either redesign its product, a process that may
be costly and somewhat time consuming, or remain out of the market until after a final judgment
is reached. Because it can easily take two years or more for a case to reach trial, staying out of the
market is not usually an attractive option. Because of the cost and effort required to redesign a
product, many defendants will opt to stay with the new design rather than continuing the
burdensome litigation. The win by Sunbeam was only preliminary in the eyes of the law, but in the
market, it probably was a final victory over its competitor West Bend.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in ClampManufacturingCo. v. Enco ManufacturingCo., 870 F.2d
512 (9th Cir. 1989), provides another example of a situation where labeling might have been
enough to avoid confusion. The parties made competing screw-type clamps. Id. at 513. The plaintiff
had owned a patent for parts of its clamp design, but its patent expired before the trade dress dispute
arose. Id. The plaintiff's product was sold under the trademark Kant-Twist. Id.The defendant made
a clamp almost identical in design to the plaintiff's and adopted the trademark No-Twist. Id. The
district court found infringement of the Kant-Twist trademark and the clamp design. Id. at 514.
Though confusion might have been likely, given the use of a somewhat similar trademark on an
identical product, the court should have considered the effect of changing the defendant's
trademark or adding other distinctive branding to the defendant's product. If the defendant changed
its trademark to something different from the plaintiff's Kant-Twist mark, and also added its own
company name or mark to its clamp, the risk of confusion would have been reduced. The court did
not discuss this option, and instead enjoined the defendant from making a clamp of the same design
as the plaintiff's clamp. See id. at 513.
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rights in the same design. Either way, the party may be enjoined from
copying the product.124 This result will not always follow when a
trademark right is asserted, but it can, and that fact raises important patent
bargain concerns. 525
Thus, trademark protection does present some potential for conflict
with the patent bargain. For some commentators, this conclusion is the end
of their analysis.126 These commentators go on to argue for per se rules
prohibiting trademark protection for previously patented features,5 27 but
that approach also misses the mark. The functionality analysis must focus
on all the policies implicated by the doctrine and seek the best balance of
those policies. 28 In this context, the key question is not whether there is
any potential for conflict between trademark protection and the patent
bargain, but whether such conflict is harmful to the patent system.
To answer this question, one must first consider the value provided by
a patent. A patent is a government-created right to exclude. 29 A patent
owner can prevent others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing her claimed invention. 3° It is the right to say no that provides
the value, and, more specifically, it is the government's enforcement of the
right to say no that makes patents economically valuable. However, the
economic value of a patent depends upon the scope and market
significance of the patent claims.5 3 ' If equivalent or better noninfringing
alternatives to the claimed invention are available, the patent has little
market value.532 The most valuable patents enable their owners to exert
control over some segment of a market. 3 Absent at least some influence
in a market, the patent-created right of exclusivity is of little economic
value.
This analysis suggests that the greatest concern over extension of the
patent-created exclusivity arises where the patent continues to provide
524. Oddi, supra note 88, at 159; see also Note, supra note 49, at 556 & n.81.
525. Myers, supra note 516, at 259.
526. See sources cited in supra note 504.
527. See sources cited in supra note 504.
528. See Jordan, supra note 42, at 354; Perez, supra note 42, at 411-13 (discussing the need
to balance the objectives of trademark law and patent law).
529. As the Supreme Court explained in an early patent case, "[t]he franchise which the patent
grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the
thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent."
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852). This proposition remains an accurate
description of the rights granted through a patent. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 476-78 (1974); Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011,
1014-15 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Weitzer, supra note 42, at 181.
530. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); Geremia, supra note 42, at 788-89.
531. Cotter, supra note 42, at 32.
532. Id. at 33.
533. Id. at 32-33.
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significant power in a particular market at or near the expiration date of
the patent.534 In this situation, an effective extension of the patent
monopoly will provide great value to the patent owner. No special patent
bargain rule is needed to prevent trademark protection in this scenario,
however, because the competitive need functionality rule guards precisely
against this result.535 If trademark protection would allow a former patent
owner to continue to exert control over some part of a market, then the
exclusive use of the features sought to be protected under trademark law
would, by definition, be placing competitors at a significant competitive
disadvantage.536 The competitive need rationale, therefore, protects against
the most harmful extensions of the patent monopoly.
What about patents that are still of some value at expiration? The
inventions claimed in these patents may be important in a market, but
there are likely a number of alternative designs available. 537 In this
situation, where the competitive need functionality standard might not
block trademark protection, a special patent bargain rule would provide
additional protection for the patent bargain. But is such protection needed?
Would the prospect of post-patent-expiration trademark protection of an
invention of modest value materially alter the balance reflected by the
patent laws? I doubt it.
Patent applications must be filed early, and it is unlikely that most
inventors at that stage are thinking much about the potential for trademark
protection fifteen to twenty years down the road.53 So while it is true that
the inventor in such a scenario seems to get something more than the
patent system promised, this possibility is not likely to undermine the
patent system. Moreover, the inventor is not getting that something extra

534. Id. at 62.
535. Id. at 62-63.
536. Id. at 62 n.230.
537. Oddi, supra note 88, at 145.
538. Cotter, supra note 42, at 33. To the extent that some inventors do give thought to the
potential for trademark protection after the patent term, the availability of protection would not
seem to undermine the patent system. If anything, the possibility of some exclusionary protection
after the patent expires would create an additional incentive to create worthwhile inventions. Unless
trademark protection is seen as a viable alternative to patent protection (i.e., unless trademark law
provides comparable or better protection), the possibility of trademark protection in addition to
patent protection is unlikely to lead inventors to forego patent protection. So long as the patent
system is used, the benefits (e.g., full and early disclosure) are still obtained by the public. Though
some commentators have argued that the disclosure benefit is lost if the product itself would have
been placed in an open market, see, e.g., Pollack, supra note 42, at 293-94 (arguing that when
manufacturing and sale of a product would disclose its construction, "the public has received no
consideration whatsoever from the patent holder"), I disagree with this view. It is the early and
complete disclosure of the claimed invention that provides an important part of patent law's public
benefit, and this disclosure is by no means certain when an unpatented product is introduced into
the market.
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for nothing. The inventor must satisfy all the elements of a trademark
claim to receive the extra protection.539 Even if such protection is viewed
as an extension of the exclusivity originally created by a patent, the end
result poses little threat to society. This scenario reflects the strongest
justification for the special patent bargain rules, yet even here, the rules
provide minimal incremental social benefit.
When a patent has little or no market value upon expiration, there is
even less reason to prohibit trademark protection for some part of the
claimed invention. If the patent no longer confers any real value in the
market, it seems perverse to speak of an "extension" of the patent
monopoly. Those who argue for special patent bargain rules in this
situation are elevating form over substance.540 There is no social benefit
to a rule that denies trademark protection for distinctive product designs
that have little or no market value apart from their distinctiveness. The
same is true for articles never protected by a patent. An absolute right-tocopy rule, therefore, provides little or no social benefit. In fact, the patentdriven rules pose problems of their own.
4. The Patent Bargain and Right-to-Copy Rules Threaten Copyright
and Trademark Protection for Ornamental Designs
The patent bargain argument is premised on the notion that a patented
invention must be fully surrendered to the public domain when the patent
expires. If there is merit to the argument, it would seem to apply with
equal force to utility patents and design patents, for both provide a limited
term of protection in exchange for a complete, early disclosure of the
invention. To obtain a utility patent, an invention must be novel,
nonobvious, and useful.5 4 Design patents, on the other hand, are granted
to inventions that are novel, nonobvious, and ornamental. 542 The
ornamental requirement of design patent law stands in contrast to the
usefulness requirement of utility patent law. Every feature of a product is,

539. Trade dress protection is by no means automatic in this scenario. The claimant must
prove that its design has become distinctive. Mere passage of time will not be enough to prove
secondary meaning for product configurations. See supra note 507. In addition, the claimant must
prove a likelihood of confusion, which can be difficult if the defendant uses its own distinctive
brand name or logo on its product. See supra notes 520-22 and accompanying text.
540. See Cotter, supra note 42, at 63 (making a similar argument).
541. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
542. Id. § 171 (designs must be "new, original, and ornamental" to qualify for a patent). The
same provision explains that other "provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall
apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." Id.This rule effectively imposes the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements of §§ 102 and 103 on applications for design patents.
Design patents are available only for ornamental designs of"article[s] of manufacture." Id. § 171.
This limitation precludes design patent protection for many artistic works.
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at least in theory, within the subject matter scope of either utility or design
patent law.
This fact has important consequences for the patent bargain and rightto-copy rules. Consider first a patent bargain rule that denies trade dress
protection to previously patented features.5 43 If an ornamental design is
patented, then under this rule the design must be fully surrendered to the
public domain upon expiration of the design patent. No restrictions on the
public's right to copy the design can be tolerated. But what if the same
design is copyrighted? Copyright protection extends to "sculptural works,"
a category that overlaps somewhat with the ornamental design scope of
design patent law,544 and copyright protection lasts much longer than a
design patent. 45 Though copyright protection may be more limited than
design patent protection, the existence of a valid copyright for an
ornamental design clearly imposes important restrictions on the public's
right to copy the design. A conflict thus seems to exist between design
patent protection and copyright protection.
How should this conflict be resolved? The supporters of the special
patent bargain rules argue that trade dress protection must be prohibited
when that protection conflicts with the public's right to copy a previously
patented invention. Does this mean copyright protection for a previously
patented ornamental design is lost when the design patent expires? It is
difficult to support any other conclusion if one accepts the basic premise
of the patent bargain argument, but this conclusion gives patent law
priority over copyright law. Some patent bargain advocates openly argue
for giving patent law priority over trademark law, but what about the
relationship between patent law and copyright law? Both are grounded in
the same provision of the U.S. Constitution. 46 Both are exclusively federal

543. There are, as noted earlier, a number of possible per se patent bargain rules. See supra
note 485. This potential for further debate over how to best enforce the patent bargain is interesting,
but not directly relevant to the argument presented in the text.
544. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(5) (2000) (Copyright protection is available for "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works."). A manufactured item can be a "sculptural work" for the purposes of
copyright law, so long as the work satisfies the ordinary requirements for protection. The most
significant limitation on copyright protection for many articles of manufacture is the useful article
doctrine. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir.
1987). That limitation, however, is less likely to bar copyright protection for purely ornamental
designs than for the useful characteristics of such articles. For this reason, there is significant
overlap between design patent protection and copyright protection for ornamental designs of useful
articles.
545. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (copyright term is life of author plus seventy years or, for anonymous,
pseudonymous, and works made for hire, ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever is less); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (design patents "shall be granted for the term of
fourteen years from the date of grant").
546. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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law. There is little reason to suggest that patent law should somehow
trump copyright law.
Maybe patent and copyright law must coexist, and maybe the patent
bargain advocates must accept the potential for copyright protection after
the expiration of design patents. Such a concession may be of little
practical significance,547 but it does undermine the basic justification for
the patent bargain argument. It is simply incorrect to suggest that when a
patent expires, be it utility or design, the invention is free for all to use.
The patent protection is lost, but other restrictions may still be in force.
The copyright example is merely one such restriction. 4
The right-to-copy rule goes even further. This rule holds that any
article within the broad subject matter scope of patent law must be
protected by a patent, or not at all. Most supporters of the right to copy
focus on the subject matter scope of utility patent law (i.e., on useful
articles), but the right, if it exists, should extend to all potentially
patentable articles. When the right to copy is applied to all useful and
ornamental designs, trade dress protection for three-dimensional objects
is effectively foreclosed. This sweeping result may be attractive to some
commentators, 549 but it clearly was not intended by Congress. 5 Moreover,
a denial of trade dress protection for distinctive, ornamental features of a
product or its packaging probably would impose a substantial consumer
confusion cost.

547. That is, there may be relatively few actual copyright infringement disputes involving
previously patented ornamental designs.
548. Consider a utility patent for an improved nuclear or biological weapon, or for a new
process of decoding encrypted radio transmissions. Such inventions may satisfy all the
requirements of patent law, but there almost surely will be other important restrictions on the right
to make and use these inventions. It would make little sense to argue that upon expiration of a
patent for a new biological weapon, the public has an unrestricted right to make and use the
invention. Although this example differs in important respects from both the trade dress and
copyright scenarios, it does illustrate yet another type of restriction on the use of certain previously
patented inventions.
549. Professor Glynn Lunney, for example, has argued that trade dress protection for product
features is often unwarranted. Lunney, supra note 520, at 1175-78.
550. Recent amendments to the Lanham Act confirm an intent, at least on the part of Congress,
to provide some trade dress protection to objects. See Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999) (placing the burden of proof for the functionality issue on the
plaintiff in actions brought under section 43 (a)); Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998) (adding functionality as grounds for rejection of trademark
applications, for oppositions, and for cancellation proceedings). It would make little sense for
Congress to twice amend the Lanham Act to incorporate functionality provisions if there were no
intention to provide trademark protection to at least some three-dimensional objects.
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5. The Patent Bargain and Right-to-Copy Rules Create an
Incentive to Trade on Goodwill
The patent bargain and right-to-copy rules tend to create an incentive
for competitors to trade on goodwill represented by distinctive product
designs. Consider the yellow tubing case again.55' Why did the defendant
copy the yellow color of the plaintiff's tubing? There was no evidence that
yellow tubing was less expensive to make, and there apparently was
evidence that other colors would have worked just as well as yellow.552 So
why pick yellow? Perhaps the defendant wanted to trade on the plaintiff's
goodwill.553
There are many possible reasons why one competitor might decide to
copy another's product design. Avoiding the time and expense of
developing an alternative design might be reason enough in some
situations. But what if there are numerous alternative designs on the
market with no significant differences in cost or quality? Which one would
be copied? What if one of the designs, though useful, is also highly
distinctive? What if the design is well-known to consumers in the market
and is regarded as a symbol of quality? Under the patent bargain and rightto-copy rules, competitors might be free to copy such a design, despite its
distinctiveness and the availability of equivalently performing alternative
designs.
This problem arises because the patent bargain and right-to-copy rules
make no exception for product designs with significant reputational value.
Under the competitive need functionality standard, on the other hand, a
product feature is functional only "if exclusive use of the feature would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-relateddisadvantage." 5

551. Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
552. Id. at 723-25.
553. Myers, supra note 516, at 256 & nn.68-69. It is important to distinguish between the
goodwill of a product and the goodwill of a producer. Trademark law protects the latter, not the
former. When a new product is developed and is patented, there is the potential to develop goodwill
in both the product and the producer. The product may serve a need or desire of consumers. The
producer may develop a reputation for making a product with a consistent quality level. When the
patent protection ends, others are entitled to enjoy the goodwill in the product, but not the
reputational goodwill of the producer. Competitors have the right to try to satisfy the consumer
demand for the type of product previously covered by the patent, but they must do so in a way that
does not create consumer confusion as to the source of the product. Some commentators have
confused these two very different forms of goodwill, and have read early Supreme Court decisions
involving the right to make a previously patented invention as opening the door to trading on the
former patent owner's reputational goodwill. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 42, at 298; Marcotte,
supra note 7, at 347.
554. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (emphasis added). The
Qualitex Court went on to note:
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Reputational value is expressly excluded from the functionality analysis
under this standard, 5" as it should be. The patent bargain and right-to-copy
rules do not take market value of any kind into consideration. These rules,
therefore, allow competitors to copy designs even where the only
significant value of the design lies in its distinctiveness.
When the right-to-copy rule is adopted-that is, when functionality is
equated with utility" 6-the potential for trading on goodwill is substantial.
Many distinctive product designs will be denied protection under such a
standard, leaving competitors free to copy. When the focus on alternatives
is rejected, there is no way to protect against copying for the sole purpose
of trading on goodwill. Functionality is an element, and all the copying
party need do is file a motion for summary judgment showing the design
is useful.
6. Seeking Balance
The three functionality rules impose significantly different consumer
confusion costs. The competitive need standard renders the fewest designs

Although sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to source
identification) in making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not. And,
this latter fact-the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product's use or
purpose and does not affect cost or quality-indicates that the doctrine of
"functionality" does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark.
Id.
555. Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 710.
556. I refer here to the right-to-copy rule most commonly advanced by commentators. The
right should extend to all potentially patentable articles (i.e., useful and ornamental objects), but
most advocates focus on useful articles. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 35, at 938-39 ("[Tlhe
fundamental meaning of the word 'function' in the doctrine's name is not merely any purpose, but
a useful or utilitarian purpose in the utility patent sense."); Mohr, supranote 42, at 389-92 (arguing
that the functionality doctrine fails to preserve the subject matter domain of utility patents, but
making no reference to design patents); Pollack, supranote 42, at 297-99 (making a patent bargain
argument based on inventions disclosed and claimed in expired utility patents, without addressing
the potential applicability of the same argument to ornamental designs claimed in expired design
patents); Taylor, supra note 7, at 214-15 (arguing that the functionality doctrine fails to protect the
utility patent system, but making no similar argument concerning the design patent system);
Geremia, supra note 42, at 809-15 (arguing for a right to copy based on utility patent law, but
making no reference to design patent protection). Some commentators, however, have noted that
the patent bargain argument would seem to apply with equal force to utility and design patents. See,
e.g., Oddi, supra note 88, at 139-40 (noting the potential for violation of the patent bargain when
a previously patented desgin receives trademark protection); Dowell, supra note 59, at 171-72
(noting that courts and commentators have focused on the potential for conflict between trademark
protection and utility patents, but not on the risk of conflict between trademark protection and
desgin patents). When the right-to-copy argument is taken to its logical end-when the right is
extended to all useful and ornamental articles-the potential for improper trading on goodwill
becomes even greater.
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functional, and therefore, imposes the lowest confusion cost."' This
standard also creates the smallest potential for bad-faith copying. The
patent bargain rule creates a higher confusion cost and provides
competitors more chances to intentionally trade on goodwill. The right-tocopy rule imposes the highest confusion cost and creates the greatest risk
of bad-faith copying.
On the other hand, the three rules provide different social benefit. The
competitive need standard provides the greatest, or at least the most direct,
social benefit by prohibiting trademark protection for those product
features that would adversely hinder free competition.558 There is little
disagreement about the importance of this policy. 559 The patent bargain
rule provides some social benefit in cases that fall outside the scope of the
competitive need standard, but this benefit is minimal. The right-to-copy
rule provides little or no social benefit, other than the reduced
administrative costs of this bright-line rule.
When the costs and benefits of the three rules are considered, the result
is quite clear. The competitive need standard is the only rule that provides
any balance at all. The patent bargain rule may provide some added
benefit, but it comes at too high a cost. The right-to-copy rule provides
little or no benefit and imposes the highest costs. It seems clear that the
right-to-copy rule goes too far and must be rejected. Unfortunately, the
TrajFix decision seems to be leading courts to adopt just such a rule.560
7. The Patent Bargain Argument Is Inherently Flawed
A number of commentators who support the patent bargain rule argue
that trademark protection provides patent-like protection, without any
durational limit.56 ' The potential for such protection, some argue,
undermines the patent bargain. 562 This argument is inherently flawed.

557. See Opderbeck, supra note 42, at 35-36.
558. Id. at 37.
559. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. a (1995) ("The freedom
to engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental
premise of the free enterprise system."); I MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.1. Indeed, most
commentators who favor a patent bargain or right-to-copy rule recognize the importance of
vigorous competition. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 42, at 381-82; Taylor, supra note 7, at 207-08;
Welkowitz, supra note 36, at 307; Gleiberman, supra note 249, at 2045; Laba, supra note 42, at
1677; Note, supra note 115, at 555.
560. See supra notes 420-33 and accompanying text.
561. See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 36, at 343-46; David, supra note 42, at 262-63; Laba,
supra note 42, at 1676; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 195.
562. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 42, at 59-60; Mohr, supra note 42, at 429; Pollack, supra
note 42, at 293-94; Geremia, supra note 42, at 816.
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The patent bargain rule creates a sort of election between trademark
563
and patent protection by prohibiting post-patent trademark protection.
In other words, the patent bargain rule forces a party with a new product
to decide whether to seek patent protection, which will last for only a fixed
period of time, or trademark protection, which will last as long as the
product design is distinctive and non-functional.5 " If trademark protection
for product designs is really equivalent to patent protection, the patent
bargain rule should lead inventors to pick trademark protection over patent
protection because of the unlimited term. 6 The patent bargain rule would
backfire. It would lead to more, not less, reliance on trademark protection
for product designs.
What is going on here? The flaw lies in the assumption that patent and
trademark protection are equivalent or interchangeable. They are not. The
patent bargain argument has some merit, but it cannot be taken too far. If
one starts from the assumption that trademark protection for product
designs is an equivalent substitute for patent protection, the argument
collapses. But if one accepts that trademark protection can restrict in some
ways a competitor's ability to make and use a previously patented
invention, though by no means to the same extent that a patent would
restrict such behavior, then the patent bargain argument makes some
sense. The argument is not as compelling as it may have seemed, but that
is because trademark and patent protection are significantly different.
Having said that, the patent bargain argument and the notion of an
election between patent and trademark protection do raise some interesting
issues. First, some product designs probably become distinctive because
of a long, patent-generated period of exclusivity. 66 Without the patent
protection, such designs might never have become distinctive in the first
place. Second, if one were to "elect" trademark protection over patent
protection, the election would likely be final. Patents must be filed within
one year of a public use or offer for sale of the invention, whereas
trademarks require use in commerce. 67 Because it takes time to develop
distinctiveness, it is quite likely that at the one-year and one-day point, the
inventor will have lost the chance to obtain patent protection, but may not
have protectable trademark rights either. Such an approach would be risky,
at best. It seems much more likely that a prudent inventor would at least

563. Long, supranote 7, at 883-89 (describing the rise of an election scenario in light of recent
decisions).
564. Fischer, supra note 42, at 58-59; Mohr, supra note 42, at 427-28.
565. Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 626; Weitzer, supra note 42, at 198.
566. I do not believe this result is common. Some deliberate actions will be required in most
cases to develop distinctiveness in a product design. See supra note 507.
567. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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seek patent protection,
while simultaneously trying to develop
5 68
distinctiveness.
8. The TrafFix Rule Has Huge Complexity Cost
When the TrafFix Court held that "[a] utility patent is strong evidence
that the features therein claimed are functional, 5 69 it may have introduced
into trademark law one of the most difficult of all patent issues. Patent
claims define the scope of the exclusive patent right,"' but the claims are
written in a highly-specialized style and often use technical language
unfamiliar to persons unskilled in the particular subject matter."' By
linking the evidentiary weight of a utility patent to the claims, the TrafFix
decision may require a full interpretation of some patent claims in
trademark cases.572
If TrafFixresults in the incorporation of the patent claim interpretation
process into trade dress cases, some undesirable, and likely unintended,
consequences might follow. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has had
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving claims arising under
the Patent Act since the court was created in 1982."' The regional circuit
courts, therefore, heard relatively few appeals involving questions of
patent law during the last twenty years.5 74 Trade dress claims, on the other

568. Of course, at some point, the inventor would have to make the election required by the
patent bargain rule. But the inventor could prosecute a patent application through allowance, a
process that can take three or more years, before deciding on patent or trade dress protection. By
that time, the inventor probably would have a reasonably good estimate of the value of the two
forms of protection. This scenario hardly seems like an efficient use of resources, but it is possible
under the patent bargain rule.
569. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
570. See, e.g., Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbh, 972 F.2d 1272,1274 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("It is to the claims of every patent, therefore, that we must turn when we are seeking
to determine what the invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to the inventor by the grant
provided for in the statute."); Davis, supra note 7, at 235.
571. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations,90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1934 (2002) (describing patent claim interpretation as "a
complex and uncertain legal inquiry"); Philip M. Nelson, Definitionfor "Limitation" in the Context
ofProsecutionHistory Estoppel andthe All Elements Rule: A ProposedSolution to the Troubling
Dictum in Kustom Signals v. Applied Concepts, 2003 BYU L. REV. 353,355-56 (2003) (discussing
the complex and technical nature of many patent claims).
572. Davis, supra note 7, at 266-72; Renke, supra note 7, at 629 (noting that patent claim
"analysis could turn each trade dress case into a lengthy, complicated, and expensive patent-type
proceeding").
573. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-09 (1988) (explaining the
jurisdiction of the federal circuit); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts
ImprovementAct: A Practitioner'sPerspective,33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 385-87 (1984) (explaining
the creation of the Federal Circuit).
574. The situation may change significantly due to the Supreme Court's recent decision in
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Holmes Group,Inc. v. VornadoAirCirculationSystems, 535 U.S. 826 (2002). The Court there held
the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over patent counterclaims, even where the claims are
compulsory under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.Id. at 832-33. The decision was based on
a formalistic application of the well-pled complaint rule, which, the Court noted, has historically
limited federal jurisdiction to actions where the plaintiffs complaint includes a claim raising a
federal question. Id. at 831-32. The Court was not persuaded by arguments that its decision would
undermine consistency in patent law, one of the very reasons Congress created the Federal Circuit.
Id. at 833-34.
Prior to the Holmes decision, regional circuits heard appeals in patent licensing cases, which
sometimes include defenses based on patent law. For example, where a patent owner sues a licensee
for breach of contract, the licensee may respond by challenging the validity of the patent. See, e.g.,
Nellie A. Fisher, The Licensee's Choice: Mechanics of Successfully Challenginga Patent Under
License, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,2 (1997) ("[T]he licensee has the power to negotiate a license,
sue for a declaratory judgment of invalidity to release herself from future royalty obligations, and
possibly be free of such payments while the suit is in progress."). Such a defense raises patent law
issues, but the Supreme Court has held that the "arising under" language of the federal
jurisdictional statutes is limited to claims and cannot be based on issues relevant solely to a defense.
Christianson,486 U.S. at 809. The Federal Circuit later distinguished Christianson in an action
involving a patent law counterclaim. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle
Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 744-45 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). This holding limited the impact of
Christianson,though the regional circuits still faced an occasional patent law question.
The Holmes decision goes much further and seems to undo much of what Congress hoped to
accomplish through creation of the Federal Circuit. Counterclaims are both procedurally and
practically different from defenses. When a patent owner becomes aware of a possible infringement
of her patent, she must take steps to end the infringement. She could sue, assuming she has done
an adequate investigation to confirm her suspicions, or she could contact the other party to initiate
patent license negotiations. The latter approach seems more constructive, and was, absent situations
where there is little likelihood of reaching a license agreement, the more common approach. After
Holmes, however, the patent owner faces a new risk. If the contact is too strong-that is, if it
creates a reasonable apprehension of a patent infringement action-it will give the other party a
basis to file a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of invalidity, noninfringement, or
both. When this type of action is filed, the patent owner has no choice but to bring a patent
infringement counterclaim. Such a claim is compulsory under the FederalRules ofCivil Procedure.
There always has been some risk of forum shopping inherent in the declaratory judgment
process, but that risk was reduced in patent disputes because of the Federal Circuit's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. The conventional view was that it made less difference which federal district
court heard the patent case because the Federal Circuit would hear the appeal regardless of where
the action was filed. That is no longer true. It is too early to tell how important Holmes will
be-there is the question of predicting when and how the regional circuits might differ from the
Federal Circuit, a speculative game indeed, and the question of whether Congress will allow
Holmes to stand, given the rather blatant conflict it creates with congressional intent. The decision
already has been the target of significant commentary, much of it critical. See, e.g., C.J. Alice Chen,
Patent:FederalCircuitJurisdiction:Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 141 (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdictionand
Uniformity in PatentLaw, 9 MICH. TEIECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); Molly Mosley-Goren,
JurisdictionalGerrymandering?Responding to Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1 (2002); Christian A. Fox, Note, On Your Mark Get Set, Go! A New
Race to the Courthouse Sponsored by Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc., 2003 BYU L. REv. 331 (2003); Timothy E. Grimsrud, Comment, Holmes and the Erosion of
Exclusive FederalJurisdictionOver PatentClaims,87 MINN. L. REv. 2133 (2003); Peter 0. Huang,
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hand, are within the appellate jurisdiction of the regional circuits. 5 This
arrangement, when coupled with the TrafFix Court's emphasis on the
significance of utility patent claims in trade dress cases, could result in the
regional circuit courts reviewing district court patent claim interpretation
decisions in appeals of trade dress cases.
An even more perverse result could follow if a trade dress case is
brought during the patent term. Such a case could be appealed to a
regional circuit court and could result in a final interpretation of certain
patent claims, or parts of patent claims, by that court. If a patent
infringement claim was filed after, or during the pendency of, the trade
dress litigation, the possibility would arise for separate claim interpretation
decisions by the Federal Circuit, which would hear any appeal in the
patent infringement action, and the regional circuit with jurisdiction over
the appeal of the trade dress action. The potential would then exist for
different interpretations of the same patent claim by two circuit courts.
because the Federal Circuit was created to
This result would be ironic,
576
outcomes.
such
just
avoid
The scenarios described in the preceding paragraphs are unlikely to
occur often, but the injection of the patent claim interpretation issue into
trade dress cases is a troublesome aspect of the TrafFix holding.5" This
added complexity will increase the cost of litigating many trade dress
claims. Such a result is not sufficient, standing alone, to justify a rejection
of the TrafFix analysis, but it does raise additional questions about the
need for the patent rule adopted by the TrafFix Court.
B. Solution Two-EliminatingFunctionalityas an Element
The functionality conundrum could be resolved by eliminating
functionality as an element oftrade dress claims and recognizing a limited
functionality defense.5 7' The focus of this defense would be the

Development and Practice Notes, The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc.: The Return ofPatentAppeals to the RegionalCircuits,5J. APP. PRAC.&PROCESS 197 (2003);
Ashley B. Summer, Note, Aerojet Takes a Dive After Over Twelve Years ofFlight,54 S.C.L. REV.
1131 (2003).
575. This point is illustrated by the Federal Circuit's treatment of cases involving patent and
trademark claims. The patent claims are resolved based on the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
the Patent Act, but the court looks to the regional circuits to resolve the trademark questions. See,
e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1129 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Since
unfair competition issues are not within the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction, we apply the
discemable precedent of the regional circuit... ."); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886
F.2d 1285, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
576. The same result could occur after the Supreme Court's recent Holmes decision, as
explained above. See supra note 574.
577. See supra note 572.
578. See Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 699-703 (presenting a similar argument).
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defendant's product, or more specifically, those parts of the defendant's
product that were copied from the plaintiffs product. If the defendant has
taken only functional features from the plaintiffs product design, the
defendant should not be enjoined from using the features, regardless of
whether the overall design of the plaintiffs product is functional or nonfunctional. 79
The modem functionality framework-the use of a front-end
functionality requirement based on the overall design of the trade dress
claimant's product-will sometimes overprotect and sometimes
underprotect distinctive trade dress. The modem approach overprotects
when a plaintiff can prove its overall product design is non-functional, but
where only functional features of that design are copied. 8 The same rule
underprotects when it classifies a plaintiff's design as functional and
denies all protection, despite the possibility that a defendant might copy
only non-functional elements.5 8'
These problems are easily avoided. The functionality inquiry should
focus on the defendant's product, not on the plaintiff s product. Moreover,
if functionality is a limited defense, it would not relieve a defendant of all
responsibility for consumer confusion. For example, if the defendant
copied only functional features, but the defendant's product was still likely
to cause confusion, a court could require the defendant to take additional
steps to differentiate the two products. So long as effective distinctions
could be made without placing the defendant at a competitive
disadvantage, a court would be justified in requiring such relief.582 Indeed,
the consumer interest in preventing confusion would seem to mandate
such a solution. The modem functionality framework unfortunately
precludes this approach. If the plaintiffs design is functional, its trade

579. Id. at 736-37.
580. Id. at 735 & n.458.
581. In such cases, a plaintiff may attempt to define its trade dress to include only the nonfunctional parts of its product, but some courts emphasize the need to evaluate functionality based
on the plaintiffs product as a whole. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826
F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[Olur inquiry is not addressed to whether individual elements of
the trade dress fall within the definition of functional, but to whether the whole collection of
elements taken together are functional."). This approach also may fail if the plaintiff's
distinctiveness evidence was based on the overall image of its product, a fairly likely scenario. If
the symbol a plaintiff claims as its trademark must be distinctive and non-functional-if the
functionality rule is applied as an element of the plaintiff's claim--then it follows that both
requirements must be met by the same symbol.
582. Dinwoodie, supra note 21, at 747.
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dress claim will be missed. 83 The defendant in such a case is not required
to take any steps to reduce the risk of confusion.584
This proposal is not radical or new. In many early functionality cases,
courts used just such an approach.585 The passing off claim required proof
that the plaintiffs design was distinctive and that the defendant's copying
was likely to confuse consumers. 8 6 Once passing off was proven, the
burden shifted to the defendant. If the defendant could prove that the
copied features were functional, the court would then ask whether the
defendant had taken reasonable steps to distinguish its product from the
plaintiffs
product. 8 7 If such steps were taken, no further relief was
588
granted.
This solution provides more protection to consumers than the modem
functionality approach. As explained above, product designs are, at best,
secondary product identifiers.58 9 Brand names and logos are more likely
to be used by consumers to identify and distinguish products. If courts
define "reasonable steps to distinguish" as requiring prominent use of a
distinctive brand name or logo by a defendant, the risk of consumer
confusion will be greatly reduced.
This solution does not avoid the difficult question of what functionality
standard should be used, but it does provide more flexibility. The
competitive need functionality standard should still be the general rule, for
the reasons given in the preceding sections. If a defendant copied only
features it needs to compete, the features should be functional, and the
limited defense would be established. But what if a defendant copies a

583. See, e.g., Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding the plaintiff's trade dress functional and rendering judgment for the defendant).
584. This statement may be a bit of an exaggeration because some courts have granted limited
relief under section 43 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (2000), even where the plaintiff's trade dress or
trademark was deemed invalid. See, e.g., Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imp., Inc., 807 F.2d
1136, 1144-49 (3d Cir. 1986). The Restatement explains, "[A]lthough the possibility or even
certainty of such confusion will not deprive competitors of their right to copy functional designs,
the general proscription against misrepresentations of source may require subsequent users of
functional but distinctive designs to take reasonable precautions to minimize the risk of confusion."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETON § 16 cmt. d. (1995). This explanation is more
consistent with the early period "passing off cases than with the modem cases. See supra note 85.
This approach is similar to my proposal, because both essentially redirect the functionality analysis
to the elements copied and balance the use of functional features against the risk of consumer
confusion. In my view, the proposal in the text is a bit more clear, and for that reason alone, might
be a better option for the courts. Substantively, however, my proposal and the position taken in the
Restatement are quite similar.
585. See supra notes 85, 89-93, 98-100 and accompanying text.
586. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
587. Note, supranote 49, at 554-55; see supranotes 85, 98-100 and accompanying text.
588. See supra note 85.
589. See supra notes 511-12.
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feature that isn't very important in the market, but is taken directly from
an expired patent? Under the modem functionality framework, this
scenario creates an all-or-nothing dilemma. Either the defendant is
liable-a likely result if a competition-based functionality standard is
used--or not-a likely result if a patent bargain rule is used. There is no
middle ground.
If functionality is instead a limited defense, courts can use a
competition-based rule as the general functionality standard, while still
providing some protection for the patent bargain. In the scenario described
in the preceding paragraph, a court could require the defendant to take
reasonable steps to distinguish its product, and might even ask whether
there are other aspects of the product that could be changed so the
defendant retains the right to use the previously patented feature. When
faced with such a choice, some defendants might decide that the right to
make and use the previously patented invention is less important than
keeping other elements of its product design, but that would be a choice
left to the defendant. The patent bargain, and the right to make and use the
invention claimed in the expired patent, would receive some protection
from the court.
The flexibility of this solution also would allow courts to balance the
patent bargain concern against the need to prevent confusion. If the
elements taken from the expired patent are among the most distinctive
elements of the plaintiffs design, but provide little other value in the
market, a court might order the defendant to cease use of the elements. In
effect, the court would be balancing reputational value, which is an
indicator of the potential for consumer confusion, against the desire to
respect the patent bargain. Where little reputational value is at stake,
courts could look for remedies that support the patent bargain. But where
confusion is likely to result from the copying of a previously patented
feature that is not otherwise important in the market, the consumer interest
should prevail and the copying should be enjoined.
Learned Hand summarized the solution proposed here in an early case.
His explanation remains apt, as does his faith in the ability of the trial
courts to resolve difficult issues fairly.
The proper meaning of the phrase "nonfunctional," is only
this: That in such cases the injunction is usually confined to
nonessential elements, since these are usually enough to
distinguish the goods, and are the least burdensome for the
defendant to change. Whether changes in them are in all
conceivable cases the limit of the plaintiffs right is a matter
not before us. If a case should arise in which no effective
distinction was possible without change in functional
elements, it would demand consideration; but the District
Court may well find an escape here from that predicament.
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Certainly the precise extent and kind of relief must in
the first
5 90
instance be a matter for the discretion of that court.
There are, however, two significant practical problems presented by
eliminating functionality as a front-end, filtering requirement. First, the
elimination of functionality as a positive element of a trade dress claim
might increase the risk of harassment suits. If plaintiffs could bring trade
dress infringement suits based on purely functional designs, there might
be a marked increase in unjustified actions brought to harass, burden, or
frustrate competitors. Large, established players in a market might use
such a strategy to impose burdensome, and socially wasteful, entry costs
on competitors attempting to move into the market.
This risk is real, but I do not think the proposed elimination of
functionality as an element would make a material difference here.
Functionality would remain an important part of many trade dress
disputes, but the focus would be directed more to the defendant's product
than to the plaintiffs product. If, however, a plaintiff brought an action
based on the copying of all or part of a wholly functional design, it seems
quite likely the defendant would have a valid functionality defense. The
existence of such a defense could be used to defeat the plaintiffs claim in
much the same way that defendants currently use the modem functionality
rule.5 9 ' Moreover, if plaintiffs were to bring harassment suits under the
proposed rule, courts would have the power to impose appropriate
sanctions, just as they do under the modem rules. For these reasons, I
doubt the proposed rule would lead to a significant increase in the number
of unjustified harassment claims.
The second practical problem posed by this solution is more troubling.
If functionality were eliminated as a front-end rule, the Patent and
Trademark Office presumably would have to register all distinctive
product designs, including wholly functional designs. The risk that such
designs could receive federal trademark registrations might lead to an
increase in harassment trade dress claims. The limited functionality
defense would remain an important barrier to such claims, but the added
value of a federal registration might increase both the frequency and costs
of such unjustified claims. The situation is a bit analogous to the existence
of trademark protection, and federal trademark registrations, for
descriptive terms. By giving such terms the official federal stamp of
approval, there is an increased risk of harassment suits against parties

590. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917).
591. Defendants would be able to move for dismissal or summary judgment based on a
functionality defense,just as many defendants now move for dismissal or summaryjudgment based
on the functionality element. Either way, the claim could be resolved at a relatively early stage of
the litigation.
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making purely descriptive uses of the terms. The Lanham Act recognizes
a descriptive fair use defense in these situations, 92 a defense similar in
some respects to the limited functionality defense I propose, but that
defense does not prevent all unjustified claims.
I have no solution to the registration problem, but I doubt the problem
is as significant as it might appear. I believe the distinctiveness
requirement is, or should be, the more important limitation on trademark
protection for product designs. I tend to agree with the Supreme Court's
analysis in the recent Wal-Mart case, which concluded that product
designs are seldom used by consumers as source identifiers. 93 If this
conclusion is correct, it would seem to follow that more functional product
designs are even less likely to be distinctive source identifiers. In other
words, I doubt the Patent and Trademark Office will be swamped with
applications to register distinctive, but wholly functional, product designs.
It will be, I suspect, quite rare to find a wholly functional product design
that is truly distinctive. While theoretically possible, I believe the practical
likelihood of this situation is so low that it effectively eliminates the risk
of abusive registration of wholly functional designs. For these reasons, I
believe the elimination offunctionality as an element oftrade dress claims,
and the removal of functionality as a consideration in registration
decisions, would pose minimal risk of abuse. The benefits of replacing the
modem functionality approach with a limited functionality defense
outweigh such risks.
C. Solution Three-Combininga Competition-BasedFront-End
FunctionalityRule with a Limited Functionality
Defense-The PerfectSolution?
I believe the proposal for a limited functionality defense is the best
solution to the problems created by the TrafFix decision. I recognize,
however, that the risks posed by this proposal may make it unacceptable
to some. For that reason, I propose a third solution: a combination of a
front-end functionality rule and a limited functionality defense. A
competitive need standard would be used both as a filtering
requirement-focusing on the overall design of the claimant's trade
dress-and as the basis for a limited defense. This approach would
eliminate the problems noted above-the increased risk of harassment
suits and the problem of registering wholly functional designs-while
maintaining the primary benefits of the limited functionality defense. The
only significant drawback to this approach is the added complexity and

592. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
593. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2000).
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cost of considering functionality as both an element of the plaintiff's claim
and as an affirmative defense.
If this solution is adopted, a competitive need standard would be used
as a filtering requirement, eliminating from litigation and registration
those designs or features needed by others to effectively compete. The
threshold would be rather high, meaning that most designs would be found
non-functional. The rule would have only a limited filtering effect, but it
would prevent the harassment problems identified above. Those concerned
that a competitive need functionality standard provides too little protection
for the patent bargain would be able to present their arguments in the
context of the more flexible limited functionality defense. The defense
would be applied in the manner described above, and would allow courts
the flexibility to find remedies that protect the right to compete and the
patent bargain. The combination proposal might be the best overall
solution to the Traflix problems.
IV. CONCLUSION

In TrafFix, the Supreme Court turned its back on the remarkable
common-law development of the functionality doctrine. The Court
rejected the general functionality standard in use by all the circuit courts,
and in its place adopted rules that have confused and divided the lower
federal courts. The functionality doctrine was not in need of major repair
when TrafFix was decided. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decided to
"fix" the doctrine anyway.594 It is now time to repair the damage wrought
by the TrafFix decision.
The repair will not be easy. It will require either another decision by
the Supreme Court or an amendment of the Lanham Act by Congress. The
former is quite possible, given the post-TrafFix divisions. But it is unlikely
the Supreme Court will revisit all the functionality issues anytime soon.
If the Court does hear another functionality case in the next few years, it
is likely that the case will be limited to a specific functionality issue.
Indeed, one of the most troublesome aspects of the TrafFix decision was
the scope of the Court's tinkering with the functionality doctrine. The
Court literally rewrote the entire law of functionality in TrafFix.
Congressional action may be more likely. The two leading intellectual
property organizations in the United States have formally criticized the
Tra]Fix decision and have called for its reversal.595 Given this level of
opposition to the TrafFix Court's analysis, it is possible Congress may

594. The old saying, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," comes to mind. Some may have believed
the functionality doctrine was broken before TrafFx, but that view fails to account for the
significant areas of agreement in the pre-TrajFixcourts. See supra Part I.C.
595. See supra note 33.
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take action to correct the TrajFix problems. If that happens, the
background and arguments presented above might provide a helpful
foundation for Congressional evaluation of the functionality doctrine. I
hope the arguments presented in this Article will spark a renewed
discussion of the functionality doctrine and will lead to reforms of the
current rules. Something must be done to correct the troubling problems
caused by the ill-advised holdings of the TrajFix Court.
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